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THE
RUSSIAN
REVIEW



An American Journal
Devoted to Russia
Past and Present

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Soviet Race and Nationality Policies

By WILLIAM HENRY CHAMBERLIN

THE race and nationality policies of such a powerful state as the Soviet Union are significant far beyond its frontiers. Molotov put forward the desire to apply Soviet experience as an argument for granting Russia a mandate for administering the Italian colony of Tripolitania. This argument apparently was not very effective in overcoming British strategic objections to this request.

But the experiences of the Soviet Union as a federal state of many nationalities, including a considerable number of Oriental origin, is certain to affect sentiment in other Asiatic countries. In many cases the peoples who dwell along the borders of the Soviet Union are racially akin to their neighbors in Iran, Afghanistan, and China. Apart from direct propaganda, news and impressions inevitably filter across frontiers.

During the period between the two wars the Soviet Union, partly by its own desire, partly because of the suspicions of its neighbors, was to a large degree isolated from the outside world. There were periods of intensive activity, as when Soviet military, political, and economic advisers helped the Chinese nationalist government in the Twenties. But in the main contact between Russia and other countries was very limited. From the end of the Russian civil war until the outbreak of the Second World War defensive isolationism was the dominant characteristic of Soviet foreign policy.

Russia has come out of this Second World War easily the strongest land power in Europe and in Asia. Its frontiers have been considerably extended, and its political influence reaches far beyond its geographical frontiers. This lends added importance to the international effect of its race and nationality policies.

The Soviet Union will be in the closest touch with China as a result of the Sino-Soviet administration of the Manchurian railway system and the Russian military interest in Port Arthur and commercial interest in Dairen. The Red Army is in military control of the northern part of Korea. Russia has put forward suggestions for a larger share in determining policy in occupied Japan.

Soviet territorial acquisitions in Europe include Latvia, Lithuania, Estonia, Eastern Poland, parts of Finland, Bessarabia, Northern Bukovina, the eastern section of Czechoslovakia. Soviet political influence is paramount in the large stretch of European territory which lies east of the line Stettin-Trieste.

Regardless of what ultimate Soviet aims may be, of how genuine is the dissolution of the Comintern, of whether there is a conscious policy of promoting Soviet interests abroad by intensive propaganda, it seems certain that the impact of Soviet political, economic, and social institutions and methods will be far stronger and wider during the next quarter of a century than it was during the past generation.

An example of how an internal Soviet constitutional change may excite speculation in all the capitals of the world was the decision early in 1944 to give the constituent republics of the Soviet Union control over foreign affairs and military affairs. One result of this decision was to lay the groundwork for the admission of the Ukrainian and White Russian Republics into the Assembly of the United Nations, with separate votes.

Speculation abroad about the significance of this change covered a wide area. Optimists saw in the move an indication that centralized control was yielding to decentralization, that the federative principle in the Soviet Union was receiving practical implementation. Pessimists were inclined to interpret the step as either a device to increase the voting power of the Soviet Union in future international organizations or a scheme to facilitate the absorption of new countries as "affiliated republics."

In connection with this last suggestion it is perhaps noteworthy that the word Russia was long ago eliminated from the official name of the country, which is now Union of Soviet Socialist Republics.

It is obviously important to understand what Soviet race and nationality policies are in theory, and how these are carried out in practice. The Soviet Union is a state of several races and of many nationalities. About 80 per cent of its population belongs to the Slav race, divided between the three principal stocks, Great Russians, Ukrainians, and White Russians. The second largest racial group is Turco-Tartar. In this category belong many of the peoples of the Volga, the Caucasus, and Central Asia, Tartars, Bashkirs, Kalmucks, natives of Azerbaijan, Uzbeks, Tajiks, Kirghiz, Kazakhs, to mention only some of the larger groups. The third distinct racial group is of Finno-Ugrian stock and includes Mordvians, Ostiaks, Voguls, Chuvashes, peoples who live in the forest lands north of the

Volga and are to be found as far east as the Urals. There are other ethnic groups, Jews, Armenians, Georgians, together with some primitive tribal peoples in Siberia and the Caucasus who do not belong to any of the main racial categories.

The culture of the Soviet Union is predominantly Russian. The Russian language is used in the sessions of the central legislative bodies, in the larger newspapers, in the principal theatres, in official diplomatic communications. But Russia is not a "melting pot" country like the United States, where English was the predominant language of the early settlers and where later immigrants, in the great majority, have been assimilated to an English-speaking pattern.

Language in Russia is closely associated with geography. Most of the peoples of the Soviet Union possess more or less defined historic frontiers, within which the majority of the people belong to a nationality group and speak the language of that group.

Racial equality is emphasized in Soviet political and social theory and is reflected in Soviet legislation, which makes incitation to racial hatred a crime. Such racial discrimination as existed in Tsarist legislation and administrative practice, notably in the so-called Pale of Settlement in which Jews, with the exception of certain categories, were required to reside, and in the artificial voting arrangements for the pre-war legislative assembly, the Duma, in which the scales were weighted against non-Russian minorities, were abolished by the Provisional Government which was set up after the overthrow of Tsarism in March, 1917.

It is a distinct asset in a country of many races that the Soviet leaders have never ceased to emphasize this ideal of racial equality and to give it practical recognition. The Presidents and Prime Ministers of the sixteen constituent Soviet Republics, for instance, are almost invariably chosen from the predominant local nationality. It may happen that a Russian from Moscow, as a result of some high Party commission, holds more power than the highest local official, but this situation is apt to be carefully disguised.

Recognition of racial equality is perhaps the most striking distinction between Communism and the rival form of totalitarianism represented by Nazi Germany and has been an obvious advantage to the Soviet Union in the mighty struggle between the two systems which ended with the complete military defeat and temporary political obliteration of Germany. The Soviet Union would never lose the services of a great general or a great scientist merely because he

happened to be a Jew, an Armenian, a Tartar, or a member of any other racial minority.

The Soviet racial attitude gives it an equally conspicuous advantage against any racist system in the international field. No one who was not a German or at least of Germanic origin could very well be an enthusiastic Nazi. Anyone, regardless of racial origin, could be converted to Communism. In this potential universalism, Communism suggests a point of comparison with the great religions, such as Christianity and Mohammedanism.

So far as legislation and the public statements of Stalin and other leaders are concerned, the Soviet Union has been pretty consistent in adhering to the theory of racial equality. This does not mean that all individual prejudice has been destroyed. But the industrial progress of the country, the shifting of great numbers of people, the movement of large numbers of peasants into the towns and cities have tended to throw members of the different national groups into closer contact with each other.

There have been a few instances when considerations of practical policy have led to abandonment of the theory of racial equality. One of these was the mass deportation of the inhabitants of the German Volga Republic to Central Asia during the first months of the war with Germany. There was apparently no attempt to sift out possible Nazi sympathizers from others. The entire population of some hundreds of thousands of people, descendants of German colonists who were brought into Russia in the eighteenth century, was uprooted, no doubt because of the fear of fifth column activity in the rear of the Red Army.

The Pan-Slav propaganda which has found expression in the publication in Moscow of the magazine, "Slavs," in the holding of a Pan-Slav congress in Soviet-occupied Sofia, and in the tone of some Soviet newspaper comment is at variance with Lenin's theory of complete racial equality, because it attributes to the Slav peoples certain peculiar virtues. The officially promoted revival of Russian nationalism, with its primary emphasis on Russian heroes of the past, carries a suggestion of disregarding the non-Russian nationalities of the Soviet Union.

However, there is no proof up to the present time that these peoples have been handicapped in celebrating their own national traditions, or that there has been a revival of the heavyhanded methods of Russification which excited much discontent against the Tsarist régime in non-Russian regions before the Revolution. A fair sum-

mary of the situation would seem to be that the principle of racial equality has been pretty consistently honored in Soviet theory and practice, but with some recent deviations as a result of military and political exigencies.

The theory of political self-determination, including the right of secession, for all the non-Russian nationalities of the former Russian Empire was repeatedly proclaimed by Lenin and is embodied in the present Soviet Constitution. The Communist belief in racial equality naturally excluded deliberate discrimination against individuals because of their nationality. Among the prominent figures in the Communist Party at the time of the Revolution one finds Jews, Letts, Poles, Armenians, Georgians, members of many non-Russian ethnic groups. Lenin himself was a Russian; but his most distinguished associate in the Revolution and Civil War, Leon Trotsky, was a Jew. Stalin is a Georgian.

There is little positive evidence that racial discrimination has been practiced in recruiting members for the ruling Communist Party and certainly no such discrimination has been officially countenanced. There have been occasional official rebukes of anti-Semitic tendencies in local Party branches and "Great Russian chauvinism" and "local nationalism" have been designated as the two opposite evils between which disciplined Party members must steer a middle course.

But the theoretical right of self-determination for the peoples of the Soviet Union is subject, in practice, to very severe limitations and is altogether subordinated to the two fundamental characteristics of the Soviet régime: the one-party monopoly of political power and the economic collectivism, with its strong element of centralization. The right of separation is granted to the constituent republics under the Constitution.

But this right is essentially meaningless because any group or organization which was even suspected of separatist tendencies would be promptly "liquidated" by the ever watchful Political Police. There was a very high rate of casualties, executions, suicides, and disappearances among non-Russian Communist political leaders, especially in the Ukraine, White Russia, Uzbekistan, and Georgia, during the sweeping purge of the Thirties. It is obviously not politically healthy even for a veteran and highly placed Communist to fall under the suspicion of disregarding the directions which are issued from the Party leadership in Moscow.

So long as the one-party dictatorship remains in the Soviet Union

such administrative changes as the vesting of control of military and foreign affairs in the individual republics are less important than they would be in federal states organized on a politically democratic basis. It may be assumed that anyone who would be appointed to such high office as Commissar for War or for Foreign Affairs in a constituent republic would be a Communist Party member. He would, consequently, be subject to the strict discipline of the Party and could be deposed and transferred at a moment's notice if he should fail to carry out policies desired by Moscow.

The Soviet system, with its over-all state economic planning, necessarily requires a high degree of economic centralization. There are no trade barriers between the Soviet republics and no individual republic would be able to carry out economic measures which were regarded as harmful to the interests of the Union as a whole, even if these measures might seem to promise some immediate direct benefit to the republic in question.

Soviet self-determination finds expression mainly in the field of cultural autonomy and in this field Soviet policy has unquestionably been progressive and enlightened. The country is organized in sixteen constituent republics,¹ with a multitude of autonomous republics, especially in the large Russian Republic, to care for the needs of other small nationalities, and autonomous districts, established for the benefit of comparatively primitive peoples or of the racial enclaves which sometimes exist when a smaller minority is to be found within the frontiers of a larger one.

The native language is used in schools, courts, and public business, and the development of native culture is encouraged in literature, the theatre, public festivals, and musical performances. As a general rule the higher officials in these nationality republics are drawn from the dominant nationality. The multi-national character of the Soviet Union also finds recognition in the second chamber of the Soviet Parliament, the Council of Nationalities, where each constituent republic, despite the great discrepancies in population, is represented by twenty-five delegates, with smaller representation for the minor autonomous units.

This policy of granting full cultural autonomy and placing ad-

¹These sixteen republics are the Russian, the Ukrainian, the White Russian, the Georgian, the Armenian, the Azerbaijan, the Kirghiz, the Kazakh, the Uzbek, the Tajik, the Turkmen, the Karelo-Finnish, the Moldavian, the Latvian, the Estonian, the Lithuanian. The last five were organized as a result of Soviet expansion after the outbreak of the Second World War.

ministration (within the strict limits of Communist rule, of course) in the hands of natives of the various national republics has tended to diminish friction and to create a sense of genuine solidarity among the peoples of the Soviet Union. Such a system, if it could be combined with the political, personal, and civil liberties which do not exist in the Soviet Union at the present time, might be usefully applied in many of the mixed nationality areas of Central and Eastern Europe. It can perhaps be set down to the account of the war and its passions that the Soviet government, instead of trying out such a policy in all the area under its military control, has supported the total expulsion of Germans from the regions allotted to Poland and of Sudeten-Germans from Czechoslovakia.

Russia on the Eve of World War I*

By ALEXANDER KERENSKY

THE brief period of Russian history from the revolution of 1905 to the war of 1914 was a time of great importance for Russia's internal development.

Foreign public opinion has a very imperfect idea of this period. It is generally believed that the attempt to "Europeanize" Russia by the establishment of a constitutional régime ended in complete failure. Due to the innate attachment of the Russian people to tyranny, so runs the argument, Tsarist absolutism easily triumphed over the liberal intelligentsia's "absurd dream." It is believed that after the revolutionary outburst of 1905-1906, the autocrat and his "boyars" became once more Russia's all-powerful masters. They resumed the exploitation of their "slaves," deprived of all civil rights. Serious historical studies devoted to Russia call this period "quasi-constitutional." When, after an exhausting war, totalitarian dictatorship was established in Russia, Western public opinion considered this régime of violence as a normal return of the old tyranny—a Red, instead of a White, tsarism.

The last short years before the war—the beginning of Russia's great catastrophe—were marked by a dynamic development of economic, cultural, and political forces.

Already at the time of the First Duma (in the spring of 1906), a bitter strife broke out in court and government circles between two tendencies. One group shared the sovereign's hatred of the constitution which had been granted in October of 1905, under the pressure of the revolutionary movement, and insisted on a return to absolutism. The "Union of the Russian People," an extreme reactionary organization, impersonated "the indignant population." From all parts of Russia, its members sent addresses demanding the suppression of the Duma and the abrogation of the October Manifesto.

The other group, whose representatives had not entirely lost the

*This is a chapter from Mr. Kerensky's projected book dealing with the main trends of Russia's historical development [Ed.].

sense of reality, declared that the return to absolutism would be sheer madness; the suppression of popular representation would incite even the most moderate and loyal elements to side with revolution. Moreover, Russia's international situation did not permit a reactionary course.

It was the second group that triumphed. Instead of suppressing popular representation and constitution, it was decided to modify the electoral law. The latter was to create in the Duma an efficient governmental majority formed by the gentry and the moderately progressive bourgeoisie. At the same time it was decided to proceed to a hasty land reform. A "Third Estate" of French or German pattern was to be created; this new class of well-to-do farmers was to replace the gentry, whose influence was on the wane. The reform was to be accompanied by drastic repressive measures against the revolutionary movement, though the latter was obviously declining.

On the eve of the summoning of the First Duma, P. A. Stolypin, Governor of Saratov, had been appointed Minister of the Interior. He was a "new man," almost unknown to St. Petersburg bureaucratic circles. Less than three months later, simultaneously with the dissolution of the First Duma (July 21, 1906), he was appointed Premier with the mission of applying the plan I have just described.

Stolypin's meteoric rise was a symptom of the times. This landowner of old provincial stock was not a courtier and had never filled high official functions in St. Petersburg. He had spent his life in the provinces and had many connections among the *Zemstvo*¹ leaders and social workers. He knew the *Zemstvo's* activity well and held it in high esteem. In Saratov, where I was elected in 1912 to the Fourth Duma, he was considered a "liberal" governor.

Stolypin was a man of strong will and an eloquent speaker, well fitted for a big political career. He did not care to govern Russia in the dull silence of bureaucratic offices. He did not look upon the Duma as a silly, useless "cackle-shop," as his predecessor, the soulless bureaucrat Goremykin, had called it. On the contrary, Stolypin was attracted by the rôle of a constitutional premier, making speeches in Parliament, waging an oratorical battle with the opposition, and leading his own majority. The St. Petersburg officials lacked a fighting temperament. Stolypin had plenty of it. This was to decide his future.

The Tsar liked the new Premier, because he was young, fearless,

¹Local self-government institutions in imperial Russia.

devoted to the throne, and firmly decided to apply the program of state reform. The leaders of the Council of United Gentry saw in him a man of their own; he was to save the country gentry from decimation. The Octobrists and the other moderate conservative constitutionalists, scared by the revolution, clung to him as to an anchor of salvation. His program—the union of the government and of the conservative forces for the consolidation of the constitutional monarchy and the final liquidation of unrest—was their own program. They hailed him as the Russian Thiers who would create a strong bourgeoisie, like the French statesman who, after the Commune, consolidated for many years the bourgeois Third Republic. But Thiers was backed by the strong French peasantry, profoundly imbued with the instinct of private property. In Russia, such a peasant class was still to be created. And many scores of years were required for its formation.

I was a confirmed adversary of Stolypin and of the social circles which supported him. I believed, as did all the Russian opposition, that Stolypin's tactical slogan: "first the pacification of the country, then reforms," was dangerous for Russia's future. Even Count Benckendorff, Russian Ambassador to London, warned St. Petersburg that only reforms, accomplished in time, could bring pacification.

But whatever the errors, and even the crimes, committed by the Stolypin government, the fact remains: it did not aim at the restoration of absolutism and the suppression of popular representation. It sought the establishment of a conservative, bourgeois-aristocratic, constitutional monarchy.

Stolypin's tragedy consisted in the fact that he felt obliged to fight not only socialism but also democratic liberalism. What was far more unfortunate for the fate of his program was that Russia lacked the social basis for the creation of a bourgeois constitutional régime of European pattern. For, as we have seen, there was no politically strong "Third Estate" in the country which could have served as an intermediary between the upper classes and the labor classes. This "Third Estate" was still in the making.

True, following the rapid development of towns and industry, the urban bourgeoisie acquired a certain influence in social and political life. But there was no such class in the villages. The First Duma elections proved already that the peasants, who mostly represented labor economy and not capitalist economy, could not play the part of a conservative class.

As to the non-peasant landownership, it was obviously declining. Economically it was so much weakened, that its participation in production did not even attain ten per cent. The government and the leading conservative circles had accepted the fact of the gradual liquidation of the gentry landownership. They only sought to preserve certain of its more vital elements, by offering them the support of a strong peasant group of well-to-do farmers.

It must be recalled that a large part of Russian peasantry was submitted to the régime of communal landownership (the *obschina* or the *mir* system). This system was hailed first by the Slavophiles, and later by the Populists. Both groups believed that the Russian peasants' feebly developed instinct of private property would protect Russia against the inroads of Western capitalism, and that the Russian people could adopt more easily the more perfect and more equitable forms of public economy. The Populists demanded the "nationalization" or "socialization" of land. They were convinced that the peasant would easily pass from the communal to the collective agricultural régime.

Actually the peasant commune, such as it existed in Russia, had very little in common with the ideal commune of the Slavophiles or the Populists. For the administration, it was simply a convenient police apparatus, permitting it to "keep the peasants under tutelage and to treat them like children," in Witte's words. Until 1903, when the principle of joint liability finally was abolished, it was especially a convenient institution for tax-collecting as the arrears due by a member of the commune had to be paid by all the other members. Thus, the *obschina* in the hands of the administration was corrupted and turned into a source of economic regression. And the peasants themselves were irritated by the fact, that, according to the existing system, they were compelled to remain in the commune whether they liked it or not.

After the agrarian disorders of 1905-6, many people realized that the compulsory police commune must be suppressed. As to the future of the liberated communes, this had to be left to the peasants' own decision. In accordance with their wishes, the communal lands would have to be partly split into privately-owned holdings, and partly turned into agricultural cooperatives. This was the underlying principle of the agrarian bill of the First Duma which provided for a partial expropriation of private lands with due compensation to the owners. The land of some private estates was to be distributed among the peasants, who then would determine themselves the fate

of the communal régime. This plan offered a healthy, democratic solution of Russia's fundamental, political and economic problem. Had it been realized, the social differentiation of the rural population would have proceeded in a free and natural way. Doubtless, a "bourgeois minority" would have been formed among the peasant masses, and it would have created in Russia a farm economy of the West European or the American type. In Siberia and the Ukraine, this minority even could have been turned into a majority. But the government refused to accept the bill, and it was on this issue that the First Duma was dissolved.

After the dissolution of the First Duma, the land reform was taken in hand by Stolypin. On November 22, 1906, three months before the opening of the Second Duma, the new agrarian law was promulgated according to section 87 of the Fundamental Laws, which granted the Emperor the power to publish decrees in the interim between the sessions of the Duma, later to be ratified, however, by the legislative assemblies (*i.e.* the Duma and the State Council).

Stolypin's land reform proved that he had a fighting temperament, but no political wisdom. In his hands, the land reform, based on healthy principles, became a weapon of political and class struggle. Instead of suppressing the compulsory character of the commune, in the interests of free peasant economy, Stolypin abrogated the commune in the interests of the peasant "bourgeois" elements. The reform was applied with great energy; it brutally violated the elementary principles of justice and law. The government backed the strong against the weak. It encouraged the well-to-do peasants to separate themselves from the commune against the majority's will. These well-to-do peasants received the best portions of the land of the commune, infringing upon the latter's rights. Moreover, they were granted loans equaling 90 per cent of the value of the land received.

During a period of some five years,² the peasant agrarian régime in Russia was submitted to a drastic transformation. And what were the results? Stolypin was very proud of his rôle of a land reformer. He even invited foreign specialists to survey his government's work. Speaking in the Fourth Duma, and severely criticizing the social and political consequences of the reform, I quoted the German scholar, Professor Aufhagen. Having visited the Russian country-side, on

²The Stolypin agrarian law was not given a definitive form and put into operation until 1911. Shortly after the outbreak of the war, the new land settlement had to be suspended. [Ed.]

the government's special invitation, Professor Aufhagen subsequently wrote that "Stolypin's reform had thrown the torch of civil war in the Russian villages." And P. Milyukov recalls the words of another foreign observer, Professor Preyer, who was favorable to Stolypin's plans. Returning from his survey of Russian rural life, he correctly stated that "the aim of the reform had not been achieved."

Indeed, by January 1915, in spite of all the persuasion and all the privileges granted, only 2,729,000 peasants demanded the conversion of their plots of land into private property (about 33 per cent of all the households in the communes). The rural population showed coldness and even hostility towards this reform for two reasons. First, they condemned the methods. The average peasant did not want to go against the commune. The "backing of the strong" idea was something against which he naturally revolted. He did not want to become a "half landlord" at the cost of his neighbors. Secondly, the conditions of freedom granted by the October Manifesto opened to the rural population a new path of economic progress which was in tune with his aspirations. This path was cooperation, encouraged both by the *Zemstvo* and the leftist intelligentsia. The Slavophiles and Populists were partly right: the social spirit of the average Russian peasant was not a mere fancy. Stolypin's reform was a failure because it went against the peasants' will.

Stolypin had pledged himself to suppress the revolutionary movement and to pacify Russia. But here again, as in his agrarian policy, he showed a fighting spirit, but a lack of political wisdom.

Russia was truly ready for pacification. The revolutionary movement was dying out of itself. For the October Manifesto had opened the way to freedom, to a creative social and political work. The so-called "excesses of the revolution"—"expropriations" (looting of banks "for the needs of the revolution"), murder of subaltern officials, etc.—awakened first perplexity and then irritation on the part of the population at large, which frankly condemned them. Stolypin could have taken advantage of this mood and "finished off" the revolution, by restoring true peaceful conditions. Instead, he "finished off" the already disarmed revolutionaries. The defense of the state against unbridled popular instincts very soon became the revenge of a victorious class. Stolypin believed that the very firmness of his "pacifying policy" would gain the population's support. But he obtained the opposite results. The sterner his attitude, the louder grew the people's protest.

The first two or three years following the dissolution of the First

Duma had been called the age of "White Terror." Today, this definition may sound strange indeed. After the experiment of totalitarian dictatorship in Russia and Western Europe, it is as absurd to call Stolypin a terrorist ruler as to compare the art of an amateur singer to the genius of a Shalyapin. Suffice it to say that following the unsuccessful assault on Lenin, the number of hostages shot in one day (5000) was far greater than that of the persons (1144)³ executed by Stolypin's courts-martial during the whole period of their existence. In those days, ruthless repression was directed against a very small part of the population, that which actively struggled against the government. Today, the entire population lives in a perpetual state of fear and trembling. Moreover, after each act of governmental terror, the most prominent representatives of literature, science and art, are compelled to send enthusiastic congratulations to the totalitarian leaders. In Stolypin's days, nobody, except the "Black Hundred," dared to openly express their sympathies with governmental executions. And all cultured society, headed by Leo Tolstoy, voiced its indignation after each new execution. Russian society protested, not because it sided with revolutionary terror which had degenerated into absurd excesses, but because it was inspired by one of the deepest traditions of Russian spiritual culture—repulsion for capital punishment. Russia, let it be remembered, was the only country in the world where capital punishment was not applied to ordinary criminal offenders. And Russia did not want the government to adopt the ways of vengeance, bloodshed, and violence in its struggle against political opponents. This is why, after Stolypin had created his courts-martial, Leo Tolstoy wrote his sensational appeal to the government, beginning with the words: "I cannot be silent . . ."

This is why, one of our most brilliant orators of the Duma, the moderate liberal, Rodichev, publicly branded the minister, by calling the gallows' noose "Stolypin's neck-tie." After the fall of the monarchy in 1917, the government of the democratic revolution immediately abrogated capital punishment for all offences. This measure, fulfilling one of the most sacred pledges of the emancipation movement, awakened general enthusiasm. Russia's spiritual atmosphere before 1914 condemned Stolypin's "pacifying" policy to certain failure, as well as his land reform.

Stolypin's own end was tragic. In 1911, during a gala performance

³Some Soviet sources estimate the number of executed by Stolypin courts-martial as over two thousand [Ed.].

at the Kiev theater, Stolypin was attacked as he sat a few feet away from the box occupied by the Tsar and his daughters. The minister was mortally wounded by a revolver shot of a former anarchist and secret police agent, a man called Bagrov. At that time, the Tsar could no longer endure his favorite of yesterday. The special investigation ascertained that, during his stay in Kiev, Stolypin was not guarded by the police, as was usually the case. Kurlov, the undersecretary of the Minister of the Interior who directed the police, was to be put to trial. But the Emperor personally stopped the investigation. There was a mystery about the minister's death. The assassin was executed without delay and held incommunicado until his death. People well informed of the secret conflict between the premier and Rasputin believed that the police had permitted the assassin to strike, in order to please the minister's powerful opponents. Stolypin himself once said to A. I. Guchkov: "I have the feeling that I shall be murdered by the police."

Thus, Russia's all-powerful "pacificator" was powerless to chain the "dark forces" supported by the young Empress. Stolypin was too honest, independent, and progressive a man to please Rasputin. But the Premier had also lost the sympathies of the Octobrists. The latter were the leading party of the Third Duma, created by Stolypin's own conservative electoral law of June 16, 1907. Sir Bernard Pares, the prominent English author who is an authority on Russia, has stated quite correctly that, given the spirit then existing in Russia, even a Duma exclusively composed of former ministers would have been in opposition to the government. But the Third Duma did not consist only of "former ministers." Of course, it was neither a leftist nor a democratic body. The new electoral law had reduced to a bare minimum the participation of peasants, workers, and of the urban democracy. In the provinces, the elections were actually in the hands of the declining gentry. And the almost general suffrage previously existing in the cities was revoked. The number of deputies was reduced, and half of the seats were given over to an insignificant minority of bourgeois capitalists, by means of an ingenious "curial" system. The representation of non-Russian nationalities likewise was drastically curtailed. Poland, for instance, was given 18 seats in the Third (and Fourth) Duma, instead of the previous 53.

Popular representation, chosen according to Stolypin's electoral law, was rightly called "Russia's crooked mirror." The leftist and socialist parties, which played the leading rôle in the first two Dumas, nearly disappeared from the Third Duma (1907-1911).

Only 13 peasants of the so-called Labor Group retained their seats, and there were only 20 Social-Democrats. The Social-Revolutionary party resumed its earlier boycott tactics. The party of liberal intelligentsia (the Cadets), which formerly led the floor, now became the party of "His Majesty's opposition," with 56 deputies. The reactionaries were much in evidence. The extreme rightists and the instigators of pogroms had no organic link with the nation (when monarchy was overthrown, they faded away in twenty-four hours); but they were subsidized by the champions of absolutism and the Police Department. Fifty seats were held by the so-called "popular representatives" of these chauvinist groups. The reactionary deputies, led by some gifted demagogues, undermined the Duma from within, continually provoking violent incidents. Next to them sat 96 members of the newly formed Nationalist party. They represented mostly the Western and South-Western regions where a centuries-old struggle was waged between the Russian, Polish, Lithuanian, and Jewish population. The entire space between the Cadets and the right wing was filled by 154 Octobrists whose number had been insignificant in the First Duma; now they formed over one-third of the elected body.

I have stressed the composition of the Third Duma, for it was about the same as that of the Fourth Duma, of 1912-1917. And yet, the Fourth Duma played an important part in the people's struggle against the last monarch and his entourage. The Third Duma, in spite of its conservative majority and its influential reactionary wing, was also active. Indeed, it proved to be a no less zealous champion of the constitutional régime than the First Duma. The difference was only in methods and temperament.

The First Duma reflected the soul of popular Russia. It was the Duma of "the people's wrath." It uncovered all the dark sides of the old régime. It was irreconcilable and would tolerate no compromise. It demanded the capitulation of supreme authority: the transfer of the plenitude of power into the people's hands. Its fundamental aspiration was expressed by V. D. Nabokov, the son of the Minister of Justice under Alexander II and Alexander III: "Let the executive power submit to the legislative." But the First Duma bestowed no laws on the country, because it was dissolved before it had been able to begin its organic parliamentary work. The Second Duma was considerably more to the left than the First Duma, and it was dissolved after less than three months (in April 1907).

The Third Duma began its existence without glamor. Its majority aimed at a compromise: loyal collaboration with the government on the basis of the October Manifesto. The latter, which inspired the leading Octobrist Party's program, granted popular representation legislative powers, the right to examine the budget and the right of interpellation.⁴ Having modified by a *coup d'état* the original electoral law, the government solemnly proclaimed the Duma's immutability. And the Octobrists were firmly decided to take advantage of their parliamentary rights; they wanted to consolidate popular representation and to transform the Duma into a decisive factor in Russia's political system.

But neither the Tsar and his entourage nor the democratic public opinion understood these tactics. At first, after the stormy days of the first two Dumas, the Tsar was well pleased with the newly elected house. He believed that it was composed of men informed of local affairs and local needs; men whose advice would help the ministers to prepare good laws while not interfering with the sovereign's prerogatives. The loyal attitude of the Third Duma was interpreted in the same way by the public opinion. It was hostile to the Duma's conservative majority and called its leaders "the servants of reaction."

In reality, the Duma's leaders were not reactionaries. The Octobrist Party was formed by the members of the middle and upper classes of the Russian society. It comprised *Zemstvo* and gentry elements, as well as industrialists and merchants, representatives of liberal professions and of St. Petersburg and provincial bureaucracy. There were few theorists among them, but many men possessing practical experience gained in the administrative, municipal, or *Zemstvo* work. And this experience led them to the firm conviction that Russia had come of age and needed bureaucratic tutelage no longer. The Russo-Japanese war had definitely proved that bureaucracy was unable to cope with the needs of a growing empire.

N. A. Khomyakov, the President of the Third Duma, was a former high official and a wealthy landowner who belonged to ancient aristocratic stock. He was the son of Alexis Khomyakov, one of the founders of Slavophilism. As to A. I. Guchkov, the creator of the Octobrist Party, he belonged to quite a different milieu. He was the grandson of a serf and belonged to the Moscow merchant intelligentsia. He was proud of his origin, despised social privilege,

⁴I.e., the right of the Duma to demand explanation from the ministers.

and did not trust bureaucracy. In spite of these differences, Khomyakov and Guchkov were members of the same party. Both believed that the consolidation of the constitutional régime was to be the fundamental aim of their activity. Both were aware that without popular representation and a deep reconstruction of the Russian political system, their country was threatened by a catastrophe which the first exterior conflict would bring about.

Europe was on the brink of a volcano. The question was not *whether* a general European war would break out, but *when* it would break out. The experience of Port Arthur and Tsuchima had opened the eyes of all Russian patriots. . . . And the entire process (which lasted seven-eight years) of turning a loyal conservative majority into opposition and finally into a revolutionary body, took place under the pressure of patriotic anxiety, which soon became patriotic indignation.

I knew Guchkov well. In 1917, we were for a time together in the Provisional Government. Later we often met abroad, in exile. He assured me that the Octobrist leaders did all they could to hasten the consolidation of Russia's internal situation and to prepare her for the inevitable international conflict. Germany's industrial development followed a dynamic rhythm; she was feverishly building her fleet; her army's technical power grew from day to day. All those who were better informed of the international situation than the man in the street clearly understood the danger: Russia's temporary weakness caused by the Japanese war and revolutionary chaos was considered by Germany as a trump card in her struggle for hegemony.

Guchkov, Khomyakov, and the other Octobrist leaders were aware of another danger: the abnormal, neurotic atmosphere which surrounded the Tsar. They knew that they could not trust the sovereign's feeble will. Therefore, they refused all of Stolypin's tempting offers to enter the cabinet. They preferred to control the government's activity, thanks to the Duma's right to examine the budget; to back the cabinet in its struggle against Rasputin, and to consolidate Russia's economic and military power through organic legislation.

The Tsar's idyll with the Third Duma did not last long. According to the fundamental laws of the Russian Empire, the army and navy remained under the emperor's direct control. Formally, the Duma could not interfere with the corresponding ministries and with their activity. But the budgets of these departments were

examined by a Duma committee. As in all parliaments, the Budget Committee became the leading and most influential organ of the house. All ministers treated it with due consideration. Before the budgets of separate ministries were examined by the committee, they were carefully studied by special sub-committees. Thus the Ministry of War and Ministry of the Navy were actually controlled by the Duma. After the Russo-Japanese war, the fleet was to be reconstructed, increased, and rearmed, according to modern technical demands, and many urgent reforms were needed in the army. But the army and navy lacked efficient direction. Higher military and naval boards were continually constructed and reconstructed. A number of highly important administrative posts were entrusted to entirely irresponsible grand dukes, who pursued their own personal or political aims, taking no one into account. Both in the army and navy, energetic military technicians feverishly drafted the necessary reforms, but they had not the power to apply them.

A. Guchkov was made chairman of the Duma Defense Committee. He was in touch with the boldest champions of reorganization in the War and Navy Ministries. Thus the Duma⁵ became the leading center in the reconstruction of national defense. It played a prominent rôle in Russia's preparation for the war of 1914. This was due both to the work it directly accomplished and to the fact that the healthy forces of the army and navy felt its support. And popular representatives knew that they were backed by the leaders of the armed forces. In the spring of 1908, when the budget of the War Ministry was examined by the Duma, Guchkov made a speech demanding that the grand dukes should consent to a "patriotic sacrifice": they were to give up their prominent rôle in the military administration. This statement was made with the full consent of the army and navy leaders; the interference on the part of completely irresponsible persons gravely hindered their work. The speech stirred the indignation of court circles. To Empress Alexandra, Guchkov's activity was an assault against the prerogatives of supreme power. Guchkov was nick-named the "Young Turk" by his reactionary opponents and became their enemy No. 1.

The Empress rightly considered the leader of conservative constitutionalism as the most dangerous adversary of her own political plan: the reestablishment of unlimited absolutism. "Octobrist" and all the moderate groups following in its wake formed but the

⁵This applies both to the Third and the Fourth Dumas.

rear-guard of democratic forces. But it was the vanguard of the more enlightened members of the higher military, bureaucratic, and court circles. It waged a progressive battle against reaction, and it led the way, against its own will, towards the revival of a widespread democratic movement. The Octobrists did not desire Russia's further democratization. But they sought to place her at a political, cultural, and economic level which befitted a great power. They were encouraged by the moderate opposition and by the more cultured elements of higher administration. This is why the Third Duma, and the Fourth Duma which succeeded it, in spite of their "counter-revolutionary" origins, played a progressive rôle in Russian history. Some of their laws, and the very fact of their existence, hastened Russia's remarkable development, which marked the last years preceding the war.

First of all, public education rapidly improved. When war broke out, Russia was on the eve of achieving general compulsory education. The absurd and criminal opposition to public education pursued by reactionary ministers at the end of the nineteenth century ceased in the early twentieth century. At the time of the First Duma, the Minister of Public Education Kaufman-Turkestansky (the son of the famous organizer of Russian Turkestan), prepared a bill providing for a system of general education which eventually was accepted by the Third Duma. The State Council,⁶ however, rejected the bill and returned it to the Duma for further examination. It was finally passed, in a modified form, by the Fourth Duma, with full support of the new Minister of Public Education, Count Ignatiev, who was firmly convinced that conditions in Russia made general education both necessary and possible. Had it not been for the war, this system would have been completely established by 1922.

In 1929, Yale University Press published for the Carnegie Endowment a book entitled *Russian Schools and Universities in the World War*. It was written by two prominent authorities on Russian education, Professors P. Novgorodzev and D. Odinetz, with a preface by the former minister, Count Ignatiev. This excellent work should put a stop to the absurd legend concerning Russia's "complete illiteracy" in pre-revolutionary times. It has been stated, for instance, that there were only "ten per cent of literates in Russia," and that the ruling class tried to close the access to public education to chil-

⁶The State Council played the rôle of the upper chamber. Half of its members were elected by certain public bodies while the other half were appointed by the Emperor.

dren of peasants and workers. As a matter of fact, even before the constitutional period, the *Zemstvos* were spending 25 per cent of their budget on popular schools. During the Duma period they were spending one third of their budget for this purpose. In the space of ten years (1900-1910), government subsidies to the *Zemstvo* schools increased twelve times. At the beginning of the present century, there were 76 thousand primary schools in Russia with 4 million pupils. In 1915, there were over 122 thousand schools with 8 million pupils. The school term was lengthened and the program enlarged, in order to give the more gifted peasant children the possibility to pass directly from primary to secondary school. Primary schools did not only teach children; they also became centers for the instruction of adult peasants. They organized libraries, lectures, Sunday and evening classes, and theatrical performances for adults. Special courses for teachers were started by the *Zemstvo* and cooperatives. Every year cheap excursions abroad were organized for teachers; before the war, thousands of them visited Italy, France, Germany, and other Western countries. To quote the authors of the work just mentioned: "The conclusion to be drawn from the general state of primary and secondary education in Russia in the years preceding the war is that throughout the history of Russian civilization never was the spread of education so rapid as during the period in question."

At the same time, the *Zemstvo* and the cooperatives attained remarkable results in the field of agricultural technique. From 1906 to 1913, the surface of cultivated land increased by 16 per cent and crop production by 41 per cent. The budget of the *Zemstvo's* agronomical aid to peasants increased six times. The government also made large expenditures on agronomical aid. With the *Zemstvo*, the government encouraged mechanized peasant agriculture. The governmental Peasant Land Bank bought millions of acres of land from the gentry and resold them to the peasants. Loan cooperatives and the *Zemstvo* furnished the live-stock and the implements. By 1914 over 75 per cent of lands suitable for agriculture in European Russia were held by the peasants. During the brief years of Russia's economic prosperity before the war, the agricultural export increased one and a half times. And the rôle of peasant economy on the domestic and foreign markets was predominant. Three quarters of grain and hemp, nearly all the butter and eggs, vegetables and meat, were furnished by the peasants and peasant cooperatives.

Simultaneously with the transfer of land into peasant hands and

the dynamic growth of peasant economy, a large-scale colonization movement—from European Russia into the Asiatic parts of the Empire—was started during that period. It was sponsored by the government, the *Zemstvo* and the cooperatives. Siberia achieved a typically “American” rate of development. Between the Russo-Japanese war and the First World War, its population doubled. The surface of cultivated land nearly trebled. Agricultural production increased more than three times. By 1914, most of the market of Russian butter exported to England was held by Siberian peasant cooperatives. In 1899, the export of butter was non-existent in Siberia. In 1915, the cooperatives exported 100,000 tons of butter.

Thanks to the constitutional régime, the cooperative movement attained its full development. And it was precisely in cooperation that the Russian people, and especially the Russian peasants, revealed their democratic spirit and their talent for organization. By 1914, nearly half of the peasant households in Russia joined the cooperative movement. In his book *Russia under Soviet Rule*, N. A. Basily gives an exhaustive outline of Russia’s development at that time. He quotes extremely significant figures concerning peasant loan cooperatives. In 1905, they had 729,000 members; in 1916, 10,500,000 members. In 1905, their total investments amounted to 37½ million gold rubles; in 1916, to 682½ millions. The urban cooperative movement grew in the same proportion. The federation of consumers’ cooperatives, headed by the Moscow Central Union, became one of the most influential economic, and even political, forces in Russia. It organized wide strata of the population, consolidated the basis of their material welfare, and pursued cultural work. The cooperative leaders, mostly belonging to the leftist parties, fortified the healthy, creative, democratic aspirations of the labor masses. The growth of the cooperatives was encouraged by the increase of the general welfare of the working class. This development was revealed by the purchase of consumer’s goods (sugar, butter, kerosene, shoes, clothes, etc.). It was clearly illustrated by the increase of public savings. According to the Soviet economist, Professor Liashchenko, the deposits in state savings institutions amounted in 1906 to 831.2 million gold rubles; and on July 1, 1914, to 1704.2 millions.

My readers may find these figures dull, but I want to show the achievements of Russian public economy on the eve of the great catastrophe which befell Russia, and which was ushered in by the war of 1914. I wish it to be understood that during the brief period

of the "five year plan" of *political freedom*, immense economic results could be achieved. This could be done without returning the population to slavery, without depriving it of all political rights, and condemning the country to famine and misery unheard of in the history of cultured nations.

According to the calculations of one of the most prominent authorities on Russia's economic development, Professor Prokopovich, during the constitutional period, Russia's public income (in spite of the depression caused by the Russo-Japanese war) increased 79.4 per cent in fifty governments of European Russia. The total turnover of foreign trade, as quoted by N. A. Basily, amounted in 1906 to 1896 million gold rubles; in 1913, it was equal to 2913 millions. The length of the railroad system in 1905 was 52.5 thousand versts; in 1915, 64.5 thousand versts. The building of the famous "Turksib"⁷ was started at that time. The railroad revenue in 1908 equaled 169 million gold rubles; in 1912, 449 millions. Professor Liashchenko states that the number of spindles in cotton mills in 1900 was 6646 thousands, and in 1913, 9200 thousands. In two years, 1910-1912, machine building increased by one third: from 101.9 million gold rubles to 136.6 millions.

I shall add to these few data the following conclusions drawn by Soviet party economists concerning the economic achievements of Russia during the constitutional period. I am quoting from the *Outlines of the History of the October Revolution*, published in Moscow by the *Istpart*:

Russia was rapidly moving ahead along the capitalist lines of development, overtaking the older capitalist countries. . . . The gross output of industry increased by 44.9 per cent between the years 1900 and 1905, and by 1913 it had increased by 219 per cent. Individual industries showed even greater increase. Technically, industry as a whole was greatly extended and modernized. A very incomplete summary gives a total of 537.3 million gold rubles as the investment in industrial equipment for the year 1910-12. During this flourishing period the increase in the capital stock of our industry was three times as rapid as that of America. As regards the concentration of our industry, Russia became one of the foremost countries in the world: the concentration of its industry was greater than that of America, for instance.

The last point is of paramount importance. The excessive concentration of Russian industry had two far-reaching consequences. On the one hand, the presence in big urban centers of large masses of

⁷A railroad connecting Turkestan with Siberia. It was completed after the Revolution.

workers created extremely favorable conditions for their organization. On the other hand, the growth of concentrated industry strengthened not so much the middle classes as the forces of banking capital. Thus, in both rural districts and urban centers, Russia's economic development did not modify sufficiently her social structure to create a new solid foundation for a capitalist society.

Many public leaders of the period were of the opinion that, in the process of her political and economic growth, Russia was to follow the path of Western capitalism. They believed that the war broke off this evolution determined by economic laws. As for myself, I did not think so at the time, and still do not think so. My personal experience persuaded me that the "peculiar way" of Russia's political and social life was not an utopia imagined by the Slavophiles and the Populists, but an historical fact.

From the fall of 1906 and up to the Revolution of 1917, I frequently visited all parts of Russia, first as a "political defender,"⁸ and later as a member of the Duma.

After the 1905 revolution, numerous trials started throughout Russia: in the two capitals, in the center and in the border-lands, in civil and military courts. People were tried for anti-governmental speeches delivered at public meetings, for "subversive" articles and proclamations. Sometimes several persons at a time, or even scores of persons were put on trial: party or revolutionary committees, organizers of local uprisings, deputies of the dissolved Dumas, military organizations, unions of railroad employees, teachers, workers and peasants, organizers of political "expropriations," leaders of strikes and peasant rebellions. In a word, Russian life, with all its aspirations, hopes, and intimate moods was reproduced in the courtroom as in a film. But while this film went on, Russia's real life continued. In every town, I talked not only to the accused and their relatives, to judges, prosecutors, local officials, but also to the representatives of the local intelligentsia, political leaders, and cultural workers. All of them did their best to explain "local conditions" to the attorney from St. Petersburg. In those days, political defenders enjoyed special consideration. There were no secrets from them. They could, if they liked, see things exactly as they were. In the courtroom, the defender was not, as in totalitarian countries, a governmental official, struggling not so much against the government, as

⁸In pre-revolutionary Russia, this name was given those lawyers who, as an act of civic duty, offered their services free of charge to the defendants in political trials [Ed.].

against the accused. In the darkest days of reaction, facing the most cynical judges (though it must be said that they were a minority), we could still be the independent defenders of right. No one dared to interfere with us. And no one was afraid to testify in behalf of the accused, the political enemies of the régime, or against the agents of the secret police.

When I described all this to a Soviet citizen of the younger generation, he listened to my story as to a fairy-tale. And yet, there were cases, which would appear even more fantastic to the subjects of a totalitarian state.

I witnessed such a case in the Lena Gold-Fields. In this God-forsaken region of Siberia, workers in those days suffered great hardships. In 1912, a strike broke out. The workers, with their women and children, marched towards the management's office. The local gendarme chief ordered the shooting of the strikers. There were many killed and wounded. This savage act of repression awakened general indignation throughout the country. The Minister of Justice, Makarov, poured fat on the fire by declaring: "So it always has been, and so it will be." These cynical words led to a new outburst of indignation. A campaign of protest was launched, and, for the first time since 1905, the workers organized political strikes. In order to pacify public opinion, the government sent Senator Manukhin,⁹ who enjoyed general respect, to investigate the Lena shooting. At the same time, the Duma opposition decided to conduct its own investigation.

I was entrusted with this mission, though at the time I was not a member of the Duma and did not enjoy parliamentary immunity. I left for the Lena region with two other political defenders. We were not at all sure that the administration would allow us to visit the gold-fields. But when we reached Irkutsk, both the Governor-General of Eastern Siberia and the Governor of the Irkutsk province, helped us in every possible way. Neither did Senator Manukhin hinder our work. Both committees began their investigation simultaneously. We questioned the victims, summoned witnesses, inspected the locality, wrote our reports. When in the fall of 1912, I was elected deputy from Saratov, I disclosed the results of our investigation in the Duma. My conclusions almost fully coincided with those of the government committee. Thanks to our combined

⁹In imperial Russia, a senator was a member of the highest judicial body in the country.

efforts, the guilt of the Lena administration was clearly established.

Can we imagine anything of the kind happening in totalitarian Russia or Germany? Of course not! And why? Because in those days, the Russian government recognized the civil rights, and after the October Manifesto, the political rights of the population. There were many arbitrary acts, but those who committed them knew that they were *violating law*. And the people *understood their rights perfectly and struggled to defend them*. It was possible to *struggle for right* and against the officials who violated it. This is entirely impossible in totalitarian countries.

The normal life of every state is founded on the gentlemanly instinct of "fair-play." Both the government and the people must obey the "rules of the game." When the government, invested with the plenitude of power, abrogates these rules on its own behalf, authority is transformed into organized violence. As to the people, they must choose between two alternatives: to blindly obey arbitrary power, or else to struggle against it using the most extreme methods.

When I was elected to the Duma, the field of my observations widened. I could observe in action the entire mechanism of the imperial government. I grasped all the tragic intricacy of the relations existing between the government and the Tsar's palace. The spirit of Russian ruling circles was revealed to me.

I clearly realized two facts. First, I did not so much see, as feel that a new conflict between the sovereign and the country was inevitable, because of the Tsar's personality and the tragic conditions prevailing in the palace. Second, I realized that following this conflict, power would not remain in the hands of conservative and liberal circles, which backed the Duma majority.

This latter conclusion was due to my direct knowledge of the real correlation of forces in Russia. This correlation of forces could not manifest itself in the Duma, because of Stolypin's electoral law. The members of the liberal opposition were not aware of the inevitable issue: due to Russia's social structure and to her spiritual traditions, *universal suffrage* (like that, for instance, in Western Europe or in America) *would fail to consolidate the old edifice*. Russia was the only great power where universal suffrage would thoroughly democratize the nation without "armed rebellion" or "social revolution."

And this democratization would not only be political, but also social. An overwhelming majority of peasants among the population; a country gentry which was dying out; a rapidly increasing

industrial proletariat concentrated in the cities; feebly developed middle classes; an immense bureaucratic army, mostly formed of cultured elements belonging to the lower classes not interested in the preservation of capitalism; and an intelligentsia, historically educated in the tradition of Russian spiritual culture, in the non-class principles of social justice and the inviolability of human person,—all this predetermined the issue of the struggle, waged between the palace and the “bourgeois” majority of the Duma.

Having learned in the Third Duma the methods of struggle in behalf of popular representation, the Octobrist Party became in 1912, in the Fourth Duma, a party of opposition.

Before the opening of the newly elected body's session, Guchkov launched his slogan: “*Against* the participation of irresponsible men in state affairs. *For* a government responsible to the nation's representatives.”

Thus, in the fall of 1912, Guchkov repeated the demands, which P. Milyukov and the Cadets expressed in 1906, at the time of the First Duma. A new critical hour of Russian history was drawing near, and the rapprochement of two previously irreconcilable political enemies—the Cadets and the Octobrists—was inevitable.

The salvation of the monarchy, as symbol of the Empire, through the transfer of the plenitude of power into the hands of a government enjoying the confidence of popular representation, was the aim of both these parties. But such an aim could no longer be realized. All the delays granted by history had expired.

Today, this is obvious to everybody. But to certain Russian political leaders of liberal and socialist circles, the fact was already apparent in those days, because of the considerations stated above.

At least five years before the fall of the monarchy, some of us began preparing for the inevitable.

The main points of the program of the future republican government were settled, and the work of organizing the leading democratic forces throughout Russia was begun. A federal democratic republic on the basis of radical social reforms—such briefly was the stand we took.

This was in no way in conflict with the individual socialist, radical, or liberal party programs. It was only a way of “carrying outside the common bracket” such factors as those public men who felt the heart-beats of the country considered to be indisputable for democracy as a whole; such points as they held would have to be fulfilled immediately after a revolutionary *coup* or the election of a repre-

sentative assembly by universal suffrage. During the last few years before the War, my political friends and myself considered as our most urgent aim the selection of a skeleton staff of men of all parties who would be capable of political work in harmony with every party, group, and organization of the Left for the furtherance of this indispensable common democratic program. In a word, our task was to prepare a coalition of all the democratic parties, not with a view of fulfilling the program of any one section, but to carry out a common national policy. This marshaling of the democratic forces was already in progress when the Fourth Duma met. After that it proceeded even more rapidly, both because public opinion became more favorable, and because there were enough people of every opposition party in the new Duma itself who were convinced that an early end of the monarchy was inevitable, now that it had degenerated into Rasputinism.

The course of Russia's internal events was brutally interrupted by war. It profoundly modified the country's spirit and created a new political atmosphere.

The Tsar faced once more, and for the last time, the possibility of making peace with his people, united in a patriotic impulse,—in the name of the Fatherland's salvation. The country was ready for this reconciliation. But the "woman with perverted ideas," as the Empress Dowager called the Tsarina, closed this path to the Tsar.

Lincoln Steffens and the Russian Bolshevik Revolution

By DIMITRI S. VON MOHRENSCHILDT

*I would like to spend the
evening of my life watching
the morning of a new world.*

—L. Steffens

STEFFENS died in 1936, at the age of seventy, convinced that liberal-bourgeois democracy was dead and that communism was inevitable.

The Bolshevik Revolution in Russia was the crucial event in Steffens' life; it transformed this brilliant journalist and reformer from an ardent crusader for a better and wider democracy into America's foremost prophet of democracy's doom. A whole generation of American intellectuals have followed him, and the pattern of his evolution provides a significant commentary on the general decline of liberalism in twentieth-century America.

I

Steffens was a typical American of upper-middle class background and upbringing. His father was a prominent business man in Los Angeles, California, where Lincoln was born. Both parents were of pioneer Anglo-Saxon stock. "My parents did not bring me up," Steffens wrote in his *Autobiography*, "they sent me to school, they gave me teachers of music, drawing; they offered me every opportunity in their reach. But also they gave me liberty and the tools of quite another life: horses, guns, dogs, and the range of an open country . . . the people, the businesses, and the dreams of this life interested me, and I learned well whatever interested me."¹

At an early age Steffens showed an independent mind and a great zest for life. It was this intense curiosity for people and ideas that made him a brilliant conversationalist and an outstanding reporter.

At the University of California, where he majored in history,

¹Steffens, *Autobiography*, N. Y., 1931, p. 111.

Steffens made one capital discovery—that all knowledge was relative and that “there was no scientific basis for an ethics.” His subsequent studies at the Universities of Heidelberg, Munich, Leipzig, and the Sorbonne convinced him that his theory was right—there was no ethics. Henceforth he adopted an experimental approach to life. He would gather facts, verify them, form a theory; then, usually, discard it, starting the process all over again.

In later years, Steffens would often say that his whole life was one of unlearning, “a difficult process of clearing out of my mind the convictions, superstitions, ideas, which got there I know not how. And the last to go have been the liberal notions . . . they seem to me now to have been cultivated human wishes and purposes, having no parallels in nature and no foundation in science.”² At the age of twenty-six, skeptical of ethical and moral values, Steffens started out to study men and society “scientifically.”

II

In 1892 Steffens started his brilliant journalistic career as a reporter in Wall Street. Impersonally, pragmatically, he studied high finance, Tammany Hall, police corruption, East side strikes. He had no “angle” yet, no prejudice for or against big business and high finance, he merely reported.

Ten years later, in 1902, *McClure's Magazine* began to run Steffens' brilliant exposes of corruption in local politics. This series of articles opened the era of muckraking. Steffens “raked up” and exposed municipal corruption in St. Louis, Pittsburgh, Minneapolis, Philadelphia. Everywhere the picture was the same: the cities were run by bosses, rings, machines, graft and corruption were universal. What was the reason for this state of affairs? If bad, corrupt men, were removed, and good men put in office, would that remove the evils of American democracy? Steffens thought so at first, but not for long. In his summary of municipal corruption (*The Shame of the Cities*, 1904) Steffens blamed no one class, interest or party. “The misgovernment of the American people,” he concluded, “is the misgovernment by the American people.” The thing to do, apparently, was to follow good leaders and reformers like Theodore Roosevelt and Joseph W. Folk.

“Don't you see what you are showing?” his friend, the socialist, Upton Sinclair, would remonstrate. But Steffens was not ready yet to admit that it was the system that was at fault. He needed more

²*Op. cit.*, p. xvii.

time, more facts. Next came a study of reformers—those who fought party machines and big business. It was almost as discouraging as his study of the bosses. Reformers like Bob LaFollette and Judge B. Lindsey were good, idealistic men, but lacked strength. They were unable to comprehend the forces around them. Invariably, when they caused good men to be elected to office, the latter also became corrupt. Who was to blame, then? By 1906 Steffens was ready for another conclusion, a new theory. It was big business that was at the root of the evil. Railroads, corporations, banks bought privileges, corrupted legislatures, judges, the police, and municipal governments. Big business corrupted politics, and the United States was a sham democracy “an organization of the privileged for the control of privileges, of the sources of privilege, and the thoughts and acts of the underprivileged.”³

By 1911, the public was growing tired of muckraking and so was Steffens. More and more he came to believe that mere exposure and political reforms were not enough, that privileges were too deeply rooted in the economic system of the country. “The cure for the evils of political democracy,” he now concluded, “is economic democracy.” Still, he was not sure what the remedy should be: socialism, anarchism, single tax, Christianity? He played with all of these “experimentally,” he tells us, but refused to join, to commit himself to a creed.

III

In the years preceding World War I, Steffens achieved a unique reputation. He was widely read and discussed. Everybody knew and liked him—politicians, journalists, radicals, poets, underworld characters; Theodore Roosevelt and President Wilson lent their ear to him. His reputation was made, his influence on contemporary intelligentsia established. “More than any other man Lincoln Steffens has influenced my mind,” wrote his protégé, Jack Reed, in 1917, “I met him first while I was at Harvard, where he came loving youth, full of understanding, with the breath of the world clinging to him . . . being with Steffens is to me like flashes of clear light. . . . He does not judge or advise—he simply makes everything clear.”⁴

And Mabel Dodge Luhan, in whose famous salon of poets and

³*Op. cit.*, p. 591. Later he discovered that the situation was the same in France and in England.

⁴“Almost Thirty,” Reed’s essay submitted to *The New Republic* in 1917, but not published until April 15 and 29, 1936.

radicals Steffens was the principal shining light, gives the following description of him at the height of his muckraking career: "A delicately built little man, very flexible in his movements and with a rapier keen mind . . . he had a professional sweetness in dealing with people that no one seemed able to resist—a forcing gentle tenderness. . . . He called himself the only Christian on earth and he wore a plain gold cross hanging on his solar plexus attached to his watch chain. . . . Undoubtedly, what he loved was his power over people rather than the people themselves."⁵

In later years, Ella Winter, Steffens' second wife, admitted that influencing youth, educating, propagandizing—were her husband's ruling passions in life.⁶

IV

If social justice through reform was an illusion, if the American system of government was basically unsound, there could be only one conclusion—social revolution. Reluctantly, Steffens accepted that conclusion. "I guessed that I would have to experience at least two revolutions to understand one. I looked around for a revolution, and there was Mexico in the throes of one." In 1915-16 Steffens was entirely occupied with Mexican affairs. "I am here," Steffens said to the Mexican revolutionary, Carranza, "as a patriotic American to learn how to see my country through a revolution we need as much as you."⁷

Carranza, he thought, was bloody and arbitrary, but still the only hope for "economic democracy." The Church and big business were the stumbling blocks; they tried to stop the progress of the revolution. Energetically, Steffens crusaded for the Mexican revolutionaries. He saw Wilson and Charles Hughes and tried to win them over, urging them to forget "the superficial atrocities of the Mexican revolution." Revolutions are bloody and destructive, he argued, but there is no other way of achieving a better social order.

In March 1917, the Tsarist regime in Russia was overthrown, and the liberal, Provisional government was established. Here at last was a really great revolution and a unique opportunity to see "how revolutions are made." With Charles Crane, Steffens eagerly set out for Russia.

⁵Mabel D. Luhan, *Movers and Shakers*, N. Y., 1936, pp. 66-67.

⁶*The Letters of Lincoln Steffens*, N. Y., 1938, 2v., I, intr.

⁷*Autobiography*, p. 729.

Of all the Americans who went to report revolutionary Russia, Steffens was undoubtedly the least qualified observer. His ignorance of the Russian language, history, political leaders, was abysmal. Even the name of Miliukov, foremost liberal leader of the time, was unfamiliar to him. Nor did Steffens in subsequent years ever try to fill these lacunae, not even when he became America's foremost propagandist of the Bolshevik cause. Admittedly, Steffens didn't give a darn about Russia and the Russian people as previously he didn't give a darn about Mexico and the Mexicans—all his interest was absorbed by the revolutionary process itself.

With all his ignorance of Russia, Steffens showed, however, a better grasp of Russian events in the confused summer of 1917 than many an American expert of Russian affairs.⁸ He observed: the revolution was not over yet; the liberals, Lvov and Kerensky, would soon fall and the revolution would move leftward; it would be a minority group that would finally win out. Everywhere he saw indecision and the people milling around "like a herd of wild cattle . . . looking for a direction in which to stampede." Only the Bolsheviks, he thought, presented a united front. They alone had a leader, Lenin, who had a plan of action and was ready to act. "He knew that a time would come when the mob would tire of indecision and not only let Kerensky fall, but themselves ask for the Czar they were used to, a ruler; and he made his propaganda and prepared his organization and his plans for that day, which he, a mob psychologist, would choose, to 'seize power' (his phrase). Lenin had studied; he knew his history."⁹

The events he just observed deepened Steffens' contempt for liberal intelligentsia. The Russian liberal leaders, then in power, were no better, he thought, than the American liberals he knew so well. They were impractical, timid men, much too tolerant, incapable of action. Free speech seemed a dubious blessing now. Russia needed a strong leader, a dictator. "I have always been fighting the opponents of liberty," Steffens wrote to Robert La-Follette, October 7, 1917, "hereafter (after Russia) I am going to work on the practitioners of liberty."¹⁰

Steffens did not witness the insurrection of November 7, which ushered the Bolsheviks into power. He learned of these events from Jack Reed and other "journalistic poets and poetic journalists" who

⁸Like Professor Samuel Harper and members of the Root mission.

⁹*Autobiography*, p. 762; see also *The Letters* . . . , I, 396-407.

¹⁰*The Letters of Lincoln Steffens*, I, 407.

reported them. He was convinced, however, that he had grasped enough, during his first trip to Russia, "to hold the key to what followed."

Once in power, the Bolsheviks found in Steffens an ardent and indefatigable advocate. He lectured extensively and enjoyed setting everybody aright, including President Wilson, Colonel House, and the State Department, about the new Russian régime; he condemned the allied intervention and proclaimed the Sisson "documents" to be forgeries.

The Versailles Peace Conference added to Steffens' disillusionment in liberal philosophy and methods. "Wilson was liberalism personified," he was wont to say, "when he failed, Liberalism failed." The privileged interests were set against Wilson, and there was nothing he could do. Now, that the peace was a failure, it seemed clear to Steffens that revolutions and class struggle were inevitable, that Russia, by sweeping away the privileges, was on the way to achieving a better democracy than that of the United States.

He generalized again. All revolutions, he now thought, followed certain well-defined natural laws, and he illustrated this theory in a fable, *Moses in Red*, 1925. "The book I have just finished is the story of Moses, told in the light of the Revolution, as a classic example of how a revolt of a people goes. Jehovah symbolizes Nature; Moses, the reformer, and leader; Pharaoh, the King, or the employer-capitalist; Aaron, the orator and the Jews as a people. The parallel with the Russian or any other revolution is striking."¹¹

In the spring of 1919, Steffens returned to Russia with the famous peace mission of William C. Bullitt. "There is more vision, there is more idealism and also more realism at Moscow than is at Paris," he wrote enthusiastically to his sister.¹² He was tremendously impressed by Lenin whom he interviewed through an interpreter. This interview left a lasting impression upon his mind. Here was a real leader with a scientific approach to society! A leader not afraid to admit his own mistakes, not burdened by ethics, not hesitant about using violence to carry out his objectives! Here was a navigator, as compared to Wilson, the American liberal, who was a mere sailor and "the most perfect example we have produced of the culture which has failed and is dying out."¹³

In his correspondence and later in his *Autobiography*, Steffens

¹¹*Op. cit.*, II, 692; to Gilbert Roe, April 16, 1925.

¹²*Op. cit.*, I, 465; to Laura Suggett, April 8, 1919.

¹³*Op. cit.*, I, 474; to Laura Suggett, June 28, 1919.

stated clearly the reasons for his admiration of the Bolshevik philosophy and methods. The Russians were the first to knock out the old system, to remove privileges, to set out to abolish "poverty, riches, graft, privilege, tyranny, and war." The government was undemocratic, a dictatorship, but its object was "to make and maintain for a few generations a scientific rearrangement of economic forces which would result in economic democracy first and political democracy last."¹⁴ This evolutionary plan for the Russian dictatorship became Steffens' favorite interpretation. "I see the world moving under the forces Marx described. Lenin understood. . . ."

Together with Bullitt, Steffens reported that the destructive period of the Revolution had ended, and that the majority of the people were behind the Bolshevik régime.

In 1919, as during his previous trip, Steffens' knowledge of Russian conditions was derived from the officials whom he interviewed through interpreters. He was flattered and lionized. Although he was aware of the repressive features of the Bolshevik régime (suppression of all opposition and mass terror) and of the widespread misery of the people—these could not be hidden in 1919 from any observer however naïve—Steffens concluded that these features were temporary and inevitable. "I have seen the future and it works" was his famous remark in Jo Davidson's studio, upon his return to America. From that time on it became a recurrent refrain in everything he wrote and said.

For the next three years Steffens traveled abroad and lectured on Russia throughout the United States. To judge from his correspondence, he was somewhat confused, not quite sure how to generalize about his Russian experience. A disillusioned liberal, he still was unable to rid himself of the lingering notions of majorities, democracy, liberty. In May 1922, as Hearst's representative, he interviewed Mussolini, and the Italian dictator impressed Steffens almost as much as had Lenin. Both knew how to change their minds completely, unlike the liberal intelligentsia, both knew that people did not want to govern themselves, but wanted to be governed. The Russian and Italian experiments, Steffens concluded, were similar in method but different in aim.¹⁵ The method seemed to Steffens "scientific" and historically justifiable.

¹⁴*Autobiography*, p. 796.

¹⁵Later Steffens approved of the Nazi methods as well; he opposed them only because of their antagonism to Russian communism.

Steffens made his third and last trip to Russia with the LaFolletes, in August 1923. This was the relatively liberal period of the NEP. He stayed only two weeks, but the trip renewed his faith in the communist experiment. Conditions, he observed, have greatly improved, the Bolshevik leaders have not yielded to capitalism, a new civilization is rising and "the new Russia will win."¹⁶ This time Steffens' information about Soviet conditions and policies came from the Anglo-American propaganda chief, Nuorteva. Besides, from then on, Steffens was in constant contact with the American pro-Soviet enthusiasts—Max Eastman (subsequently a bitter opponent of the Soviet system), Anna Louise Strong (Steffens' protégé), Albert R. Williams, and, finally, his second wife, Ella Winter, who later made several trips to Russia and became Steffens' principal source of information.

Psychologically, the major effect of his Russian experience was to blunt Steffens' critical faculties. The "scientific" reporter felt, apparently, no urge to observe Russia with his own eyes and to see how far the Soviet theory tallied with Soviet practice. He accepted the leaders' interpretation and never doubted it after.

The Russians, Steffens was now convinced, were building a new civilization which was destined to replace, in time, the rotten liberal-bourgeois civilization of the West. "I cast out," he wrote to Gilbert Roe, "my old manner of thinking, ceased to be a liberal, and have since been watching events as if they were divine (or natural) revelations."¹⁷ Henceforth, Soviet Russia became for Steffens a new religion, admitting no doubts, no criticism.

V

Disillusionment in the "business-plutocratic" civilization of the United States was widespread among the American intellectuals in the Twenties. Steffens reflected this disillusionment, while at the same time he was helping to deepen it. He was restless and spent some time, a disillusioned radical, on the Riviera; finally, in 1927, he returned to the United States and settled in Carmel, California. There was a brief period when his enthusiasm for Soviet Russia was somewhat cooled. The Soviet leaders, it would appear, blamed him, unjustly he thought, for the fiasco of the Bullitt mission and "for being able to state their case and yet staying out of the Communist

¹⁶*Letters of Lincoln Steffens*, to Fremont Older, Oct. 5, 1923.

¹⁷*Op. cit.*, II, 672; to Gilbert Roe, April 16, 1925.

Party." He wanted to go to Russia again, but was afraid. Yet, throughout the Twenties, he ardently defended the Soviet leaders and their policies and was highly annoyed by his leftist friends who were beginning to criticize them. He wrote to Marie Howe: "The intelligentsia! They shoot 'em in Russia; and I know why: they have to be shot every time the world moves, shot or crushed."¹⁸ And, writing the following year to Matthew Schmidt: ". . . I am for them to the last drop, I am a patriot for Russia; the Future is there; Russia will win out and it will save the world. . . . That's my belief. But I don't want to live there. It is too much like serving in an army at war with no mercy for the weak and no time for the wounded. Youth can stand it; youth loves it, but for me who am ruined by the easy life of the old culture, Russia is impossible. My service to it has to be outside here."¹⁹

In the late Twenties, Steffens lectured and debated on democracy's doom. Revolutions, he told his audiences, lead to dictatorships, but dictatorships will eventually yield to democracy. Nothing delighted him more than shocking the bourgeois.

The Autobiography of Lincoln Steffens, published in 1931, was called the key book of the depression. In it Steffens described his disillusionment in liberalism and political reform, his admiration for the Bolshevik Revolution; he foretold the doom of the middle classes, but at the end held out some hope for the "new capitalism" in the United States. It was beginning to solve the economic problem, he thought. He wondered whether Bolshevik Russia and capitalist America were "driving, the one consciously, the other unwittingly, toward the same end."

The ray of hope held out for America in the *Autobiography* soon flickered out, however, as the depression deepened. The capitalist system could not recover, the machine had stalled and "our horrid old uncivilized economic system [was] lying upside down on its back out on the steppes with its rusty wheels in the air."²⁰ Roosevelt and the New Deal were too moderate, too much like the old muckrakers—mere reformers in an age of revolutions.

More and more Steffens became intolerant of Soviet Russia's critics. ". . . Max [Eastman] does not really understand the Russian Revolution. . . . He is a Menshevik like Trotsky."²¹ Will

¹⁸*Op. cit.*, II, 720; November 29, 1925.

¹⁹*Op. cit.*, II, 759; July 20, 1926.

²⁰*Op. cit.*, II, 1051; to Sam Darcey, ? 1934.

²¹*Op. cit.*, II, 914; to Ella Winter, December 31, 1931.

Durant, who wrote an unsympathetic article on Russia ("The Tragedy of Russia") in the *Saturday Evening Post*, reminded him of a pig "which saw nothing in a rich castle yard, but garbage, and not enough of it."²² LaFollette, Upton Sinclair, and the liberals and reformers were all bankrupt and stood "defeated and dumb before a crisis which calls for leadership or counsel." The liberals could never understand the Soviet experiment, Steffens thought, because they were still reasoning "from false ideals, like right and wrong, liberty, democracy, justice."²³ To Steffens, Soviet Russia was the only key to the future, and Lenin, was the true liberal of our day.²⁴ Although he alone saw the light, he thought, he himself was corrupted by the old culture and was not ready for the "Kingdom of Heaven" (The Communist Party).

Brushing aside the critics, Steffens deliberately sought out information about Soviet Russia which would conform to his preconceived views. He attacked or ignored authors who were even remotely critical, surrounding himself with communists and near communists. Now he abandoned all pretense at impartiality. "To hell with the open minds! A pro-Russian, pro-communist book is the one that's needed now. I would like to write it myself. Wish I had up-to-date stuff. I'd make a thriller, not an objective line in it, just a proclamation that Russia had found the way for America."²⁵

"Our old culture is finished," Steffens wrote in 1935, "we all have got to turn to welcome the new culture, which covers everything,—the arts, science, business, life."²⁶ During the last six years of his life, Steffens was actively engaged in propagandizing Soviet Russia and communism. "The most dangerous high-power salesman [of communism] in America"—said a professor, introducing him to a huge audience at Harvard in 1933. Steffens conducted brief columns in several California papers and lectured extensively at Rotary Clubs, private schools, universities, and forums throughout the United States. A crusading spirit as intense as that of his earlier muckraking days, animated him. He burned with the desire to convert. University professors, students, writers, and labor leaders came to him for advice and to listen to his vision for a new communist society. Steffens was quite aware of his influence and enjoyed it. "Strange

²²*Op. cit.*, II, 943; to Ella Winter, December 23, 1932.

²³*Op. cit.*, II, 851; to Mrs. A. Winter, September 14, 1929.

²⁴See "The Greatest of Liberals," *Soviet Russia Today*, Jan. 1936.

²⁵*The Letters of Lincoln Steffens*, II, 959; to Ella Winter, May 2, 1933.

²⁶*Op. cit.*, II, 1007; to Joseph R. Boldt, Jr., Sept. 10, 1935.

how they accept me as an authority . . . they are young, going left fast, many of them socialists or near it, and ate up my preference for communism."²⁷ Civil liberties and democratic processes are "the bunk," he told his audiences; a war between Communism and Capitalism is coming soon and, whatever its outcome, ultimately Communism will win.

VI

Steffens' lifelong search for a "scientific" cure of the evils of American democracy thus ended in a sweeping repudiation of the basic principles of Democracy. Civil rights, peaceful and legal change, moral standards of humaneness and tolerance, all went by the board. The scientific, experimental approach to society, of which he was so proud, was discarded together with the rest of the liberal notions. Deliberately, dogmatically, Steffens accepted the Russian communist dogma and tactics based on the proposition that the end justifies the means, while remaining naive and uncritical about Soviet realities.

In the past quarter of a century, more than anyone else, Steffens helped to create, what Koestler called "a neurotic complex" about Soviet Russia, and no one was more effective in undermining faith in the traditional ideals of American democracy. Whether these ideals can again be revitalized, only future generations of Americans will know.

²⁷*Op. cit.*, II, 936; to Ella Winter, November 20, 1932.

From Soviet War Poets

Translated from the Russian

By VERA SANDOMIRSKY

OUT OF THE KAZAN NOTEBOOK

MARGARITA ALIGER¹

For me the skyline did not flicker,
in front of me war turned to be
no majestic road to the front,
no regiment ready for battle
and no end in a deathly engagement
on the threshold of immortality.

No,

the war took my soul
and forgot it midways.
And over it rolled contingents
in the acrid smoke, thorny dust
of marches, evacuations,
preventing my soul to rise.
At night above head thundered by
echelons of crying children
who lost their mothers en route,
wheels out of their minds whizzed by.
Hospital trains have dragged my soul
all the way around Russia.
Towns, cities, towns . . .
Woods and barefooted clusters of trees . . .
How your frosts burn!
How your bluish snowstorms smoke!
At night the wounded moan
With the far off voice of an ancient friend.
Forgetting to be out of flesh
My soul cried out like a bird
to hear for a reply
in the hiss of the stormy voyage:

¹"Iz Kazanskoi Tetradi," *Stikhi i Poemy* (Verses and Poems), Ogiz, Moscow, 1944.

"Here is the rear.
No danger is here.
Do not hope for death in battle.
You will live.
You will get there.
You must.
No matter how hard to die you desire."
So that tired, weak it should
from that train-step fly in the snow-drift.
That it should rise,
turn around,
go on,
crawl along the bloody foot-print,
and find enough power to say:
"I believe in triumph."

1941

LENIN

STEPAN SCHIPACHEV²

Lenin out of bronze and dusty poplars.
The ruins of a burnt out block.
Upon his entry in this Soviet town
The enemy has taken Lenin down.

A dandy-colonel visibly content
To deal so quickly with the statue
While of a servile army photo-man
The camera kept clicking.

At night the colonel boasted getting drunk,
At dawn, however, fear caused shudders:
The monument stood in the garden as before
Erected out of dust by strength unseen.

Among the officers a sudden turmoil.
Afar vague shadows flickered passing by:
Guerillas closing tight their circle
Marched to attack.
And Lenin led them.

1941

²*Sbornik Stikhov* (Collection of Verse), Ogiz, Moscow, 1943.

LIFE AND DREAM

ALEKSEI SURKOV³

The thunder silent, years gone by,
We will be older twice and three times.
About the hero at that time
This tale will be put together:

That sparing none of his very strength
He marched against the cruel current
And in the hour of his death
He uttered lofty, deep comment.

That he succumbed to dreams and hopes
At night preceding bloody action.
To all such tales we both will listen
With old age mirth.

For you and I went casually
To see the heroes in their foxholes
And shared with them the same old bread
And drank out of a single vessel.

No shining halo on their forehead,
They swallowed dust and tramped on snow,
Their fate they carried like a burden
Of heavy bricks.

They carried on their hunchbacks—loads,
Not playing hide and seek with death
And bitter curses on their lips,
When it so happened—died.

Their days and nightly dreams
Not likely with quotations bloomed,
But of their native land the honor
They did not let be hurt.

Let them be groomed. No harm.
Imagination loves the stress.
But life of men is ever coarser,
More bloody, holy, and more simple.

1944

³"Zhizn i Mechta," *Rossiia Karayushchaya* (Punitive Russia), Sov. Pisatel, Moscow, 1944.

NEW NAME

MARGARITA ALIGER⁴

After seeing him off to war
and saying the last farewell
for an instant it seemed
all of her strength was gone.
Surely it would not hurt
if she were to fall on the floor
and the heart would stop beating
forgetting it all.
But she did not fall
and she did not cry.
A voice close by said ringing:
"This is only the beginning."

She wanted to go home,
to lie down and weep.
But that's not what she did.
Things turned out otherwise.
Under a cloudy sky
firmly her feet obeyed.
She didn't forget on the way
to stop by for the bread.
She fed the baby
and put him to bed.
And she knew that she was
in the thick of the fight.
She knew she was now alone
at the very front.
"How to break the siege?"
not dodging a single attack.

Erect she marched on,
no more doubts, no more fear.
From afar she seemed old,
quite young from near.
She wouldn't give up
and her heart stayed warm
in the unthinkable frost

⁴Out of "Novye Stikhi" (New Poems), *Znamya* (The Banner), No. 1, 1945.

of the deepest rear.
No warmth of a fire, no rest,
not a single exemption.
The whole war you marched
in an infantry's grey platoon.
You waged war wrapped in longing,
the female urge for rest,
the faith in your loved defending
with the might of your breast.
The faith that he is known
as the bravest and best,
that he will come back
unharmd and safe
to return all that was
in the fullest way.

Others had failed
in this righteous faith.
Others were numbed
by the message of death.
People would comfort
and say: "Don't believe it."
What's yours isn't theirs
and their tears come easy.
"A misprint, maybe—
an error, maybe—."

Not to accept is easy,
to wait for that knock on the door,
to believe in the miracle
of his return from there.
But just try how it feels
to perceive with your blood,
to accept with your womb
the merciless title of widow.
Try to live up to it
and make it a glory.
For some—it's not fitting,
for others—not pleasing.

Widows don't wear mourning,
do not cry in front of others,
do not hide their eyes in the morning,
do not throw their moans to the winds.
Lips pressed drier,
voice choked lower,
singed hearts
have nothing to fear.

And when the muzzles of our guns
will cool down,
when our worn-out men
will lay down their arms,
the hour will come to appraise,
soldierly, what matters.
Brothers, let's think and figure
like men, like brothers.
For those who honestly fought
in our camp,
for those who with us remained
after all that happened,
having marched in the wake of war
with a burden of tons,
for Russian women, widows,
who have looked at death,
who came through alive
with an unriddled strength,
for them in Russia
we must find a new name.

1945

RODINA

KONSTANTIN SIMONOV⁵

She touches of the oceans the three greatest,
 She lies in abandon unfolding her towns,
 Engaged in hoops of black meridians,
 Unvanquished, broad and proud.

But at the time when the last explosive
 You hold already on the upswing in your hand,
 When in that instant you must remember
 All that remains for us so far behind,
 The giant country then you don't remember,
 The one you have criss-crossed and learned so well,
 You will remember your native land
 As seen in childhood:
 A chunk of earth sloping against three birches,
 Some lengthy road behind a brush,
 A creaky ferry on the river and
 Sandy shores under willows short.

That's where to come from we were lucky,
 That's where for life till death we found
 The handful dirt which is well fit
 To show the signs of the whole world.

Yes, you can live through heat and storm and frost,
 Yes, you can endure cold and hunger,
 March toward death . . . but the three birches,
 While alive, you can to no one surrender.

1944

⁵Out of the collection *Voina* (War), Sov. Pisatel, Moscow, 1944.

Lenin and the Agent Provocateur Malinovsky*

By BERTRAM D. WOLFE

I

ROMAN Vatslavov Malinovsky was a Russified Polish working-man of peasant stock, born in the Plotsk Province of Russian Poland in the year 1878. When he met Lenin at the Prague Conference¹ he was 34, robust, ruddy complexioned, vigorous, excitable,

*This article is a chapter in a forthcoming book, a triple biography of Lenin, Trotsky, and Stalin, entitled *Three Who Made a Revolution*, scheduled for publication by Dial Press in 1946. [Ed.]

The life and deeds of Roman Malinovsky and the political line pursued by the Tsarist Police Department in the Social Democratic Party is reconstructed here from the police archives and from the testimony before the Extraordinary Commission of the Provisional government in 1917. All the testimony before the main Investigating Commission was subsequently published by the Soviet government in a seven-volume work called *The Fall of the Tsarist Regime* (*Padenie Tsarskogo Rezhima, po materialam Cherezvychainoi Komisii Vremennogo Pravitelstva . . . Gos. Izdat. Leningrad, 1924-27*). The testimony of Ulyanov (Lenin) and Rodomytsky (Zinoviev) before the sub-commission were not so published, but I have been able to reconstruct the text sufficiently from contemporary accounts in the daily press: *Pravda* (Bolshevik), *Rabochaya Gazeta* (Menshevik), *Den* (Liberal), and *Vestnik Vremennogo Pravitelstva* (official News Bulletin of the Provisional government). Fortunately, this last contains a fair amount of direct quotation in its issue of June 16, 1917, the accuracy of which is confirmed by the accounts in the other dailies, including *Pravda*. Other sources for the following account are the writings of Burtsev, personal reminiscences of men who knew Malinovsky, and documents summarized from memory by Boris Nicolaevsky, who was director of the Historical Archives of the Russian Revolution in Moscow during the years 1919-21. Except where otherwise noted, the source is always the seven-volume publication by the Soviet government of the Testimony before the Extraordinary Commission of the Provisional government.

¹The Russian Social Democratic Labor Party, to which Lenin, Martov, Dan, Plekhanov and others mentioned in this article, belonged, was formed in 1898. At its Second Congress, held in 1903, it split into two factions, Bolsheviks (Majority) and Mensheviks (Minority), which continued to regard themselves as members of a single party. During the revolutionary upsurge of 1905, pressure from the rank and file forced them to reunite into a single organization, which, at the Stockholm Congress of 1906 and the London Congress of 1907, elected a united Central Committee

a heavy drinker, a rude and eloquent orator, a gifted leader of men. In the closing years of the preceding century he had been convicted several times of common crimes, the third offense being that of burglary ("robbery with breaking and entry"), for which he had served a prison term from 1899 to 1902. The police noted that he was a heavy spender: though he earned a living first as tailor and then as metal turner, his wages were never sufficient for his expensive tastes. In his youth he had worked for a while in Germany, then returned to Saint Petersburg. Here he entered the labor movement, probably in 1902, with a perfect background for the rôle of police informer.

How early he became a regular agent is unclear. For years his chief source of income was his wages as a metal worker while he used his police connections only to pick up a bit of extra cash. When he thought he had something which would interest them, he would telephone, or send in a written report signed *Portnoi* (Tailor), for which he would be paid a sum like twenty-five or fifty rubles. Even after he became a professional agent with a regular salary, he did not become a "professional revolutionist"—his usefulness consisted in his continuing to be a worker at the bench. He himself confessed to the Bolsheviks, and the police confirm it, that he was ambitious to rise to a place of prominence in the revolutionary movement. Moreover, his ambition felt a double spur: the higher his advancement, the more he meant to the police and the higher the sum they set on the value of his services.

In 1906 he was one of the founders of the Petersburg Metal Workers Union. In 1907 he became its secretary, serving till the end of 1909. Here he steered a careful course between Bolsheviks and Mensheviks. The former were more interested in control and political leadership of the union, the latter in the preservation of its autonomy. Therefore, as an active unionist, he inclined to the latter. In 1908 he successfully resisted an attempt of the Bolsheviks to

including both Mensheviks and Bolsheviks. During the period of reaction which followed, the leading Russian Social Democrats quarrelled bitterly in their exile colonies abroad. In 1911 Lenin finally decided to ignore the united Central Committee elected at the London Congress of 1907 (a committee which included both himself and other Bolsheviks, Martov and other Mensheviks). He set up a rump organization committee consisting only of Bolsheviks, which called a Conference in Prague, Austria (Czechoslovakia), for January 1912. It was attended almost exclusively by Bolsheviks and proclaimed itself the representative of the entire party. It elected a new Central Committee of Bolsheviks, reading the Mensheviks and other factions out of the party.

capture his union, but after he went over to them completely, he helped them to win control. Zinoviev, who met him while he was its secretary, testified to the Extraordinary Commission that he thought him to be "rather a Menshevik," and the Mensheviks had the same opinion.

Five times he was arrested for his activities, either by police who had no inkling of his rôle, or because he was at a meeting which he himself had betrayed, where everybody had to be taken in. His early reappearance on the scene after each arrest was so managed as not to excite suspicion. A typical arrest was that of late November 1909. He had tipped off a secret caucus of the labor delegates to an impending anti-alcoholic congress and was present when it was raided. Released in January 1910, he was exiled from Saint Petersburg to avert suspicion from him. This ended his secretaryship of the Petersburg Union, but he immediately turned up in Moscow in the Spring of 1910, where he was welcomed by the entire labor movement and was able to report to the police on every phase of it. On the rolls of the Moscow Okhrana (Security Police) he appears as of March 1910, no longer as a "piece worker" but with the regular salary of 50 rubles a month, plus expenses. In addition, of course, to his wages as a metal turner.

The police had come to the conclusion that the chief danger to the régime was the possible unification of all opposition forces against it:

"Malinovsky was given the order to do as much as possible to deepen the split in the party. . . . I admit that the whole purpose of my direction is summed up in this: to give no possibility of the party's uniting. I worked on the principle of *divide et impera*."²

Since this political aim coincided in an essential respect with that of Lenin, Malinovsky was now instructed to take the earliest possible opportunity to come out as a Bolshevik and to attach himself as closely as possible to the Bolshevik leader. Police Director Beletsky testified that, in view of the important mission, he freed his agent at this time from the further necessity of betraying individuals or meetings (though not from reporting on them), as arrests traceable to Malinovsky might endanger his position for the more highly political task. It was the easier for the police to make this exemption since they had by now advanced their men to a number of key posts in the

²Testimony of Police Director Beletsky, *Padenie Tsarskogo Rezhima*, Vol. III, pp. 281 and 286.

Bolshevik underground, including the headship of the Moscow organization itself, which had just been taken over by agent Kukushkin. The agents ascended quickly in the party hierarchy by the simple expedient of arranging the arrest of incumbents and others who stood in their way.

But Malinovsky seemed to enjoy denunciatory work, and, despite the exemption, continued it. Indeed, he could not resist one more grand coup before he went over to the Bolsheviks. As a leading official of a legal trade union, he was well regarded by the Liquidators³ who set all their hopes on legal trade unions and a legal labor party and found the underground party a handicap. He joined with them in planning a Conference at which they hoped to launch their broad legal labor party, then, on Malinovsky's suggestion according to the testimony of Beletsky, the preliminary planning conference was raided and most of the leading Liquidators were bagged. Thus their hopes were ended for some time to come. This was in the year 1911, the same year in which agent Brendinsky smoothed another obstacle from Lenin's path by arranging for the arrest of the Conciliator⁴ Bolshevik Rykov. In the retrospective light of the 1917

³In October 1905, under the combined pressure of the 1905 Revolution and of French agents who were negotiating a loan to the Russian government and a Franco-Russian alliance (which would be more popular in France if Russia had a constitutional government), Tsar Nicholas II issued a manifesto granting a representative institution, the Duma, and various other limited constitutional rights. On this basis, legal political parties, political agitation during election campaigns, and legal trade unions became possible. In the labor unions and the Menshevik faction of the Social Democratic Party a movement sprang up to liquidate the underground conspirative party as a handicap to the efforts to build legal parties and unions. The advocates of this idea were known as the Liquidators. Lenin proposed their expulsion from the socialist and labor movement, and then the expulsion of all those who were opposed to their expulsion.

⁴Many Bolsheviks agreed with Lenin on his proposals concerning tactical measures for fighting Tsarism and capitalism, but were opposed to his propensity to expel all those who disagreed with his tactical proposals. Since they were for party unity they called themselves the Party, or Party-Loyal, Bolsheviks, but he preferred to dub them "Conciliators," his theory being that those who were "conciliatory" towards the Mensheviks or the Liquidators were almost as bad as the latter. Lenin did not always command a majority in his own faction for his advocacy of expulsion of opponents. When Rykov, an outstanding leader of the Bolshevik Conciliators went secretly from Paris to Russia in order to line up the underground Bolsheviks against Lenin on this matter, the police agent Brendinsky, serving as Lenin's smuggling agent for underground literature and for persons surreptitiously entering Russia, notified the Russian police, and Rykov was arrested. Thus the Conciliators were thwarted, and Lenin retained the upper hand for his expulsion policy.

police testimony, all of Lenin's and Malinovsky's subsequent polemics against the Liquidators as "police agents," "police unionists," and "advocates of a police labor party" make strange reading indeed. Beletsky's testimony on the raid on the Liquidators is confirmed by a note in the official edition of Vol. XVII of Lenin's *Collected Works*:

"Malinovsky clearly did not break with the Liquidators completely. He took part in a conference of their supporters, and played his hand in such fashion that the Conference, called by them for the Fall of 1911, was raided by the police. At that time a suspicion arose in a narrow circle of Moscow workers and Social Democrats who were in contact with Malinovsky . . . but the rumors concerning him soon died down."

About the same time, Malinovsky learned that Lenin was summoning a Party Conference too, at which he was to "remove" the Central Committee regularly elected by the last United Party Congress, and set up in its place a Bolshevik dominated Central Committee. The Conference, as we know, was held in Prague in January 1912. Malinovsky appeared as the representative of the Moscow trade unions and of the Bolshevik underground political organization of which his fellow agent Kukushkin was the head. Lenin had of course heard of this well known trade unionist, newly won from Menshevism. As we know, he was so taken with the convert that Malinovsky was elected to the new, purely Bolshevik Central Committee, and was urged to become the party's standard bearer in the contest for the Moscow deputyship.

A police spy with a record of convictions for common crimes as a Duma Deputy—the idea was so audacious that the highest authorities had to be consulted. From now on, Police Chief Beletsky met with his agent only in private rooms of the most fashionable restaurants. He took him in person to see the Minister of the Interior. He consulted with the Assistant Police Chief, the Assistant Minister of the Interior, the head of the Moscow Okhrana, and, according to his testimony, also with the Governor General of Moscow, Junkovsky. This last testified that he did not know of Malinovsky's rôle until he himself became Assistant Minister of the Interior, and that, learning of it, he disapproved. The weight of evidence suggests that Beletsky and not Junkovsky was telling the truth.

Interdepartmental communications on the subject were now so cautious that they no longer referred to their agent by his old

pseudonym of *Portnoi*, but used such circumlocutions as "the personage of whom I spoke to your Excellency on such and such occasion."

Both police and Bolsheviks set to work with great energy to secure their candidate's nomination and election. The newly founded daily *Pravda*, the Bolshevik apparatus, and—what proved more important—the whole machinery of the Department of the Interior and its police, were mobilized for the purpose. The first hurdle was the criminal record. The Ministry saw to it that their candidate got the necessary "Certificate of Good Repute" from local authorities in his native province. Next, all the more popular of his possible rivals were eliminated by the simple expedient of throwing them into jail. This included the most likely candidate of the Moscow workers, Krivov.

As election day approached, Malinovsky reported that a hostile foreman was planning to fire him from his factory. The electoral system provided for the workingmen to vote by secret ballot in their factories, where they chose delegates to the next higher nominating body, which in turn chose electors for the Workers' Curia of the Provincial Electoral College, where actual selection of deputies was made. (Thus neither voting in the factories nor indirect elections are Soviet inventions, as is so widely believed, but were inherited from Tsarism). But no workingman was eligible to vote or to be chosen as delegate, elector, or deputy, unless he had worked in the given factory for the six months preceding the election. The Police Department came to their candidate's rescue once more by throwing the astonished foreman into jail, releasing him after the election with the explanation that the arrest had been "an unfortunate mistake." (Neither in Tsarist nor in Soviet Russia has there ever been any recourse against officials for false arrest). Aided by such campaign methods, the Bolshevik and Police joint candidate swept all before him. The Department showed its appreciation of his advancement in the secular world by raising his salary from 50 rubles a month to 500. And this was now supplemented not by a metalworker's wage but by a Duma Deputy's.

"For the first time among ours in the Duma," wrote Lenin in a letter full of the underscorings with which he showed his excitement, "there is an *outstanding worker-leader*. He will read the Declaration [the political declaration of the Social Democratic Fraction on the Address of the Prime Minister]. This time it's not another Alexinsky. And the results—perhaps not immediately—will be *great*. . ."

II

The Fourth Imperial Duma, to which Malinovsky was elected, began its term in late November 1912. It was to be a long Duma, destined to continue in being until the Revolution of 1917 thrust power into its reluctant hands. Its thirteen Social Democratic Deputies (seven Mensheviks and six Bolsheviks) formed a single Fraction, for the split which Lenin had started at the Prague Conference at the beginning of that year had not yet taken effect inside Russia.⁵ The Fraction chose Chkheidze, Georgian Menshevik, as chairman, and Malinovsky as vice-chairman, and commissioned the latter to read the first political declaration.

Lenin was highly displeased with this unity in the Duma Fraction, for, as long as it endured, here was an authoritative and conspicuously public leading body around which the longing for unity inside Russia might crystallize, as against the Prague (Bolshevik) Central Committee. One of the chief tasks with which he was to commission Malinovsky was to split this last symbol of a unified party.

So strong was "conciliationism," i.e. the mood for unity, that the entire bloc of deputies lent their names as contributing editors both to the Bolshevik legal daily *Pravda* and the Menshevik *Luch*, and unanimously adopted a resolution calling for the fusion of the two papers. Indeed, from reading them, one could not then deduce any very good reason for their remaining separate, for Lenin was having great trouble with his editors. *Pravda* had been founded on the eve of the election campaign to take advantage of the increasing liberality of the government with reference to the press. The better to direct it, Lenin had moved from Paris to Cracow in Austrian (Polish) Galicia, only a day and a night by express from Saint Petersburg. (Krupskaya adds two psychological motives for the change of residence: to escape from the necessity of daily quarrels with the other factions, and to "move a little nearer to Russia whither all our people at that time longed terribly to go.")

Despite the closer contact, *Pravda* continued to assume a "conciliator" attitude in response to the popular mood inside Russia. It went so far as to censor, mutilate, or suppress Lenin's articles

⁵Each party's deputies in the Duma formed a fraction, or, what is known in the United States as a caucus. For explanation of Lenin's attempt to split the Social Democratic Party, and hence its fraction in the Duma, see note 1, on the Prague Conference.

where they sought to sharpen the fight against Mensheviks, Liquidators, Bundists⁶ and Vperyodists.⁷

"Vladimir Ilyich was so upset when from the outset *Pravda* deliberately struck out from his articles all polemics with the Liquidators. . . . Ilyich became nervous, wrote irate letters to *Pravda*, but they did not do much good. . . ."

Here are excerpts from some of these "irate letters":

"We received a stupid and impudent letter from the editorial board. We will not reply. They must be kicked out. . . . We are exceedingly upset by the absence of plans for reorganizing the board. . . . Better yet, complete expulsion of all the veterans. . . . They praise the Bund and *Zeit*, which is simply despicable. They don't know how to proceed against *Luch*, and their attitude towards my articles is monstrous. . . . (Letter of Jan. 12, 1913).

"We must kick out the present editorial staff. . . . Would you call such people editors? They aren't men but pitiful dishrags, who are ruining the cause. . . ." (Letter of Jan. 20)

And to Gorky:

"And how did *you* happen to get mixed up with *Luch*??? Is it possible that you are following in the footsteps of the deputies? But they have simply fallen into a trap!"

At the time these angry letters were written, Stalin was in Saint Petersburg and Molotov was secretary of the Editorial Board. The fact that they were on the receiving end of these bursts of anger probably explains why Stalin's recent *History of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union* eliminates all traces of the quarrel.

As early as December 18, 1912, that is to say a few days after the Duma Fraction was organized, the astute Malinovsky was able to report to his superiors the welcome news that he would be able to

⁶The Bundists were members of the Jewish Socialist League or Bund, an organization of Yiddish-speaking socialists and trade-unionists in Russia, principally in Russian Poland, claiming to represent all Yiddish speaking workers throughout the Russian Empire.

⁷The Vperyodists were a group of dissident Bolsheviks who disagreed with Lenin's tactics in a number of matters, particularly his insistence on participating in Duma elections and utilizing the Duma as a platform whence his party's views might be expounded to the masses. Their name is derived from the paper they founded, *Vpered* (pronounced *Vperyod*, meaning Forward). Lenin expelled them from his faction in 1909.

split the Fraction and would have Lenin's support for this purpose. On that date Assistant Police Director Vissarionov wrote to the Minister of the Interior:

"The situation of the Fraction is now such that it may be possible for the six Bolsheviks to be induced to act in such a way as to split the Fraction into Bolsheviks and Mensheviks. Lenin supports this. See his letter."

The letter referred to, a copy of which Malinovsky supplied to Vissarionov, was one Lenin had written a few days earlier to Vassiliev (the name then being used by Stalin). It had been written in invisible ink between the lines of a commercial letter to an official of the Russian Bank for Foreign Trade.

"If all of our six are from the workers' curiae," said the secret writing, "they cannot silently submit to a lot of Siberians.⁸ The six must come out with the sharpest protest if they are being majorityized (*mayoriziruyut*, i.e. being overridden by the seven), they should publish a protest in *Pravda* and announce that they are appealing to the ranks, to the workers' organizations."

This was to be the gist of Lenin's argument and of Malinovsky's strategy for disrupting the united Fraction. Malinovsky of Moscow, Badaev of Saint Petersburg, and the other Bolsheviks from Tula and lesser centers were chosen by the workers' curiae, ran Lenin's argument, while the Georgian Mensheviks, for example, had been elected by the entire Georgian population. Therefore the Bolshevik six must be regarded as representing a majority of the working class and the Menshevik seven a minority. It was a curious foreshadowing of the argument of 1918 concerning the superior representative character of the Soviets as against the Constituent Assembly.

Finding Malinovsky able and willing (the other Bolshevik deputies, writes Krupskaya, "were shy, but it was quite obvious that they were good, reliable proletarians"), Lenin left to him the task of leading the Bolshevik Duma group towards an open break with the

⁸The Menshevik deputies were not of course all representatives from Siberia. The leading Menshevik deputies were from Transcaucasia, where Socialist sentiment was so strong that they got an absolute majority of the vote, regardless of class alignments. The Bolshevik deputies, however, were from industrial centers in which they were elected from the workers' estate or curia. By calling the Menshevik deputies a "lot of Siberians" Lenin is trying to emphasize the fact that they come from outlying districts and not from the main industrial centers.

Mensheviks, while he himself turned his attention to *Pravda*. He called Stalin to Cracow to instruct him on the matter, and sent Sverdlov to Saint Petersburg to whip the editors into line. Soon he was able to write gratefully to Sverdlov:

"Today we learned about the beginning of reforms on *Pravda*. A thousand greetings, congratulations and good wishes for success. . . . You cannot imagine how tired we are of working with a completely hostile editorial staff." (Letter of Feb. 8, 1913).

But Malinovsky dutifully reported the arrival of Sverdlov. He hid in a Duma deputy's home, and, when he issued forth onto the street, he was arrested (Feb. 10, 1913). Thereupon Lenin dispatched Stalin to Saint Petersburg, fully prepared to carry out the splitting or "irreconcilable" line. On March 13, after telling Malinovsky about it, Stalin went to a concert for the benefit of *Pravda*, where he too was arrested. Both Sverdlov and Stalin were sent to Siberia, where they stayed all through the war until released by the Revolution of February 1917.

Next Kamenev was sent to take charge. The mood of Lenin's household when Kamenev left is reflected in this passage from Krupskaya's memoirs:

"We all (Inessa Armand, the Zinovievs, Krupskaya, and Lenin) went to the station to see them off. . . . We spoke very little. Every one was wrapped up in his own thoughts. We all asked ourselves how long Kamenev would hold out, how soon we should meet again? When would we be able to go to Russia? Each of us secretly thought about Russia; each of us had a strong desire to go. Night after night I would dream of the Nevsky Gate (a suburb of St. Petersburg). We avoided speaking on the subject but all of us secretly thought about it. . . ."

Malinovsky did not turn Kamenev in, perhaps because the frequent arrests were exciting suspicion. Instead, he provided excellent copy for Kamenev's purposes by his fiery speeches in the Duma denouncing his own Menshevik colleagues. The new line found a willing supporter in the new editor-in-chief, Miron Chernomazov, another police agent. In October 1913, Lenin expressed his satisfaction to Kamenev on *Pravda's* line:

"Here everybody is satisfied with the newspaper and its editor (doubtless, Kamenev is meant, for he was the real behind-the-scenes editor). In all this time I haven't heard a single word of criticism."

And Lenin had every reason to be satisfied. The Duma Fraction had just split. The mellow mood of conciliationism had vanished. *Pravda* was engaged in daily "merciless and irreconcilable war" with *Luch*, the Mensheviks (who were now all lumped together as Liquidators), the Bundists, and the Trotskyite "non-factionalists." Most of the Vperyodists had abandoned their independent standard and either gone over to Trotsky's league of party-unity advocates or had returned, repentant, to the Leninist fold.

The police, too, were satisfied. Yet this business of having the Bolshevik leader of the Duma on their payroll was bringing its complications. First there were his speeches. He was undeniably eloquent and forceful. Sometimes Malinovsky wrote them himself and sent them to his two chiefs, Lenin and Beletsky, for approval. At other times Lenin or Zinoviev or Kamenev drafted them, or even wrote out whole speeches in detail. These, too, were sent to Beletsky for approval. In the police files were found drafts in Malinovsky's hand, with amendments in the handwriting of both Lenin and Beletsky. Realizing how popular their deputy was, the police tried to cut out some of the most "subversive" passages. But Malinovsky had difficulty following instructions. In reading the first Declaration of the Fraction, he managed to eliminate an offending passage on "sovereignty of the people" by pretending to get rattled and skip an entire page of his manuscript. But *Pravda* followed his original text in its report on the session. When his revolutionary speeches were attacks on the liberals, the Cadets (Constitutional Democrats) or the Mensheviks, the police gave him free rein. At other times, he often tried to substitute a belligerent "revolutionary" fight with Chairman Rodzyanko for the delivery of the speech itself, thus managing to get himself interrupted and denied the right to continue. Yet on the whole, the Bolshevik régime so closely limited the autonomy of a deputy and of the fraction that the police had little success in modifying his speeches. Thus this incomparable informer and incomparable divider of the movement, was at the same time an incomparable Bolshevik agitator. There is not the slightest doubt but that the Bolsheviks were winning readers and funds for *Pravda* and widespread support among advanced workers thanks to his speeches in the Duma, his articles in *Pravda*, his propaganda tours through all the industrial districts of Russia. And, once the split was completed and socialistic workingmen were faced with a *fait accompli* and a necessity to choose between factions, a greater number lined up for Bolshevism than for the conglomerate of their opponents.

Then there was the danger of exposure. Some liberal official, high in the Ministry of the Interior or the Police, was privy to the arrangement and did not like it. From the outset, this still today unknown personage tried to communicate with the Socialist "under-world" without revealing his identity. When Malinovsky was elected, *Luch* received an anonymous warning on his rôle. A year later the wife of Theodor Dan received a letter telling her that a high police official wanted to see her in confidence, and that she could signify acceptance of the appointment by a code advertisement in a stipulated newspaper. Both warnings were ignored.

When Bukharin, living abroad, learned of Malinovsky's election, he wrote to Lenin that he had escaped from exile in 1910 only to be seized again in Moscow, suspiciously, right after a meeting with Malinovsky. Bukharin was puzzled by the angry tone of Lenin's answer: there was a dark campaign of slander being waged against this wonderful Bolshevik; if Bukharin joined it, Lenin would brand him publicly as a traitor. He desisted.

Then there were the February and March 1913, arrests of Elena Rozmirovich (Mrs. Troyanovsky), Sverdlov, and Stalin. Acting on a blind hunch, Troyanovsky wrote from abroad a letter to his wife's relatives in which he said that he knew who had caused her arrest: "a man playing a double rôle." If she were not freed, he would make an exposure which would "stagger society." As Troyanovsky calculated, the police opened the letter. Director Beletsky testified in 1917 that when he had shown the letter to Malinovsky the latter had "become hysterical" and demanded her release as a condition to serving the Department further. She was released.

To ward off suspicion Malinovsky declared at a meeting of the Central Committee that "some one close to the Duma Six was a person who had police connections." The axe fell on Miron Chernomazov, already under investigation, and in May 1914 he was quietly removed from the editorial board of *Pravda*. He had been its editor-in-chief while Malinovsky was its treasurer. The latter position enabled the Duma Deputy to turn in copies of the paper's balance sheet, and a complete list of the names and addresses of all who contributed money. On the other hand, he held meetings, raised funds for the paper, contributed himself from time to time—amounts which he always added to his police department expense account. These sums the police more than recouped when they levied fines on the paper, in one case a fine of 500 rubles for an article written by none other than Duma Deputy Malinovsky.

During all this time he was practically a commuter between Czarow and Petersburg. Naturally, it was easy for him to cross the frontier. Lenin summoned him at every important juncture, giving him entry into the most highly confidential meetings, when the only other persons present were Lenin and Krupskaya, Zinoviev, and Kamenev. The police department received full transcripts of the decisions taken, all Lenin's most secret acts and plans. Every biographer and historian owes an indebtedness to these complete and competent police reports for the period. Malinovsky went on joint lecture tours with Lenin to all the Russian colonies in emigration. Together they attended a secret congress of the Lettish Social Democrats and another of the Finns. He was entrusted with setting up a secret printing plant inside Russia, which naturally did not remain secret for long. Together with Yakovlev he "helped" start a Bolshevik paper in Moscow. It, too, ended promptly with the arrest of the editor. Inside Russia, the popular Duma Deputy travelled to all centers. Arrests took place sufficiently later to avert suspicion from him. Thus a Bolshevik conciliator group headed by Miliutin disappeared, as did the regular Bolshevik organization in Tula and other local bodies. The police raised his wage from 500 to 600, and then to 700 rubles a month.

III

On the 8th of May, 1914, Roman Malinovsky handed in his resignation to the Chairman of the Duma, Rodzyanko, "for reasons of health," and the same day left the country. He had notified neither Central Committee, nor Duma Fraction, nor constituents. The amazement at this inexplicable action was enormous. At each session of the Duma, whenever a Bolshevik arose to speak, the reactionary Deputy Markov would cry out with intentioned malice: "*But where is Malinovsky?*"

The leaderless Fraction—for the others were smallish figures who had let him guide the day to day struggle with the Mensheviks—reviewed the events leading up to his disappearance in an effort to find a key to the mystery. Recently he had been quick-tempered, more so even than usual. He had complained of his health, and of wearying with "mere parliamentary means of struggle." On May 4, he and Chkheidze—in an unwonted unity move initiating with the Bolshevik leader—had brought in a motion to postpone all discussion of the budget until a proposed law on parliamentary immunity was taken up. When this was rejected, Malinovsky led the other

deputies in a rumpus which prevented Prime Minister Goremykin from speaking. Rodzyanko suspended Bolsheviks, Mensheviks, and Trudoviks, 21 deputies in all, for the next 15 sessions for the disturbance, but Malinovsky and Chkheidze had had to be taken out by force. Thereupon, he had tried to persuade his colleagues not to return at all to the Duma, but to "appeal to the masses against it." A quiet return to the Duma would be shameful. It was time to have recourse to more revolutionary methods. He was voted down. All the suspended returned to the Duma on May 7th and tried to make statements of protest. They were denied the floor. But Malinovsky continued to shout his protest until the guards removed him once more. The next day he handed in his resignation.

That same day, Chairman Rodzyanko received a visit from Assistant Minister of the Interior Junkovsky who informed him, "in strict confidence," that the departed Deputy had been a police agent and had been ordered to resign to avoid a possible scandal. Rodzyanko was told that he might inform the Presidium of the Duma, but that the secret should go no farther, or the good name of the Duma itself would be compromised. The last police entry on Malinovsky was a dismissal bonus of 6000 rubles to start life anew abroad. Now *Luch* remembered its old anonymous letter. Rumors swirled around the corridors of the Tauride Palace and soon the entire press was speaking of "dark police complications." But when Lenin's friend Bonch-Bruyevich, as correspondent of the Kharkov daily *Utro*, sent a dispatch of the same tenor to his paper, he received a sharp telegram from Lenin categorically denying the allegation. For the ever reckless Malinovsky, despite the peril of his situation, had gone straight to Lenin in Cracow!

There he had given several contradictory "political" and "personal" versions of his flight, then, on closer questioning, had "confessed" that in his youth he had been sentenced for an attempt at rape, which the police now threatened to expose if the most useful of the Bolshevik deputies did not resign from the Duma. While Lenin was pondering this, the Menshevik and Liquidator press arrived with their reports of rumors that the Bolshevik leader had been a police spy. Martov and Dan raised the question: was it not factionalism itself that enabled unreliable elements to rise so high in the Party? They demanded a non-factional or multi-factional party tribunal to investigate the case, political and personal, of Roman Malinovsky. For Lenin, and for his faction now representing itself as the Social Democratic Party, the situation was fraught with

potential disaster. What a weapon against Bolshevism would be provided by the knowledge that its outstanding spokesman and leader inside Russia was a police agent! What universal demoralization if this man who knew everybody, had travelled everywhere, had had in his hands all connections, all secret lists of members, sympathizers and contributors of funds to *Pravda*, should turn out to be a police spy!

In the name of the Party (i.e. the Bolshevik) Central Committee, an investigating commission was immediately set up. It consisted of Lenin, Zinoviev, and Hanecki, a Polish Social Democrat of the Warsaw Opposition and a close supporter of the Bolsheviks. No Mensheviks were included. This commission heard testimony from Malinovsky, from Bukharin who reiterated his old charges, from Mrs. Troyanovsky who told the circumstances of her arrest and release, and testified that her interlocutors had shown knowledge of matters which, in her judgment, only Malinovsky could have told them. Burtsev was asked his opinion. He answered that he thought the Duma Deputy a "dirty fellow but not a police agent."

Bukharin's reminiscences of that difficult moment were published in *Pravda* on January 21, 1925, one year after Lenin's death:

"I distinctly hear Ilyich walking downstairs. He does not sleep. He goes out on the terrace, prepares tea, and up and back he strides on the terrace. He strides and strides, stops, and again strides up and down. Thus the night passes. . . .

"Morning. I go out. Ilyich is neatly dressed. Under his eyes are yellow circles. His face is that of an ill man. But he laughs gaily, the accustomed gestures, the accustomed sureness:

" 'Well, what do you say, did you sleep well? Ha, ha, ha! Good. Want tea? Want bread? Let's go for a walk?' Just as if nothing had happened. Just as if there had not been a night of torture, suffering, doubt, cogitation, tense mental effort. No, Ilyich had donned the mail of his steel will. Was there anything that could break it?"

That night, sentimentally remembered by Bukharin, Lenin decided to exonerate Malinovsky of the main charge against him, and to pronounce Martov and Dan "malicious slanderers." When Bukharin's reminiscence appeared, Martov's paper took it to mean that Lenin, during that tortured night, had knowingly decided to defend a police spy and attack his accusers out of cold factional calculation. But the passage we have quoted is capable of another interpretation: that Lenin had succeeded in convincing himself of

the falsity of the charge. Which interpretation is correct? Let us examine the available evidence.

"Vladimir Ilyich thought it utterly impossible for Malinovsky to have been an *agent provocateur*," records Krupskaya. "These rumors came from Menshevik circles. . . The commission investigated all the rumors but could not obtain any definite proof of the charge. . . Only once did a doubt flash across his mind. I remember one day in Poronin (the summer residence of the Ulyanovs where the trial took place), we were returning from the Zinovievs and talking about these rumors. All of a sudden Ilyich stopped on the little bridge we were crossing and said: 'It may be true!'—and his face expressed anxiety. 'What are you talking about, It's nonsense,' I answered deprecatingly. Ilyich calmed down and began to abuse the Mensheviks, saying that they were unscrupulous as to the means they employed in the struggle against the Bolsheviks. He had no further doubts on the question."

"*These rumors came from Menshevik circles. . .*" Here was the key to Lenin's reaction. The Bolshevik press adopted a resolution condemning Malinovsky for "indiscipline . . . desertion of his post . . . disorganizing departure . . . a crime which placed him outside the ranks of the Social Democratic Party." And condemning the Liquidators (Martov was now always treated as a Liquidator too) for "hurling dirty and malicious slanders at the former deputy, like the rightist press which spreads slanderous rumors in order to bring confusion into the ranks of the workers."

In the Bolshevik theoretical organ, *Prosveshchenie* (Enlightenment), Lenin wrote a long article, not against Malinovsky but against Martov and Dan, under the title: *The Methods of Struggle of Bourgeois Intellectuals against the Workers*.

In it Martov and Dan are denounced as incurable gossipy old women who live for scandal ("like insects that defend themselves by secreting an evil smelling fluid"). They are worse than other Liquidators. Martov's famous pamphlet against Lenin, *Saviors or Destroyers*, is retroactively denounced as another example of this "impermissible, dirty, slanderous" method. To the proposal for an impartial court of investigation, Lenin answered:

"We do not believe one single word of Dan and Martov. We will never enter into any 'investigation' of dark rumors in which the Liquidators and the grouplets which support them may take part. . . If Martov and Dan, plus their concealers, the Bundists, Chkheidze

and Co., the 'August Bloc People' etc. directly or indirectly invite us to a common 'investigation,' we answer them: we don't trust Martov and Dan. We do not regard them as honest citizens. We will deal with them only as common criminals—only so, and not otherwise. . . . If a man says, make political concessions to me, recognise me as an equal comrade of the Marxist community or I will set up a howl about the rumors of the *provocateur* activity of Malinovsky, that is political blackmail. Against blackmail we are always and unconditionally for the bourgeois legality of the bourgeois court. . . . Either you make a public accusation signed with your signature so that the bourgeois court can expose and punish you (there are no other means of fighting blackmail), or you remain as people branded . . . as slanderers by the workers. . . ."

So far had the atmosphere been embittered since the unity Congresses of 1906 and 1907.⁹ The main steps towards this impasse had been the public exposure of Lenin's responsibility for the revolutionary robberies (Martov's *Saviors or Destroyers*, 1911), Lenin's seizure of the party apparatus at the Prague Conference (January 1912), the maneuvers of Lenin and Malinovsky to smash the unified Duma Fraction (December 1912 to October 1913), and now the rumors that the Bolshevik Duma leader was a police agent. Lenin did not have enough faith in Martov and Dan as fellow Social Democrats to sit on a common committee with them. But he believed Malinovsky! This embitterment, this factional momentum, was one of the incalculable component forces entering into the final split of 1917. Even the fact that Martov was a Menshevik Internationalist and Lenin a Bolshevik Internationalist could not bring them together during the World War, which both opposed.

IV

A careful weighing of the evidence leaves no doubt in our minds but that Lenin believed Malinovsky's story of his early conviction for attempted rape, and resignation of his mandate under threat of exposure.

"One feels ashamed for mankind," wrote Lenin on June 4 1914, "when one sees how the personal misfortune of a man is utilized for a struggle against an opposing political tendency."

⁹See note 1.

That was a little over a month before the War began. Lenin's treatment of Malinovsky during the war, when the latter was an obscure prisoner in a German prison camp, demonstrates his conviction of the ex-deputy's innocence of the police charge. Lenin sent him reading matter and material for agitation among the other Russian prisoners. Krupskaya sent him food parcels, took care of his laundry and clothes, and performed other services that had no political meaning beyond that of acts of personal comradeship. Late in 1916 (two or three months before his exposure) the Bolshevik paper, *Sotsial Demokrat* publicly stated that Malinovsky had been "fully rehabilitated" by his subsequent conduct, for his past crime of desertion of his post.

"I did not believe," testified Citizen Ulyanov before the Extraordinary Investigating Commission of the Provisional Government, "in provocation here, and for the following reason: If Malinovsky were a *provocateur*, the Okhrana would not gain from that as much as our Party did from *Pravda* and the whole legal apparatus. It is clear that by bringing a *provocateur* into the Duma and eliminating for that purpose all the competitors of Bolshevism, etc., the Okhrana was guided by a gross conception of Bolshevism, I should say rather, a crude, homemade (*lubochnyi*) caricature. They imagined that the Bolsheviks would 'arrange an armed insurrection.' In order to keep all the threads of this coming insurrection in their hands, they thought it worth while to have recourse to all sorts of things to bring Malinovsky into the Duma and the Central Committee. But when the Okhrana succeeded in both these matters, what happened? It happened that Malinovsky was transformed into one of the links of the long and solid chain connecting our illegal base with the two chief legal organs by which our Party influenced the masses: *Pravda* and the Duma Fraction. The *agent provocateur* had to serve both these organs in order to justify his vocation.

"Both these organs were under our immediate guidance. Zinoviev and I wrote daily to *Pravda* and its policy was entirely determined by the resolutions of the Party. Our influence over forty to sixty thousand workers was thus secured. . ."¹⁰

As always, to Lenin a gain for the faction was equivalent to a gain for "our party" and for "the revolution." Whether he was right in calculating that the split in the Duma was a gain, or whether

¹⁰*Vestnik Vremennogo Pravitelstva* (News Bulletin of the Provisional government), June 16, 1917, p. 3, as confirmed and slightly modified by Lenin in *Pravda*.

the police were right in thinking it a loss to the revolutionary movement, we must leave to the reader to decide as he considers the events of the year 1917. At any rate, the police were so convinced of the desirability of a split that the loss of Malinovsky's services and the alarming news that the International Socialist Bureau was calling a new unity conference caused them to issue a general circular of instructions to all their subordinates and secret agents. Beletsky was no longer police head, and Assistant Minister Junkovsky was now the deciding force, yet the political line of the police remained the same. The circular read:

"Information received from political agents points to a tendency recently exhibited within the ranks of the Russian Social Democratic Party towards the unification of the different factions. . . . In view of the exceptional gravity of this intention and the undesirability of its taking effect, the Police Department considers it necessary to . . . impress upon their secret agents the necessity for participating in the various party conferences, there to insist, firmly and convincingly, upon the utter impossibility of any such fusion, particularly the fusion of the Bolsheviks and the Mensheviks."¹¹

V

The last act in this strange drama of Roman Malinovsky occurred in November 1918, when Lenin had been in power for a full year. On November 2, reckless adventurer to the end, Malinovsky turned up in Petrograd. For three successive days he visited the Smolny Institute (Bolshevik Headquarters) and demanded to be arrested, or taken to see Lenin. On the third day, Zinoviev saw him and ordered his arrest. He was taken to Moscow for trial. The Bolshevik Krylenko, who was later to conduct so many prosecutions until he himself disappeared in a purge, was appointed as prosecutor. He knew the defendant well since he too had reason to believe that one of his arrests by the Tsarist police was Malinovsky's work. The trial was swift and secret. But the workers organizations of Moscow sent deputations to attend, for they feared that Lenin might exonerate their ex-deputy once more.

We are able to reconstruct some of the episodes from two sources: Burtsev, who had exposed Azev and Zhitomirsky but slipped up on

¹¹Russian text in *Rabochaya Gazeta*, April 1917; English text in Kerensky, *The Crucifixion of Liberty*, N. Y., John Day, 1934, p. 246.

Malinovsky, was in a prison cell in Moscow at that moment, and his cell mate was the ex-Director of Police Beletsky, who testified at the trial. Burtsev has recorded the proceedings as reported to him by Beletsky.¹² The other source is the guarded account given by various Bolshevik writers, the most accessible in English being that of Malinovsky's Duma colleague, Deputy Badaev.¹³ The two sources coincide sufficiently for us to make a fair picture of the proceedings.

Malinovsky's bearing was proud and challenging. Repeatedly he demanded that Lenin be summoned, but his request was refused. Lenin, he asserted, must have known of his rôle after his resignation from the Duma. He had often tried to tell Lenin that his past was filled with abominations, but Lenin refused to listen saying that for Bolsheviks these personal misdeeds of his youth had no meaning. Did not Lenin know that the police had a hold on him, yet permitted him to rise to prominence? Did not Lenin know of the charges against him by Bukharin, Rozmirovich, Krylenko, Petrovsky? Yet Lenin had permitted him to rehabilitate himself in a German prison camp, making propaganda among Russian prisoners for Bolshevism. Had not the Bolshevik organ, *Sotsial Demokrat*, in December 1916 declared that Malinovsky had been "fully rehabilitated" for his past indiscipline by his present services?

"The best period of my life was the two and one-half years which I devoted to propaganda among the Russian prisoners in Germany. I have done a great deal during that time for the spread of the ideas of Bolshevism."¹⁴

"He alleged that he was forced to become an *agent-provocateur* because he was already completely in the hands of the police. He represented his career as a long martyrdom, accompanied by suffering and remorse from which he could not escape. . . . He tried to prove that he left the Duma of his own free will because of personal unhappiness, and that he obtained permission from the police to quit politics. . . . He adopted a pose of sincere repentance while admitting the gravity of his crimes."¹⁵

A notable procession of witnesses testified against him: ex-Police Chief Beletsky; ex-Assistant Chief Vissarionov; ex-Minister Ma-

¹²Vladimir Burtsev, "Lenin and Malinovsky," *Struggling Russia*, Vol. 1, No. 9-10, May 17, 1919.

¹³*The Bolsheviks in the Tsarist Duma*, N. Y., International Publishers, pp. 161-2.

¹⁴Quoted from Burtsev.

¹⁵Quoted from Badaev.

karov; ex-Assistant Minister Junkovsky; former Deputies Badaev and Petrovsky; and many of the men and women he had betrayed. Both Junkovsky and Beletsky were asked leading questions tending to prove that his activities had benefited the Bolsheviks more than the police. Beletsky agreed to this, but Junkovsky, said Burtsev, declared that he was "an honest monarchist and that he could not enter into a discussion of that question."

His closing words, according to Badaev, were a profession of sincere repentance and a reminder that he had returned voluntarily to Bolshevik Russia knowing that he could expect nothing but the death penalty. And according to Burtsev:

"When the Revolution triumphed in Germany and Russia and the possibility to participate prominently in political activities was lost to him forever, he decided to go back and die, rather than to flee into the obscurity of an Argentina or a similar place of refuge. Of course, he could have committed suicide, but he preferred to die in view of everybody, and had no fear of death."

The verdict was the firing squad. At 2 A.M. of the very morning after the trial ended, he was shot. Not long thereafter, his former chief, the ex-Police Director Beletsky, and that other chief who had forced his resignation from the Duma, the ex-Assistant Minister of the Interior Junkovsky, met the same end. Burtsev was released from jail and fled beyond the frontier of Soviet Russia.

Russia's Attempts to Open Japan

By HARRY EMERSON WILDES

SIXTY men in half a dozen rowboats seem no serious menace to the stability of an empire yet, in August 1711, Japan trembled at their coming. At the northernmost tip of Shimusu island, remotest of the Kuriles, the invaders were at least 1300 miles distant from the capital, but Japan was panicky with fear.

Strong words, these, but they are true. When fifty Russian adventurers and eleven Kamchadals, guided by a shipwrecked Japanese who did not know the region, crossed the ten mile wide Kuril strait between Cape Lopatka in Kamchatka and Shimusu island, Nippon went through ecstasies of terror.

For more than seventy years gullible Japanese had swallowed wild rumors that the Russians were giant Red Hairs who fed on human flesh. Ever since the arrival of the Muscovites at the Sea of Okhotsk in 1638, the Japanese had expected a descent upon Japan. Then, as now, Japan craved sensation; in Nippon rumor always reigns supreme. The coming of the sixty Russians in their rowboat flotilla was magnified into the report that an irresistible armada had come to conquer. Indeed, to this day, Japanese historians report the enterprise as a Russian naval expedition seeking to annex Japan.

Not that Ivan Petrovich Kozyrevsky, leader of the oarsmen-adventurers and first Russian to set foot on Japan's soil, would have disclaimed such intention. Russified grandson of a Polish prisoner of war, he entertained delusions of grandeur; he shared the Japanese delusion that his sixty associates were a mighty force.

"Our purpose," he told his men, "is to investigate Kamchatka and the nearby islands, to inquire into what government the people owe allegiance and to force tribute from those who have no sovereign, to inform ourselves as fully as may be possible about Japan and the way thither, what weapons the people have and how they wage war, whether they might be willing to enter into friendly and commercial relations with Russia and, if so, what kind of merchandise they might be induced to buy."

Commercial and political reconnaissance, however, took secondary place in Kozyrevsky's mind to military conquest. Upon arrival on Shimusu he opened fire upon the unarmed Kurile natives, killed ten

of them and wounded others, and compelled the rest to promise "eternal subjection" to the Tsar. It is extremely doubtful whether any of the Kuriles who gave that pledge had the slightest understanding of what they were promising, or to whom they were swearing allegiance, since the Japanese fisherman-interpreter had but a limited knowledge of Russian and Kozyrevsky knew nothing of Japanese, but Kozyrevsky was content; he forwarded to Peter the Great these empty oaths of loyalty.

It is not in the least unthinkable that at some future day of treaty making, those Kozyrevsky pledges, exhumed from the Moscow or Leningrad files, might become the basis for a Russian claim to territory!

If so, their application must be limited, for they cover Shimusu island only. Kozyrevsky, disappointed at finding no wealth upon the little island, moved south to neighboring Paramushiru to seek sable skins and fox furs, as well as to exact more submissions. But then, as well as now, Paramushiru was heavily armed and the natives proved hostile. To Kozyrevsky's demand for surrender, the Kuriles replied proudly, "We are no one's subjects and we pay no tribute." There were, the Kuriles added, neither foxes nor sables in the neighborhood, although beaver was plentiful, but, in any case, all trade was pledged to the Japanese and there was nothing to sell to Russia.

Kozyrevsky fumed but he dared take no aggression. For two days he lurked in the neighborhood, hoping to catch the Paramushiru garrison off guard—he even thought of moving south to Onnekotan but the strait was too wide to cross in skiffs; then, empty-handed, he went back to Kamchatka.

If the Russian Tsar gained nothing by the visit, nor by subsequent "voyages" in the summers of 1712 and 1713, to Shimusu, Paramushiru, and Onnekotan—Kozyrevsky fared better. To Peter the Great the expedition leader sent small quantities of silk and metal, together with a highly fanciful chart showing the approximate, and very inaccurate, locations of the fifteen largest islands of the Kurile chain, but, for himself, Kozyrevsky retained the major portion of the stores entrusted to his care. His sudden prosperity attracted attention, and he was arrested on charges of embezzlement and sedition. Thereupon, surrendering his loot, he took orders, became a Siberian peasant saint of the Rasputin pattern and spent the remainder of his life in denouncing the authorities.

Russia, disillusioned about wealth to be gained in the Kuriles, stepped cautiously thereafter. On receipt of the Kozyrevsky map,

Peter the Great, in 1720, dispatched two special agents, Feodor Luzhin and Ivan Evreinov, to check the chart. They managed to follow the Kurile chain as far as Shasukotan, the fifth island, but there they quarrelled so bitterly that the expedition turned back. Five years thereafter, Peter died, leaving Russia in such confusion that Eastern expansion halted.

If Russia really meditated conquest, which is doubtful, it was an inappropriate time to cease activity. Japan was torn by dissension. Immediately after Kozyrevsky's rowboat voyaging, 20,000 peasants in Musashi, in the suburbs of what is now Tokyo, rose against their landlords. Coincident with the Luzhin-Evreinov scouting, agrarian unrest broke out in the northern province of Mutsu. The uprisings had not the faintest connection with Russian arrivals but Japanese officialdom insisted that the *kami*, Japan's gods, had been so outraged by the profanation of Nippon's sacred soil that disaster had been inevitable. In order to prevent further calamity, Japan tightened her already stringent restrictions against foreigners.

Had Russia descended in force upon Japan in the early years of the eighteenth century, conquest of the Kuriles might not have been difficult, but the sad fact was that Russian explorers were far too engrossed in personal quarrels to spare any time for annexing territory to the Tsar's domains. The Japan section of Vitus Bering's famous expedition, for example, spent three years on the shores of the Sea of Okhotsk in two hostile camps, fortified against each other, while officers and men spent most of their time hurling violent abuse across the barricades.

Captain Martin Spanberg, a fellow Dane assigned by Bering to sail along the Kuriles to Japan, continued the vendetta in 1738 from his sixty foot flagship, *Archangel Michael*. His subordinates, William Walton and Alexander Shelting, commanding smaller ships, were, Spanberg said, nothing but drunken louts who could not keep their records straight. Walton and Shelting, two Britons, retorted that Spanberg was not only a liar but a nincompoop; they added that no Russian knew how to sail a boat and that the crews were wholly incompetent. This sounds as though Walton and Shelting were friends but the fact is that they were agreed only in their opinion of Spanberg; it is no exaggeration to say that every ship's officer hated all the rest and that all of them were cordially detested by their crews. Under such circumstances, it is not surprising that the backbiting voyagers managed to sail as far as Uruppu, well down the Kurile chain, before turning back. No landings had been anywhere attempted.

Next year, 1739, the angry rivals, Spanberg and Walton, set out independently, each resolved to outdo the other. As might have been anticipated under such conditions, each returned with news of successful accomplishment. Each man, assured that his competitor could not check his reports, announced that he had reached Japan proper. Spanberg, according to his own story, touched at a port in the neighborhood of Mito, though apparently not at Mito itself, and was welcomed by "important looking officials" bearing gifts of gold coin, rice, tobacco, and fish. He had, Spanberg declared, reciprocated by offering sweets and brandy which, he said, were much relished. But he refused a pressing invitation to go ashore.

Walton's *St. Gabriel*, not to be outdone, announced similar experiences. The Briton, it appeared, had fallen in with a stray Japanese junk which escorted him to Kochi, on Tosa Bay in Shikoku, where Kazimirov, his mate, and seven sailors were allowed to land. Here, too, presents were exchanged. Though Walton did not have the imagination to speak of high officials bearing strings of fish nor of gifts of candy in exchange, he did declare that "a limited trade was permitted." If Walton's story is correct, this marks the beginning of Russo-Japanese commercial relations.

If Walton's story is correct! Great difficulty lies in assaying the degree of truth each skipper used. Spanberg looked over Walton's log and found flaws enough to fill a sixteen-page notebook full of criticisms and corrections; Walton retorted that Spanberg himself was an unmitigated liar. Indeed, Walton implied, Spanberg was so far amiss that instead of having visited Mito province, the Spanberg ship must have been actually on the west coast of Japan and if the captain had seen any land at all, it must have been Korea.

A geographic quarrel hotter than the famous Cook-Pearry controversy flared immediately. Savants of the Admiralty, the Naval Academy, and the Academy of Sciences puzzled over the evidence. Their decision was a masterpiece of tactfulness. Both Spanberg and Walton, they announced, were correct; it all depended upon which maps were used. By Spanberg's chart, which they agreed was probably more nearly accurate, the ship had been at Mito, but, they hastened to admit, reasonable basis existed for the belief, that if one used Walton's map, Spanberg must have seen Korea. The decision speaks volumes for the accuracy of the charts prepared by Kozyrevsky and by the Luzhin-Evreinov experts, as well as for the navigational skill of the rival skippers.

However this may be, the Russian attempts at exploration coin-

cided with still more internal troubles in Japan. In 1739, a serious farmer uprising in Mutsu protested taxes equal to 50 per cent of farm produce; no less than 84,600 rebels, according to Japanese accounts, marched on Matsudaira fortress. In the region where Walton said he called, silver miners, striking against the increased cost of living, jam-packed a ten mile road leading from Ikuno to Takeda. At Hido, in Bingo province, ten villages demonstrated against their overlords. All three disturbances, with which Russians had nothing whatever to do, were laid by Japanese propagandists at the doors of the foreigners, thus intensifying the anti-alien feelings of the general public.

For years thereafter, Russia, distrusting all Japanese news and engrossed in her problems nearer home, ceased her efforts concerning Japan.

Again, as in the case of Denbei at the opening of the century, a castaway Japanese sailor roused interest in Japan. Captain Daikokuya Kodaya, skipper of a junk wrecked on the Aleutians in 1782, refused repatriation lest he be killed for having visited foreign lands: he, like Denbei, became "professor of Japanese" at Irkutsk. Eventually, Catherine the Great sent for him to appear at her court.

No one who attended Kodaya's audience ever forgot the event. The former sea captain turned professor appeared with his jet black hair hanging in three pigtailed behind his shoulders. A silver suit, embroidered in rose, over blue brocade, set off by huge red buttons, made him the center of attention, particularly as he insisted upon carrying into the audience chamber not only a great black hat but also a massive cane. As this apparition appeared before her, Catherine extended her hand in greeting. Kodaya, whose Japanese training included nothing remotely bearing on public osculation, bent over, and while the Tsarina awaited the polite courtesy kiss, Kodaya carefully licked the royal hand.

"I did not know what to do," Kodaya explained later. "The Court ladies stood beautiful as snow. I was terribly confused."

So must Catherine also have been, but since all this occurred at a time when she was cultivating contacts with the East, she overlooked unconventionality. Over the rose-and-silver professor's protests, she ordered the repatriation of the shipwrecked sailors and she sent an emissary to open trade with forbidden Japan.

The man chosen as leader was young Lieutenant Adam Laxman, graduate of Kodaya's courses. Supremely confident that the Japanese would welcome the returned mariners, he overruled Kodaya, as

Catherine also had done, and, in the spring of 1793, arrived at Matsumai, now called Fukuyama, the southernmost settlement of the Hokkaido. Immediately upon his landing at that remote village, Laxman and his fifty Russians were clapped into jail.

Kimura, the Shogun's under-officer, explained the reason. "The usual penalty for breaking the Japanese exclusion law is life imprisonment, but since you are foreigners and do not know the law, we will not insist upon this penalty. Instead, you must go back to Kamchatka and never return to Japan. You may, if you desire, leave these shipwrecked men with us, to be dealt with as the law commands, but never again, under any circumstances, must you bring back any of our subjects who are cast away. By our law, shipwrecked sailors are the property of that nation upon whose shores they may be cast."

Laxman left the unfortunate waifs. Kodaya and his fellow-countrymen were hurried down to Yedo and were given an audience before Shogun Iyenori in his Fukiage garden—a most unwonted honor for the skipper of a junk. But after the unfortunates were thus displayed, they were locked up for life. So isolated were they that their memory was long forgotten; indeed, even their names remained unknown until well within the present century.

Returning to St. Petersburg, Laxman, whose knowledge of Japanese conferred no credit on Kodaya's school, committed an unpardonable blunder. Presenting an official paper, signed by Kimura, he explained that the document represented permission for a Russian ship to pay an annual visit for trade at Nagasaki. It was, in reality, as luckless Russians were later to discover, no such permission, but merely a letter of introduction to the Nagasaki port officials in case Laxman should ever arrive at that harbor where Holland had a trade monopoly.

As a matter of fact, even this introduction proved of slight value, as Adam Ivanovich Krusenstern, commanding the *Nadezhda*, learned in 1804. Of this episode, little need be said, for the story of Krusenstern and of his partner, Nicolai Petrovich Rezanov, in their attempt to open Japan for the benefit of the Russian-American Trading Company is too well known. Usually, however, the details of how the Russians were confined, first to their ship for six weeks' time, and then to a "walking ground" ashore, the size of a tennis court, are entirely omitted. So, too, is the tale of how the nineteen Russians and five returning Japanese were jailed for twenty-four weeks in a dark, filthy fish warehouse before being ignominiously dismissed

empty handed. The five castaways remained behind; nothing is known of their fate.

Russia herself was too much overcome by Austerlitz to take active vengeance upon the Japanese for their insulting cruelty, but officers stationed in remote Siberia felt the slight upon their honor. While Krusenstern pursued his circumnavigation of the globe, the first Russian to emulate Magellan, Rezanov had returned to Siberia to tell his story. He commissioned two young naval officers, Lieutenants Nicholas Alexander Khvostov and Gavrila Ivanovich Davidov, to avenge his treatment.

In Japanese annals these hotheaded boys are the villains of Russo-Japanese relations. Kozyrevsky was evil enough, but to this day the exploits of Khvostov and Davidov are, in Japanese minds, the true cause of hostilities. Lads in their early twenties, with no balance wheel to govern their emotions, these beardless boys set out with alacrity to prove their mettle. Probably they were seeking reputations that would warrant their transfer to the more interesting battlegrounds of the West but they went about their tasks with the indiscriminate madness of adolescents. As late as 1882, the chief of Japan's Geographical Society, Admiral Viscount Buyo Enomoto, wrote a series of articles tracing the origin of Russo-Japanese hostility to their activities.

Leading sixty-five men, the crews of two small "men-of-war," they fell unexpectedly upon Kushunkotan, on the west coast of the narrow neck of southern Saghalien. Why they chose this small village, remote from both Nagasaki and from the Kuriles, as the target for their wrath, is shrouded in mystery, unless it was closest to their Siberian headquarters; at any rate, they robbed rice warehouses, captured a Japanese, and set the town afire. Before they left, they nailed upon the torii of the temple, far enough removed from any building to escape the flames, a copper plate bearing a message to Japan. The message was an ultimatum, demanding that Japan open trade relations under penalty of ravaging all Saghalien. Because of the mistreatment of Rezanov, who could not "even buy a fan or a snuffbox while at Nagasaki," Russia—in other words Khvostov and Davidov—announced the impending Russian annexation of Uruppu and Etorofu, the two largest Kuriles, on neither of which a Russian had thus far set foot.

Japan, jittery and yet determined, rushed three thousand soldiers northward to Hakodate in the Hokkaido where they would be equally available for warfare in either Saghalien or the Kuriles.

They were none too soon; in the spring of 1807 the two boys, leading now two hundred soldiers, fell upon Naiho, in south Etorofu, where they attacked a thousand unarmed Ainus and three hundred unarmed Japanese fishermen. After a Homeric struggle, in which five Japanese were taken captive, the Russians withdrew, bearing with them as their sole trophies, all the settlement's spare clothing.

Next they appeared before Shana where they stole the rice and sake and uprooted a row of ornamental spears set before the gates of the headman's home; they burned this village also to the ground. Two men were lost in this engagement; they had, it seems, drunk too much sake and had gone to sleep in the midst of battle. The Japanese captured the men, speared them to death, and then salted their heads for shipment to Hakodate.

This still further infuriated Khvostov and Davidov who sated their anger by assaulting the tiny island of Rishiri off the northwest corner of the Hokkaido. Before they left, they warned Japan that unless she granted trading rights to Russia, she would lose all her northern provinces.

Russia was not, however, alone in boasting swashbucklers. Informing the Shogun of these attacks by "five hundred Red Hairs, each eleven or twelve feet tall," Kozo Hirayama, a warrior who had not been active in the fighting, promised, if given a thousand Japanese convicts, to conquer all of Russia. The proposal was solemnly debated but was shelved when Sadanobu Matsudaira, naval expert, reported to the Shogun:

"If instructions should be issued to proceed to the capital of Russia and capture it, it would scarcely be possible to carry these out with only one or two ships."

Khvostov and Davidov, in the meanwhile, had returned to Russia, where they died in a foolhardy, schoolboy-like attempt to leap across an open drawbridge in the dark. Possibly death was a happy escape for them, since St. Petersburg, learning what had happened in the Kuriles, totally disavowed their deeds by placing all responsibility upon the Russian-American Trading Company which, the government added, was officered by "persons of no great distinction." Khvostov, Davidov, and local officials in Siberia were wholly to blame, Russia said, for the Kurile raids.

"These local officials," Russia added, in order to make the disclaimer seem more real, "are all rogues. None but vagabonds and adventurers ever enter into the Company's service as fur collectors.

Often they are criminals. In both Kamchatka and America they tyrannize over the natives. Their idleness, drunkenness, and debauchery are notorious enough, but to make it worse, the Company agents seduce and stimulate them to drink brandy to excess."

Japan remained wholly unconvinced. When, in 1811, Captain Vasily Mikhailovich Golovnin arrived in Japan on the sloop *Diana* to survey the coast and to make peaceful agreements, the Japanese took him prisoner, corded him cruelly and led him, jailed in a bird cage in which he could neither sit nor stand erect, through the principal cities of Japan. He remained a prisoner for more than two years.

Eventually, however, he was freed and returned to Russia. His *Memoirs of a Captivity in Japan*, a three volume encyclopedia of Japanese religion, government, geography, products, laws and customs, long remained Russia's chief source of information about her secluded Eastern neighbor. In short, Golovnin successfully performed what had been asked in vain from Kozyrevsky, Spanberg, Laxman, and Krusenstern.¹

¹For general background of the Russo-Japanese relations as told herein, see:

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Kaitskushi. *Hokkaido-shi*, Tokyo, 1884.

Morishima, Churyo. *Komo Zatsuwa*, Yedo, 1787.

"Japan and Russia in the 17th Century," Excerpts from *Life of Masamune Date*, in *Tokyo Times*, December 14 and 21, 1878.

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Latest Trends in the Soviet Theatre

By ALEXANDER BAKSHY

SINCE the foundation of the Moscow Art Theatre in 1898, Russia, during the two decades preceding the Revolution, was pre-eminently the theatrical laboratory of the world. Experimental work on the stage went hand in hand with experimental work in drama. The Moscow Art Theatre's search for new realist-impressionist forms of acting was paralleled in the plays of Chekhov and Gorky, in the adaptations of Dostoevsky, and in the works of lesser writers. Meyerhold's interest in the evocative powers of the stage as revealed in stylized settings and acting and, later, in the frank underscoring of the natural conventions of the theatre, was echoed in the works of Leonid Andreev, Alexander Blok, and Alexey Remizov who, like Meyerhold, sought to express a mystic, other-worldly quality of life.

The situation witnessed a notable change after the Revolution. For some ten years the directors went on experimenting, though often carrying their theories to absurd conclusions (as in constructivism) which almost destroyed the theatre as a form of art. On the other hand, the playwrights, with the possible exception of Mayakovsky, evidenced little originality of form or any marked ability as writers. Not until the late Twenties did the Soviet drama begin to show signs of resurgence. At that time a number of plays appeared which were instilled with an emotional and imaginative power of an undeniably high order. Some of those plays were frankly romantic, like Vishnevsky's "The Optimistic Tragedy," others realistic but highly charged with tragic heroism, like Vsevolod Ivanov's "Armored Train 14-69," others still presented an effective mixture of realistic comedy and melodrama, like Constantin Trenev's "Lubov Yarovaya." The significant fact about those plays was the source of their inspiration, the pathos of the revolutionary struggle.

The years that followed this brief outburst of creative imagination, up to the very eve of the German invasion, produced innumerable plays, but one would be hard put to it to find more than a bare half dozen among them that have stood the test of time and are still

capable of moving an audience. Whether the blame for this should be laid on "socialist realism" which as an official doctrine for all forms of art dominated the Soviet drama during that period, or on the pursuit of topical themes in the conditions of a constantly changing social and economic scene, is difficult to say. The sad fact remains that the great majority of those exercises on the themes of the industrialization of the country, the collectivization of farms, and the struggle with the so-called "wreckers," are not only hopelessly dated, but were mechanical and synthetic even at the time of their appearance.

However, mention should be made of the few happy exceptions. Nikolay Pogodin's "The Man with the Gun" and "Chimes of the Kremlin," two lively, if loosely constructed, plays picturing the early years of the Soviet régime, ring true to this day in spite of their emphasized political message. Most of the other plays of this able and prolific author fall into the category of uninspired exercises on set themes, only occasionally relieved by flashes of talent. A much more talented writer, Leonid Leonov, who never descends to obvious propaganda, wrote several plays before the war, which were marked by his characteristic intensity of feeling and a keen interest in unusual characters with a twisted soul and an embittered outlook upon life. Of these plays "Polovchanskiye sady" (The Orchards of Polovchansk), with its subtle interplay of emotions reminiscent of Synge and Ibsen, is the only one that is wholly convincing and satisfying. In fact, it is a beautiful play and one of the very best in the Russian drama of this century. A play out of the common run is Ivan Kocherga's "The Watchmaker and the Hen," a comedy of situations, sometimes farcical, sometimes wistful, in which a poet's imagination is allowed to play with the whimsical concept of two kinds of time, the ordinary time, measured by the clock, such as governs the natural sequence of events, and the revolutionary time, rushing here, tarrying there, but always unpredictable in its results. Two plays with the lyrical quality of Chekhov, only keyed in a major tone, are the delectably earthy "Krutoyar" (Steep Bank) by A. Savelev and E. Raimond, which for some mysterious reason has never been produced, and "Dalyokoye" (known in an English translation as "Distant Point") by A. Afinogenov, a charming picture, occasionally touched with tragic overtones, of the old and the new in Soviet life as it is lived on a little railway station almost isolated from the world in the depth of the Siberian *taiga*. There is little that one could add

to this list, except perhaps V. Shkvarkin's "Nobody's Child" which pokes gentle fun at the discomfiture of two old-fashioned parents obliged to adjust themselves to their daughter's expected, but mysterious motherhood, which in the end turns out to be a hoax.

The dearth of good Soviet plays before the war was painfully felt by all concerned with the well-being of the Soviet theatre. More and more the directors and theatre managers found themselves obliged to fill the gap with Russian and foreign plays by classic authors. Indisputable evidence of this is contained in the daily newspaper lists of current shows. Here it will be sufficient to quote some figures on the hits of the first six months of 1940. Thirty-seven new productions were presented in the Moscow theatres during that period. Reviewing the season the *Sovietskoye Iskusstvo* (Soviet Art; July 9, 1940) singles out the following as artistic successes:

Chekhov's "Three Sisters," at the Moscow Art Theatre; Gutzkow's "Uriel Acosta," at the Maly Theatre; Molière's "Tartuffe," at the Moscow Art Theatre; Gogol's "Revizor," at the Vakhtangov Theatre; Shakespeare's "As You Like It," at the Yermolova Theatre; Schiller's "Maria Stuart," at the Lensoviet Theatre; Gorky's "The Zykovs," at the Lenin Komsomol Theatre; Sukhovo-Kobylin's "Delo" (A Law-Suit), at the Central Red Army Theatre. Of the new Soviet plays it includes in the list only four: V. Solovyov's "Field-Marshal Kutuzov," at the Vakhtangov Theatre; "Pir" (The Feast) by Peretz Markish, at the State Jewish Theatre, "Sashka" by Constantin Finn, at the Theatre of Satire, and "Prostyia serdtsa" (Simple Hearts) by Constantin Paustovsky, at the Theatre of Revolution.

It is notable that in this list of successes there is not one play dealing with such political themes as the Five-Year-Plan, the kulaks, the wreckers, or the achievements of the Red Army. Of course many such plays were produced during that season (as during every season before that), and as usual many dithyrambs were sung to them by the reviewers. But the political actuality of those plays was already spent before the end of the season. At any rate, there was a welcome opportunity to forget them. And the more responsible critics did so, as for example in this statement in *Sovietskoye Iskusstvo* (September 30, 1940):

All kinds of "Ogni mayaka" (Beacon's Lights) have long ceased to attract our theatres. The "mysteries" of the cheap and shallow playwriting have been completely disclosed and exposed. "Genkonsul" (The Consul-General) no longer

has the right to represent Soviet literature on the stage.¹ The theatres have come to realize that the now mature Soviet playgoer is no longer satisfied with such plays. Moreover, the companies themselves feel sated with them, and with new enthusiasm and delight have turned to the riches of the classic repertory. The main thing, and one that is most remarkable, is that in the very approach to the classic authors and in the treatment accorded them there has been revealed a new trend of our theatre toward a certain romantic ardor, an underscoring of the elements of poetry. . . . But it is enough to glance at the few *premières* of the more important Soviet plays (it must regretfully be admitted that their number and quality were low this season) to become convinced that in the new works of Soviet dramatists, too, the poetic element is increasingly more prominent, driving away schematism, rhetoric, and dry as dust reporting which only recently were the sad distinctions of the plays that filled the repertories of hundreds of theatres.

It is not to be denied that on the very eve of the war with Germany (the first war with Finland made practically no impression on the Soviet theatre) there was a marked trend toward a more imaginative and more vibrant art of the theatre. It continued through all the four years of the World War. The classic repertory (Griboedov, Gogol, Ostrovsky, Chekhov, Gorky, Shakespeare, Lope de Vega, Goldoni) enriched by such romantic plays as Sardou's "Patrie" and Rostand's "Cyrano de Bergerac," remained dominant on the stage. There was a similar tendency in the Soviet drama. One evidence of this was the appearance of several new plays in verse, which on the whole maintained a fairly high literary and dramatic standard. Among these mention should be made of Y. Apushkin's "Mazeppa," Victor Gusev's "Moskvichka" (The Moscow Girl) and "Synovya trekh rek" (The Sons of Three Rivers), the latter an ambitious, but far from successful, attempt to treat the war theme in symbolic imagery, Anatoly Marienhoff's "Shut Balakirev" (Jester Balakirev), Alexander Gladkov's "Davnym-davno" (Long, Long Ago), and, perhaps the best of all from the point of view of verse, Ilya Selvinsky's "Livonskaya voyna" (The Livonian War) which paints a richly colored, if not entirely convincing, picture of Ivan the Terrible and his reign.

Significant as this poetic trend was, however, it amounted to no more than a trickle in the vast output of war plays. It had to contend

"Ogni mayaka" is not known to the writer. "Genkonsul," a play by the brothers Tour and L. Sheinin, a popular play writing team, held sway on the Soviet stage for a long time. It tells a lurid story of two Russian soldiers captured and tortured by the Japanese, the efforts of the Russian Consul-General to save them, the Japanese attempt to kill the Consul-General, and the ultimate Russian triumph.

with two powerful tendencies of an entirely different character. One was the journeyman's exploitation of the horrors of the war and glorification of the Russian partisans and army men. The other, representing a more serious approach to the war theme, sought to reproduce the true feelings of the people with a special emphasis on the psychology of heroic action.

The Soviet playwright enjoys a favored position among Soviet citizens. The demand for plays is enormous. The financial rewards are beyond the dreams of even the highest-paid officials (such hits of the war years as Constantin Simonov's "Russian People" and Leonid Leonov's "Invasion" were played, one in 150 theatres, the other in over 80; according to the reports for 1942-43). All one had to do was to sit down and write a passably actable play. But through the years it had been hammered into the playwright's head that he had not only to picture the Soviet life, but to educate the people by inspiring them with enthusiasm in the building of a new society, and by showing them how the Communist faith and drive can resolve all their problems. With the Germans invading and ravishing Russia and the patriotic sentiment sweeping the country, nothing seemed more natural and simple than to apply the same formula to war themes. The results can be best described by quoting from an article in *Literatura i Iskusstvo* (October 10, 1943):

The very first plays about the war had guerrillas for their heroes. They held the place of honor in the fortunes of the model, universal Soviet family which in the beginning claimed the principal attention of Soviet dramatists, as exemplified by such plays as "Front" by V. Solovyov, "Nakanune" (On the Eve) by A. Afinogenov, and "Dom na kholme" (The House on the Hill) by B. Kaverin. Nor could it be otherwise. The people's avengers made themselves felt in no uncertain terms from the first days of the war. Life pointed out the theme to the playwright. But the solution of the theme was rather crude in the beginning. . . . In the plots of nearly all these plays the town or village in which the family lives is overrun by the enemy. On the eve of the German occupation, the old and the young (those of the middle age are at the front) go away to fight as guerrillas. Preparations before leaving, the general anxiety, the bitterness of parting, the determination to wage a life and death struggle—such is the subject matter of the first scenes. In some measure this material reflected the truth of thousands of such facts. . . . The Soviet patriot knows no hesitation when it comes to the defence of his native land, testified these plays, even though in a very general way. But the subsequent fate of such a man, as shown in them, followed not the laws of real life, but the rules of stage craft. The heroes of these plays exchanged their brief-cases or milk-pails for hand-grenades and automatic rifles, but psychologically they remained the teachers and accountants they were before. The playwrights found a special attraction in contrasting the "peaceful" habits and moods with

the "exotics" of a guerrilla camp. This is why the plays about guerrillas contain so much love, so many reminiscences, and so many comic episodes. The new traits of human character were drowned in this profusion, and the playwrights were constantly obliged to use inexpressive, "general" soap-box phraseology to confirm the readiness for struggle, the courage and patriotism of the characters of the play.

Although exploiting stock plots and stock characters, these plays in their day served their patriotic purpose, which it would be ungrateful not to acknowledge. But the great majority of them have been forgotten long since, and even among the few that showed a more original approach and a deeper understanding of human nature, only four plays, and those with reservations, can be regarded as outstanding contributions to Russian dramatic literature.

We are inclined to give the place of honor to Leonid Leonov's "Nashestvie" (Invasion) for the richness of its characterization, the fullness with which it lays bare the inner springs of each character, the dramatic suspense which it builds with a perfectly natural unfolding of the plot, and its vigorous and flavorsome Russian. It draws masterly portraits of two of its leading characters, both misfits in the Soviet society, who find different answers to the problem of what to do under the unexpected German dispensation. The younger man, the lost sheep of the family to which he has just returned from jail, is a moral wreck seemingly incapable of any normal human feelings, least of all of sharing the intense hatred of the Germans which smoulders in the breasts of the other members of his family. But the Germans help him to recover his moral stamina. Their depredations in the city, and particularly their beastly treatment of a young girl open his eyes. Disappearing from his home, he carries out a number of daring attacks on the Germans, and when captured meets his death posing as the fiance of his sister and a well known leader of the local partisans.

Different is the fate of the other misfit. An old man, in the Tsarist days the wealthy mayor of the city, he emerges from obscurity to be reinstalled in his old job, to recover his possessions, and to begin another climb to power and riches. Deserted by the Germans in their sudden evacuation of the city, he is left high and dry, trying desperately to save his skin, and finally resigning himself to his fate.

The play draws convincing and moving portraits of the old doctor and his wife, parents of the young man, and of some partisans. It is marred in some scenes by an overemphasis of physical horror such as the repulsively beastly outward appearance of the Germans and the

somewhat mechanical suspense of the final scene where the prisoners, one by one, are taken out to be hanged.

The same tendency to pile up horrors detracts not a little from the same author's play "*Lyonushka*," a sombre, but extremely vivid, picture of life under the Germans, which touches genuine pathos in the story of the tragic love of a young girl for a dying, wounded tankman, the ghastly and speechless wreck of what, only a short time before, was a handsome young man.

Constantin Simonov's celebrated "*Rusскиye ludi*" (Russian People), which the Americans had occasion to see in a very inadequate production by the Theatre Guild, lacks the intensity of the Leonov plays and also suffers from a looseness of construction and from lapses, here and there, into patriotic rhetoric which does not ring true. Nevertheless, it has many appealing qualities. It is sincerely felt, it shuns heroics, and it has the lyrical charm of simple people going through the trials of war and accepting great sacrifices, yet remaining reserved in their intimate feelings. It is this sensitive, lyrical, and characteristically Russian atmosphere that holds the play together in spite of the casualness of its plot, and that has been mainly responsible for its sensational success in Russia.

To this brief list of outstanding war plays we feel justified in adding "*Ploshchad tsvetov*" (The Square of Flowers) by V. Ilyenkov, which was published a year ago, but, according to available reports, has not yet been produced. The play deals with a situation resembling that in Leonov's "*Invasion*," but it achieves its effects in a different way. It is sparse of realistic detail, and concentrates not so much on character as on emotion. To that extent it breaks away from the formulas of "socialist realism" and harks back to Ibsen. It provides a solid psychological foundation for its situations, but knows how to handle them to achieve the maximum effect on the stage, at times capping them with a touch of symbolism. Altogether, both intellectually and theatrically, it is a superior play.

The greatest popular success in Soviet Russia has fallen to Alexander Korneychuk's "*Front*" which has been acclaimed by Soviet critics as the most important play of recent years. Important it unquestionably is, but not for its dramatic or literary merits. On these two counts it is a rather mediocre performance, superficial in characterization, obviously contrived in plot. It rises above all other Soviet plays in one single but tremendously vital point—with a daring but rarely seen among Soviet playwrights it attacks the old leaders of the Red Army, proud of the honors and decorations earned

by their exploits in the Civil War, denouncing their incompetence in the conduct of the war with such an efficient and intelligent enemy as the Germans. Only the critical issues involved in the war can explain the enthusiasm with which the play was received by the public and, what is even more significant, the official patronage extended to it by the Soviet government. Today, when one reads the speeches and articles of Soviet authors bemoaning the virtual absence of satirical plays, one cannot help recalling the fate of two biting satirical pre-war plays, "Kleveta" (Calumny) by Nikolay Virta and "Opasnye znakovstva" (Dangerous Acquaintances) by Mikhail Zoshchenko. They, too, dealt with patent evils of Soviet life, but the object of their attack was the subservient and incompetent but sacrosanct bureaucracy, and they were banned from the stage and denounced by the critics as libels on the Soviet life.

Of the numerous historical plays on the patriotic theme which place the accolade of Soviet recognition on such heroes of the Tsarist wars as General Brusilov, General Skobelev, Admiral Nakhimov, Admiral Kornilov, General Kutuzov, General Suvorov, and a host of others down the ages, one of the best, Ilya Selvinsky's "Livonian War," dealing with the life and times of Ivan the Terrible, and the charming "Davnym-davno," a comedy in verse by A. Gladkov, have already been mentioned, leaving only two others, even more remarkable plays by Alexey Tolstoy, to be added to the list. These are "Oryol i orlitsa" (The Eagle and His Mate) and "Trudnye dni" (Hard Days) both joined under the title of "Ivan Grozny" (Ivan the Terrible). The plays are masterpieces of historical drama, forthright in characterization, vibrant with passion, broad in vision, and redolent with the color, the spirit, and the rich idiom of the period they describe.

In this brief review of the trends in the Soviet theatre we can overlook the few and not too important, if comparatively recent plays, whose subject is the personal and family life outside the impact of the war. The war is over, and new problems have come to the front. V. Katayev in his "Otchy dom" (The Parental Home) has given another conventional picture of the enthusiastic workers rebuilding the ruined town. The more sensitive Constantin Simonov probes somewhat deeper into the feelings of his characters in "Tak i budet" (And so It Will Be) which discusses the problem of love confronting a middle-aged war veteran and a young girl. Clearly, we still have to wait for the more full-blooded, more unreservedly honest, and more stirring plays picturing the life of the Russian people.

In the meantime we can note the welcome fact that the harassed Kamerny Theatre with its leader, Alexander Tairov, and Yury Zavadsky, leader of the Mossoviet Theatre, were recently made the recipients of official honors in recognition of their services to the art of the theatre. Both Tairov and Zavadsky have always preached, practiced, and fought for an independent art free from the oppressive domination of the drab and narrowly interpreted formulas of "socialist realism." Perhaps the official recognition of their work is the first step in a more tolerant attitude toward a greater variety and scope in the creative work of the theatre.

The Youth of Rimsky-Korsakov*

By M. O. ZETLIN

Translated by Catherine Butakov

*"On ne peut ici bas contenter
qu'un seul Maître."*

—Ch. Baudelaire

I

HE was in every way quite an average boy: simple, pleasant, uncomplicated. The only unusual thing about him was his musical gift. Thousands of boys like him came from Russia's cultured, upper middle-class families. In the main, all of the young musicians of that time were children of one class, one rather small stratum of society that, aside from producing officers and civil servants, gave to Russia quite a few talented men in all the different branches of art. Such an abundance of talent in so short a period had not existed anywhere except in ancient Athens. In one half-century, literature, music, and painting grew by leaps and bounds, flashed like fireworks on the grey sky of Russia.

Nicholas Rimsky-Korsakov's childhood was the typical childhood of a boy of his class. It was spent in the quiet county town of Tikhvin. The small wooden house, complete with mezzanine, columns, and pitcher-shaped railings, stood on the outskirts of the town, right on the riverbank, and differed little from the houses of the country squires. Nicholas was the offspring of elderly parents. At the time of his birth (March 6, 1844), his father was sixty-one, his mother forty-three. His brother Voyin was twenty years his senior, and Nicholas grew up among adults. A spirit of love and kindness reigned in the house. His father had reached the position of civil governor under Alexander I, but proved too gentle for the times of Nicholas I. He had shown great kindness to the Polish exiles after the uprising of 1830, and was relieved of his duties in a most ungracious manner, but being a free-mason and a pietist took

*In vol. 4, no. 1 of *The Russian Review* we published a chapter on Balakirev from Mr. Zetlin's book *Pyatery i Drugie (The Five and Others)*. We are publishing now another chapter from the same book, dedicated to one of Balakirev's most famous disciples. [Ed.]

this blow as befitted a Christian. "Bad for vanity, good for morality," reads the entry in his diary on the day of his retirement. From that time on reading and his children's education filled his life. His financial circumstances went from bad to worse. Great kindness and complete trust in people gradually helped to dissipate his considerable fortune.

Nicholas' mother was the daughter of a rich landowner, Skaryatin, and one of his peasant women. She was brought up in her father's house on an equal footing with his other children, but was slightly ashamed of her origin and did not like to remember her childhood. She was quite a beauty in her youth and was endowed by nature with a good ear for music.

Nicholas had a good memory, and studying was easy for him. He liked music as do all musically inclined children. He loved listening to the ringing of bells in the neighbouring monastery, and the memory of their tolling for a dead monk stayed with him all his life. The monasteries of Tikhvin were at the time places of pilgrimage. Crowds of colorful pilgrims of both sexes, the blind, the crippled, the beggars, and the "simple-minded" singing their ancient canticles, rattling coppers in wooden bowls—all of these homeless ones, finding shelter in "the houses of God"—made an unforgettable picture. Ancient churches filled with relics of olden times, the somber faces of the saints on the icons, the glitter and richness of vestments and sacred vessels, religious processions and the long, reverent services—all of this made a lasting impression on the boy's soul and later enriched his creative genius.

Nicholas started his piano lessons quite early, at the age of six, and displayed no exceptional abilities. He also began to compose at an early age, but considered it more in the light of a game, something like the fitting together of blocks. He was much more interested in travel, the sea, and ships. His brother Voyin was an enthusiastic sailor, and had sailed around the world in a companion ship of the frigate "Pallas," glorified by Goncharov. He used to send home long, descriptive letters that were read aloud in the family circle, and Nicholas was fascinated by the nautical terms as would be any boy. When the time came, he quite willingly entered the Naval Academy. It was something of a family tradition: he had relatives in the navy and his brother Voyin was already embarked on a quite brilliant naval career.

As is customary, he suffered in the beginning from loneliness and homesickness, his heart and thoughts were with his parents, and he

wrote them long, boyish, charmingly spontaneous letters. "Will you soon start covering the garden with pine branches, and the apple-trees with straw, Mother? Let me know how many canaries you have now; are Spica and Vega still alive?" he asked. "I suppose that now, in Tikhvin, the currant bushes are budding, and the violets are in bloom. . . . I can just picture the strawberries, and the raspberries, the mushrooms, and you, Mother, making preserves in the garden. . . . Our bath-house and the bathing. . . . And, finally, Booka, Serko, Sharik, Matroska (the dogs), the cow, the chickens, your store-room, Mother, the large garden, the fir-tree, the elder-trees (here follows a perfectly childish enumeration of all the Tikhvin vegetation). . . . Watch the stars oftener, Mother, and in that way remember me. . . ." "Best wishes to you on Uncle's name-day. I suppose you will have the traditional *pirog* for which one of the chickens, probably Ary, will be killed." He writes in the same strain three years later: "I am now entering my fifteenth year, but the time when I used to run in your garden, Mother, and play 'horses' with you does not seem so very far away." Then follow long childhood reminiscences in which boys of his type love to indulge. These letters show us an ordinary, lovable boy. It is the same boy who looks at us from his portrait. A delightful, slightly clumsy boy with high cheekbones and a pug-nose, one hand lying awkwardly on the embroidered skirt of his coat, the other holding a cadet's large, plumed shako: a boy proud of his uniform, proud of his shako. There were thousands of such boys in Russia. They usually grew up to become quite average, unremarkable men. This boy became a great composer.

During those times the discipline in the Naval Academy was quite severe, neither did it relax for Nicholas when his brother Voyin became its director. On the contrary, he made it a point to be more exacting with Nicholas than with the others. From the first year of his Academy life, with his brother's encouragement, Nicholas started taking piano lessons. In the summer, during practice cruises when, because of gun-fire, a piano could not be taken aboard, Voyin even rented a room for him in Kronstadt complete with piano. To their father who protested against such prodigality he replied that: "It is the best time of Nicholas' life for acquiring an art that in time will prove to be not just a diversion but morally beneficial. I cannot tell to what degree he is inclined toward music, but do consider his talent big enough to be worth developing. Not to do so would be a sin before God, it would be like burying His gift."

Gradually music began to play an ever greater part in the boy's

life. When he was thirteen, he was taken to his first opera—Flotov's "Indra." He was enchanted—not so much by the music as by the performance as a whole, even by the way the conductor waved his baton. Little by little he learned not only to look but to listen, even started counting the instruments in the orchestra trying to distinguish their different sounds. At home he tried to pick out his favourite arias on the piano, tried to get opera scores and arrangements. He even learned to read scores without the help of instruments. Once, being punished for some infraction of rules, by confinement to quarters, he gave his hard-earned savings to the watchman to get him a complete piano score of "A Life for the Tsar,"¹ thus turning his punishment into a holiday. His letters home were filled with the most detailed accounts of all the operas he heard. He even bought some music paper, made arrangements of his favourite arias and sent them to his parents. "I am now learning by heart the Sextet and the Mad Scene from 'Lucia.' I do wish father could also learn to play them. It is really quite easy: only in the Sextet the left hand should be more agile than is father's, and must not obey the right hand. You cannot imagine how I love to study operas, and how much I dislike piano pieces. They seem to me such dry, boring stuff, while when one plays an opera it is easy to imagine oneself in the theatre listening or even playing or singing. One can even picture the stage-settings—in a word, it is really very amusing." Gradually, though still in a childish way, he began to prefer some operas to others: "Italian music is more elegant, while Russian is more pleasant and reminiscent of our peasants and ancient Slavonic times." About Glinka's "Ruslan" he wrote: "They say it is a wonderful opera worthy to take its place with Meyerbeer's 'Robert,' and other classical operas."

Nicholas heard his first symphony at the age of fifteen, and his impressions were so powerful that they stayed with him all through life. He even remembered the program: Beethoven's "Pastoral," Mendelssohn's "Midsummer Night's Dream," Glinka's "Arragon Jota," the entr'acte from "Lohengrin," and Liszt's "Prometheus." Wagner and Liszt he did not understand, but was delighted by the "Pastoral." Yet a musical career was far from his thoughts. "I really should go to the country-house, and do some practicing"—he wrote his parents—"I suppose my fingers are quite stiff. But what can one do? As an officer I may even have to spend a few years

¹Glinka's opera.

without playing, for service is more necessary even if it is less pleasant."

He was a rather indifferent scholar, but fearlessly climbed the shrouds and masts during practice cruises, and once fell from a seven-story height and nearly drowned. His progress in music was unexceptional. "Listening to his playing," wrote his brother to their parents, "I find that although he is not hampered by lack of technique, he is still lacking in the necessary taste and understanding of the pieces he plays (though they may be his favorites). Maybe it is too early to expect so much at his age. Nevertheless, I consider it my duty to nag and prod him into repeating over and over again while I stand at his back, assume the duties of a *Kappelmeister*, and beat the measure with voice, hands, and feet." How far we are from a *Wunderkind*!

What Nicholas lacked was proper guidance for which his brother's turning into a metronome was no substitute. Voyin himself realized it, and in the fall of 1859 Nicholas began to study with Kanille. For the first time he was dealing with a real musician. His teacher made him play Chopin, Bach, and Beethoven. Together they admired Glinka's operas, "the best in the world." Kanille made him harmonize choral melodies, make arrangements of church-singing, write variations on the melodies of Russian folk-songs. Once he even set Nicholas to writing a "Sonata," which won his approval. We can easily imagine how pleased the young composer was when, on hearing his variations on "Amidst the Even Plain" his teacher applauded him heartily. Carried away by his music, Nicholas began neglecting his studies. Brother Voyin became worried and even tried to take severe measures. He told him that he would provide no more money for music lessons. Nicholas sulked but submitted. Kanille was quite willing to teach him gratis, but could one disobey one's brother? At last Voyin relented, and the lessons were resumed though they became less frequent than before. Thus a year went by. In the fall of 1861, Kanille spoke of his pupil to Mily Balakirev and was asked to bring the young composer to see him. And so, on a Sunday (a red-letter day for Nicholas) a slow-moving carriage took them to the temple of art: a small apartment on the Ofitserskaya street. Once there, Nicholas bowed clumsily from the waist, shook hands, was embarrassed by Cesar Cui staring at him fixedly from under his glasses, thirstily drank tea, listened to the not quite intelligible talk, laughed obligingly at the jokes, and with admiring, myopic eyes watched Balakirev's handsome face, listened to his authoritative

talk. Later, Balakirev improvised in his usual brilliant manner. Everything was marvelous, everything was magnificent! Nicholas did not know how to thank Kanille for such splendid new friends.

II

Balakirev invited Nicholas to visit him whenever he had leave. These days became real holidays for the young man. To escape for a time from the Academy, from the strict supervision of his brother, from the company of boys, to be transported, as if by magic, into a world where art reigned, where the most intelligent men of Russia met, and treated him as their equal—was like a fairy-tale. Everything was full of interest for him. Vladimir Stasov read aloud the "Odyssey" or Gogol's "The Nose," the painter Myasoedov recited poetry, Stasov, emulating a circus strong-man, lifted them by turns in the air. Sometimes they visited Cesar Cui, and played quartets on his two pianos. They played Berlioz's Scherzo from his "Queen Mab" or the Procession from Balakirev's "King Lear" in an arrangement by Modeste Moussorgsky; excerpts from Cui's opera or the songs of Cui and Balakirev, whose "Selim's Lament" and "Song of the Goldfish" were Nicholas' particular favorites.

He liked them all: Cesar Cui, so very witty that it was better not to become a subject for his wit, kind Stasov, droll Moussorgsky who treated him in a comradely way, although he liked to tease and annoy him, making fun of his protruding lower lip (he used to point to his own lip when kissing him, choking with laughter). But the most remarkable among them was Balakirev. His talent seemed to Nicholas to "surpass all bounds of possibility," his knowledge inexhaustible: to support his opinions he brought forth with the greatest ease dozens of examples from the music of all ages and all peoples. To argue with him was unthinkable. His very presence intimidated Nicholas. He believed blindly in his every word, repeated after him that of all Beethoven's symphonies only the Ninth was good, and of his other work only the Missa Solemnis, and his last quartets; that in all of Mendelssohn there were only three or four decent measures; that Chopin, in spite of his talent, often resembled a nervous society woman subject to "the vapours." He quickly learned to use musical terms faultlessly and with assurance; if not always understandable, still they were as fascinating as the nautical terms that had such charm for him in childhood.

With his usual faultless intuition Balakirev saw the great talent

concealed in this modest youth. As did all of his other friends, Nicholas began the course of training consisting, as usual, of half-talks, half-lessons. At first glance the problems Balakirev gave him appeared to be way above his capacities: for instance, he proposed to him to undertake the writing of a symphony! It did not seem to matter that the young composer had no knowledge whatever of counterpoint, and harmony; that he only might have heard of the far-famed prohibition to use parallel fifths and octaves. To Balakirev's way of thinking all these things were learned through the study of great works and from experience gained in composing. He only told him in what key the symphony should be written, offered a few themes (also with keys), and recommended Schumann's "Manfred" and Third Symphony, Glinka's "Jota" and "Prince Kholmsky," finally, his own "King Lear" for guidance. Nicholas was both gifted and observant, and with the help of all this material started "cooking up" his symphony. Every new bit was played through with Balakirev who approved some of it, rejected a great deal, and substituted much of his own. Some of the excerpts they orchestrated jointly. In orchestration Nicholas understood a little more than in other things because Balakirev gave him Berlioz's "Traité d'Instrumentation" to study. Still he was ignorant of the simplest things, had no knowledge of bow-instruments, and indicated interminable legatos impossible to execute. Anyway, for better or worse, in May of 1862, the first part, the Scherzo, and the Finale of his symphony were completed. It had a great success in the circle, especially the Finale. Stasov rumbled and bumbled, and embraced the young author; Moussorgsky approved: "stout man, Korsakov," and kissed him, not forgetting to point to his lip; Balakirev simply beamed with pleasure. Only Nicholas' attempts to write the Adagio were unsuccessful: the circle was prejudiced against too well-rounded forms, against *cantabile* melodies.

Never before had Balakirev put so much passionate interest into his teaching. Obviously, Nicholas (or, as he affectionately called him, "Korsinka") was his favorite pupil, and the repository of his highest hopes. Balakirev seldom was mistaken in others, neither did he misjudge himself. Let Stasov proclaim him a genius, let all these youngsters listen to him admiringly—he knew his limits. He was incapable of lasting inspiration. Like a poor swimmer he suffered from shortness of breath. He felt that if he was destined to live in the memory of men, it would not be through his own works, but through the music of the men whom he had nursed and brought

to full stature. He had a craving for spiritual fatherhood. Up to now, his pupils had given him no satisfaction: Gusakovsky was deteriorating quite definitely, and sometimes Balakirev cruelly said that the best thing he could do was to die. Moussorgsky he considered a near-idiot; Cui, a talent pure and simple without any personality back of it. "Korsinka" had an enormous gift, and what was even more important, it was of a special, feminine character. He was as soft and yielding as wax, and only he, Balakirev, only his virility, could bring this gift to fruition. Perhaps all this was nothing but a thirst for love and affection that the others could not satisfy. Companionship with this youth was like the flowering of his heart. Still, though Nicholas looked at him with adoring eyes, he foresaw with the clear-sightedness of inner vision that it was a mirage, that in this too, life would cheat him. For Rimsky-Korsakov was as yet only a "delightful child" with great promise in the future, but when his talent would be in full flower he, Balakirev, would already be an old man, and not needed. So with no faith in the future, he highly valued the present: these hours of their companionship. He knew the time would come, the blow would fall, and prepared to meet it, but when it happened it seemed harder than he had thought, and was all too sudden.

III

Nicholas graduated from the Academy, and was expected to sail on a practice cruise of several years' duration. This was the customary beginning of a career in the Navy. Who could have supposed that this disciplined and rather weak youth would suddenly balk before the inevitable? To part from Balakirev and his circle, to interrupt his musical studies for years, seemed to him dreadful, for by now he knew that his road was that of the composer. Shortly before graduation, Nicholas had lost his father, and although officially he passed under his mother's supervision, actually it was not she, but his masterful brother who had to replace the weak, old father. Was it not his father's voice that seemed to come from beyond the grave repeating the same thing? "Serve. Service is life's work, while music is only a diversion." Shortly before his father's death he had heard him comment to his mother: "After all it is not an artist we want to make of him!" while Nicholas thought to himself: "Yes, an artist, exactly an artist!" He knew that his symphony was good, he knew that he was making progress. "If I stay in Russia, perhaps I shall not be too happy, but I shall be on the right road,

my road"—he was wont to say. Balakirev not only grieved at the thought of parting from his favorite pupil, he also feared that a long absence from musical circles and regular studies was dangerous for his weak and feminine nature, that Nicholas might become "demagnetized," and be lost to art. In heated discussions on whether "Korsinka" should sail, in which all of his friends were then engaged, he took his stand on doing everything possible to prevent his departure. Cui and Moussorgsky took it all more calmly. "Well, service does not interfere with my work" said Cui. "Yes, but you are already a finished artist"—retorted Balakirev—"while Korsinka is in the first 'green' period of his youth. Neither his character, nor his talent have matured." "They will develop during his cruise. Let him live independently, let him see the world, meet people" answered Cui. Moussorgsky was of the same opinion, although there had been a time when he himself had acted quite differently. Balakirev tried to take steps, do some wire-pulling at the Ministry where he had some contacts, tried to have the sailing orders cancelled, but found that this could only be done if Korsinka handed in his resignation. Before that prospect, even Balakirev hesitated. He knew how hard was the road for a poor musician.

In spite of his feeble attempt at rebellion, Nicholas submitted to the decision of his mother and brother. Their motives for wishing him to go were quite different. On his father's death, his mother lost her pension and became dependent on her elder son. She could not support Nicholas, while he had no desire to become a burden to his brother. The parting with Nicholas was extremely painful to her. Her character and that of her elder son were quite incompatible, and although he always treated her with the utmost outward deference, she sensed the underlying coldness. Besides he was absorbed in his own family—his young wife, and two children. "My heart is always hungry," she used to say to Nicholas. On the other hand, she was jealous of his new friends, particularly of Balakirev. She knew that she was no longer the sole possessor of his heart from the time he met that "sorcerer" who had quite bewitched her boy. She hoped that the long journey would bring him back to her, cure him of vain dreams. His absence would make her life poor and empty, but she was willing to accept it. "Nevertheless I have decided on this, knowing that the cruise will do you good. And so, my friend, do not hold it against me now nor in the future when I shall no longer be with you. Think only that I have willingly deprived myself for a number of years of the happiness of seeing you, and delighting in

your affection." Voyin regarded the coming journey as a "trial by sea." Nicholas' musical aspirations were to him a passion. "If the passion survives, then it will prove that it was real, then with a strengthened will and character, with intelligence developed by reading and traveling, Nicholas can give himself to music; but if his musical aspirations vanish, there will be no reason for regrets because their precariousness will show that they were nothing but illusions." So reasoned Voyin and, therefore, refused to intercede in any way in his brother's behalf, in spite of all of Balakirev's pleas. On October 20, 1862, the clipper "Almaz" weighed anchor in the roadstead of Kronstadt, and among those aboard was the eighteen-year-old Rimsky-Korsakov. He was leaving with a heavy heart, as if into exile.

IV

The members of the circle did not forget their absent friend. Balakirev wrote often, Cui once in a while. In spite of his brother's hopes, Nicholas did not come to love his service although he bore it uncomplainingly, the way he bore sea-sickness and tropical heat. He realized that the Navy was not his vocation. The voyage itself, the new countries interested him, but much in the life of the clipper was disgusting. He depicts life in the midshipmen's mess in dark colours: "Everyone does what he wants without paying the slightest attention to the comfort of others: one reads, the other yells, the third sits up all night and sleeps during the day—the result is complete confusion." At first he tried to compose, finished the Andante for his symphony, orchestrated it, and wrote a trio for the Scherzo. "I do not understand how it is possible"—he wrote—"my present surroundings and the future are odious, filthy, and I still can compose in this 'wilderness.'" Very soon, though, he realized the impossibility of working in this "wilderness," and complained bitterly: "I am unable to start a thing, nothing gets written, everything displeases me. Nothing but bits and pieces come to mind, and the devil only knows whether they will ever be fit for anything. . . ." "Why should I worry? I am healthy, but that is not enough; I am fed, but that too is not much; I can pace the deck evenings, I can read—still it is not enough; for I cannot compose." And in a parody of Gogol's "Notes of a Madman" he grew ironic at his own expense: "Somewhere between Libau and Palangen. I cannot remember the date, the month too has disappeared, the devil only knows what has been going on. How could I have imagined up to now that I am a certain

midshipman Rimsky-Korsakov, and not Mozart? One of these days a theme worthy of Mozart came to me, and here it is. . . ." and he wrote down a worthless little tune. But the joke fell flat: he really was a bit like Mozart.

His spirits rose for a time when news reached him from St. Petersburg that his Andante, mailed twice, was at last received, played in the friendly circle, and approved. He was delighted. "I am made happy by the news from Balakirev"—he wrote his mother—"he sustains me. Truly, he is a very good man and loves me dearly. Maybe even more than some of my relatives. Yesterday, on receiving his letter, I nearly went crazy with joy, paced my cabin for about an hour at a forced march till I worked up quite a sweat. Now I am happy, gay, and satisfied. Will start a new symphony: *Symphonie en B moll, No. 2, par N. Rimsky-Korsakov*. Oh, if only it would come out well! Mother, although any kind of passion is a vice, still give me your hand for luck, maybe it will go all right." He wrote again when the symphony did not "go," and he was once more close to despair: "In Russia music has only started to develop, and all Russian musicians do not walk—they fly ahead! I should support this development of music in Russia, I could amount to much, and here I sit, not doing a thing! Why is it? It is frightening, but I am developing a certain apathy toward music, I have become indifferent. Voyin will rejoice and say that he foresaw it all when he said that all my dreams about music were rubbish, that when I grew more sensible I would probably abandon it. Possibly it may come true, but there is the rub: I will leave the crows and not join the peacocks. Ah, well, let us go on serving, toil hard, become a 'so-so' man. And so we will, so we will." And more in the same strain: "I am growing musically dull-witted and stupid; not a single month of inaction but is a loss. After a short three-year period, I will emerge with an iron will, a tempered character, hardened musical abilities and nerves, incapable of producing anything half-decent." Obviously this fear of iron nerves was pure neurasthenia, and it was not hard for his brother to prove him wrong. He rightly answered that a painfully sensitive nervous system was not necessary for creative work. He believed that if the sea, and service would strengthen Nicholas' character, then it would be easier for him to work well later in the field of music, provided it proved to be more than a passing fancy. There would still be time to acquire musical technique, nor would his fingers stiffen at his age.

Essentially Balakirev wrote him the same things, but with the

difference that he believed in what Voyin did not: namely, that Nicholas' talent would pass the test. He begged his friend not to give in to dejection, not to waste time, to read as much as possible, and Nicholas following his advice read the Iliad, the Odyssey, Schlosser, Belinsky, the classics, and without doubt matured spiritually during these years. In their letters the two friends tried to avoid all show of feelings. It was the time of "thinking realists" and nihilists, when Turgenev's Bazarov begged his friend: "Please, Arkady, do not speak so beautifully," and proclaimed that "Nature was not a temple, but a work-shop." Still their suppressed affection for each other showed itself, no matter how hard they tried to conceal it. By changing one letter in Balakirev's first name, Nicholas addressed him as "Milyi" (which means "dear" in Russian), and borrowing the expressions of sentimental boarding-school girls, signed his letters: "your adoring Rimsky-Korsakov." "I miss you very much"—in his turn wrote Balakirev—"in spite of the fact that I am very busy and should have no time for it. I miss you even more because, aside from Cui, I do not expect anything from anyone. Gusevsky has definitely gone to the dogs, and speaking in cold blood, he could do nothing better than die; both for himself and others this would be preferable to his present existence. From you I expect much and trust in you like an old aunt in her school-boy nephew. . . . In my thoughts I embrace you, with all the warmth of said old aunt, and murmur: my darling, my pigeon, my golden one, etc. . . ." Nicholas would answer in the same vein: "Please excuse me, dear aunt, for not having written in so long. . . . I kiss your lips, and ask your blessing for all that is good." Balakirev replied: "Dear Nicko, I must confess that as long as you are not present I kiss your photograph, and wait impatiently for your return; at least for your letters. I must also tell you that I was so happy to receive your photographs that I grew quite sentimental, my eyes are suspiciously damp, and I feel a certain nervous tremor. In a word, I have really become an old aunt."

Nicholas begged his older friend to criticise him without mercy. In justice to Balakirev it must be said that he did not ask Nicholas to accept his judgment as final. "You will have much of this kind of musical correspondence in the future, and I, therefore, once and for all, advise you not to cling blindly to any authority: trust yourself more than anyone else. You may have faith in my critical ability and in my capacity for musical understanding, but let not my opinions become immutable laws or it will be as bad as going to a

conservatory." And Nicholas really did show independence. For instance, he refused to change according to Balakirev's advice one part in his Andante. "You do not like it, and I believe you when you say it is weak, but it seems to me that to change it means changing the whole Andante. It is shrill, but I like this shrillness. . . ." Neither did he accept Balakirev's offer to orchestrate his symphony. "As you wish, but I really would not care to have you orchestrate my symphony—I would rather do it myself." Of course it was easy to maintain the teacher's liberalism and the pupil's independence at a distance and in letters, but in personal contact Balakirev's despotic nature was bound to assert itself with new force.

Alexis R. Wiren

By STEPHEN DUGGAN

THE story of the Russian Student Fund, which follows, was written by Alexis R. Wiren, the man who at the age of twenty-three had the interest and initiative to start it. I know that I speak for the rest of the Directors of the Fund in saying that the quality of Wiren's devotion to the idea, the depth of his conviction in the value of the effort, his tireless enthusiasm and patient search for the best way for accomplishing our objective, not only endeared him to us, as an individual, but have contributed that which is the essential for success—leadership. It may sound strange to speak of leadership on the part of a youngster as Wiren was then, at the time the Fund was formed, considering that the Board of Directors comprised some of the most prominent people of this country. And yet, in the true sense of the word, it was "leadership" for his attitude was contagious and all of us were delighted to help him by advice, introductions to others, and such other help as we could give.

The amazing fact is that in spite of the briefness of the period which Wiren, at the time of the beginning of the Fund's work, had spent in the United States, he had acquired so much understanding of American ideals. The success of his efforts, to a high degree, are traceable to that understanding.

As a son of a distinguished Russian Admiral, Alexis was expected to serve in the Navy, as his two older brothers did. However, before entering the Navy, he wanted to complete training as a Naval Architect and started his studies, as such, in the Petrograd Polytechnic Institute. As a result of the first World War, he transferred to the Naval Academy and received his commission in the Naval Air Force of the Black Sea. He was sent to the United States as a member of the Russian Naval Aviation Commission in the fall of 1917 and in view of the events which took place in Russia, resumed his training in the Naval Architecture Department of the Massachusetts Institute of Technology.

Wiren's determination led to the completion of more than two year's work, in less than a year and a half. When one bears in mind that this work had to be done in a foreign language and under unfamiliar circumstances, it becomes very impressive. And so, follow-

ing his own experience, at the age of twenty-three, Alexis Wiren was successful in making a practical start on the fulfillment of his objective—helping others of similar background to complete their higher education in this country.

We, the Directors of the Fund, have not heard much of the difficulties encountered by him and we found that while he was unquestionably an idealist, he was a practical man as well. While some expected only a limited interest to be possible, he was able to secure the financial backing needed so that all applicants approved by the Fund were aided.

We found also, that those to whom we introduced Wiren, have instinctively caught his spirit and invariably were glad to do whatever they could to help in its success. I know from personal experience and I know that I speak for the rest of the Directors, when I say that our participation in the affairs of the Russian Student Fund has always been one of the most satisfying associations we have had with any activity. And we believe that the accomplishments of the Russian Student Fund, from any point of view, are indeed high.

The Russian Student Fund 1920-1945

By ALEXIS R. WIREN

I

A HUNDRED years from now, if one were to trace the lives of individuals and the influence they left on the progress of the human race, it would be of special interest to see what contribution to this progress has been made by a group of some six hundred and fifty Russian émigrés who have been helped by the Russian Student Fund to complete their education in the United States.

It would be of special interest for a number of reasons: first, because this was the first group of educated Russians to come to this country. And as one of those who went through the same experience I must admit that what I found here was quite different from what I expected from my limited reading of American authors and other published material on America then available in my native country.

More important, however, is the fact that this group of Russians must, if they have any feeling of appreciation, be deeply grateful to the country and the people who so generously and sincerely befriended them and where everything has been done to make them "feel at home." I say, more important, because gratitude imposes on people the most stimulating type of obligation, that of living up to the trust, whether expressed or implied, that, regardless of their occupation and material progress, they would do their utmost to succeed not only as professional men but even more so as human beings.

There is an additional reason which should make for the successful adjustment of these Russians, and that is that they all, in various degrees, were subjected to a series of "selective" processes, or "screening," provided by life itself.

Apart from a small portion of the original group assisted by the Fund, which consisted of former officers of the Russian Army and Navy and technical students sent here by the Russian government during World War I who became stranded here as a result of the Russian Civil War, the great majority had to find their way to this

country from whatever portion of the globe they happened to have been thrown by the explosive forces of the Revolution and Civil War. This required initiative. In some cases it required several successive emigrations, such as to Constantinople, then to Brazil, thence to the United States.

Occasionally, some young Russians came to the United States more or less by accident, simply because they had friends in this country with sufficient interest to enable them to join them. Once here, these young émigrés needed the desire and determination to resume their college training, sufficient determination to learn enough English to be admitted to a college, sufficient persistence to save enough money to cover the expenses of at least one term, and, in many instances, more than that. Last, but not least, they needed seriousness of purpose in doing their scholastic work sufficiently well so as to be recommended by their college for a loan from the Russian Student Fund.

II

The end of 1945 marks the twenty-fifth anniversary of the Russian Student Fund—a milestone which makes it appropriate to stop and review what has been done.

The Fund was a source of material help which made the completion of the studies by those to whom it advanced loans a little easier. What happened to the graduates after the completion of their studies is something for which the Fund cannot claim credit or be blamed. In order that the performance of individual graduates could be seen in its true perspective, one must bear in mind that frequently a "lucky break" was instrumental in starting an individual towards success, while in another instance a man may have had several starts which gave no opportunity for advancement in the ordinary sense of the word. This may apply to those who, on the surface, appear to have made a poor use of the opportunities for advancement, but who may actually have accomplished much more than the others, as human beings. Non-glamorous as their occupations may appear, unknown as their contributions remain, they still may have done as much, or even more, in their personal relationships with people.

From the outset, the Russian Student Fund was fortunate to have adopted a policy of selecting those who, on the one hand, seemed to have the necessary qualifications for making good use of the opportunity offered them and, on the other hand, held promise of welcoming a chance to help others. Mistakes were made, for it is difficult to

foresee how an individual may develop; but it would appear that mistakes were few and that the great majority of those helped have fully measured up to the Fund's expectations.

In approaching the problem of selecting deserving students, the Scholarship Committee of the Fund has weighed one factor only—the likelihood of the individual's making a good use of the education which he was to receive. Children of peasants and workmen, government employees, professional men, army and navy officers, landowners, doctors, scientists, lawyers, were all approached on exactly the same basis. They came from all parts of Russia, they belonged to all sorts of social and economic strata. In a way, they truly represented a cross section of Russia.

Scholastically, those to whom the Russian Student Fund has extended loans have done remarkably well, better than one could normally have expected, considering their handicaps. Few had any knowledge of the English language and most had to combine their studies with earning part of their expenses. Since there is no yardstick which could be used in comparing scholastic performances at different colleges, the Fund tried to evaluate the work of its students by asking the colleges to rate them in comparison with their classmates. On that basis, throughout twenty-five years, 44 per cent of those helped by the Fund had "Superior" standing, 33 per cent "Good," 22 per cent were about the same as the average of their classmates, and 1 per cent, below the average.

The help given by the Russian Student Fund was in the form of loans, repayable after graduation on a basis of minimum monthly installments depending upon the earnings of the individual graduate. By September 1, 1945, 259 former students of the Fund had completed their repayments. The total amount advanced, including the academic year 1944-45, is \$674,112.88, while the total repaid to date is \$337,645.70.¹ Again, these figures in themselves do not tell the full story. There were numerous occasions when a graduate, knowing that his repayments would make it possible for the Fund to assist some other student, paid back much more rapidly than required by the agreement, in spite of the fact that this must have been a sacrifice on his part.

¹At the present time the Russian Student Fund has \$322,292.39 outstanding as loans, which is less by \$22,428.80, due to the cancellation of unpaid balances of the loans to former students who are no longer alive. Graduates, through the Alumni Association of the Fund and otherwise, have contributed to the Fund \$8,475.66 besides their repayments.

Since for some time there have been no applicants from the original group of Russian émigrés, the Fund has been assisting for some years young American men and women of Russian descent, mostly children of Russians who found their way to the United States. The bulk of graduates, however, consists of men and women born in Russia.

III

What account did the Russian graduates of American universities helped by the Fund give of themselves? Where are they and what are they doing? About a hundred were in active military service of the United States during the Second World War. A story about these is a subject in itself and will be told elsewhere. According to the Directory of the graduates, published by the Russian Student Fund in January 1944, close to 50 per cent of the former students were engaged in various branches of engineering (civil, electrical, mining, mechanical, petroleum). Other professions and occupations were represented in the following order: Scientific work, academic, industrial and governmental, in the fields of chemistry, agriculture, forestry, geology, biology, metallurgy; business administration; architecture; education; medicine; law.²

²Here is a cross section of the graduates' occupations. Some, of course, are still working at comparatively modest jobs. Moreover, titles may be misleading, one designing engineer may be a glorified draftsman, while another may be the key man in a large enterprise. Head of Department of Airplane Structure, United Air Lines, San Francisco, California; Construction Engineer and Superintendent, Koss Construction Company, Des Moines, Iowa; Auditor and Chief Finance Officer, Petroleum Engineering, Tulsa, Oklahoma; Ordnance Engineer, Rhode Island Arsenal; Professor of Astronomy, Ohio Wesleyan University, Delaware, Ohio; Physicist, Ballistic Research Laboratory, Aberdeen, Maryland; Foreign Department, The Chase National Bank, New York, New York; Metallurgist, U. S. Navy Yard, Mare Island, California; Professor and Head of Mechanical Engineering Department, University of North Dakota, Grand Forks, North Dakota; Research Director, The Upton Company, Lockton, New York; Chief Engineer in a Carrier Corporation; Technician in charge of Clinical Laboratory of General Electric Hospital; Forest Supervisor, Indian Service; Industrial Engineer, Republic Aircraft Corporation; Chairman, Yates Pool Engineering Committee and Consulting Petroleum Engineer in Iran, Texas; Chief Engineer of Engine Division, The Buda Company; Attorney with U. S. Labor Relations Board; owner of fruit growing business in California; Factory Manager, Bellanca Aircraft Corporation; Manager, Oil and Gas Engine Department, Ingersoll Rand Company; Assistant Secretary, Continental Oil Company; Chief, Aircraft Engineering Branch, Civil Aeronautics Administration, U. S. Department of Commerce; Vice President and Chief Engineer, Edo Aircraft Corporation; Curator of Slavic Collection, Hoover Library, Stanford University; Hon-

From the examination of the 1944 Directory, one conclusion can be safely made—the graduates are all progressing along their professional lines.

If one were to get the details of the graduates' childhood, the part they had in the First World War, their experiences during the Revolution and Civil War in Russia, their escape to some European or Far Eastern country, their arrival and early experiences in the United States, their study at one of the many colleges attended, and their subsequent professional careers, one would undoubtedly find excellent material for an exciting adventure story, the kind one usually thinks to be altogether improbable. Almost invariably one would find one or two narrow escapes, periods of hunger and of dire privations, dogged persistence, and just plain stamina.

The graduates of the Fund attended one hundred and six different colleges and universities throughout the United States. It was a part of a plan, though some of it was accidental. In general the Fund endeavored to have the students widely distributed rather than concentrated in a few universities. In this way they were more likely to get better acquainted with American life. In some cases the choice of a college was determined entirely by the particular course the student had chosen; in other cases—by the willingness of a particular college to give partial aid.

Tortuous was the road in many a case. Here is one illustration: Stevedore upon reaching New York and later a "checker" on the same job but without having to use physical strength . . . Upon advice of a friend applies for a painter's job in a street car barn but is fired for not knowing how to paint, though successfully holds a similar job elsewhere . . . Learns from someone that cab driving pays more, gets a taximan's job . . . Hears college education is possible, saves money, enrolls in a college, driving the taxi at night . . . Accidentally gets a job as a "manager" of a photo studio . . . Keeps up his studies and graduates as a Civil Engineer . . . Now is a Captain in the Army Engineer Corps, serving in the Pacific.

There is also much to be said about romance. Most of the graduates of the Fund, men and women alike, are happily married and many have grown-up children. College training frequently was the origin of the romance—sometimes it was the meeting of classmate's sister, or getting acquainted with a summer school assistant librarian

rary Curator of Economic Botany, New York Botanical Garden; Staff Engineer, Commonwealth Edison Company, Chicago, Illinois—and so on to the end of the alphabet.

at the college, or meeting a co-ed at the school. While some of the graduates married Russians, most have American wives or husbands. From information given by graduates it would appear that about 67 per cent are married.

In the earlier years, when it was thought that within a brief time it might be possible for the graduates to return to Russia without the risk of losing their lives and without having to subscribe to the political thoughts prevalent there, most graduates did not change their citizenship. But, as time went on and the possibility of returning to Russia became more and more remote, an increasing number of the graduates felt that they ought to become citizens of the nation which had so genuinely befriended them. Now, with very few exceptions, graduates of the Fund are American citizens and are trying to be useful members of the nation as well as of the communities in which they reside.

In the process of assimilation some of the graduates became less and less discernible as "foreigners." A few have changed their hardly pronounceable family names into something that would be understood without the repeated question "How do you spell it?". Mr. Cheresheff became Mr. Cherry, Mr. Dvornichenko, Mr. Devorn, and Mr. Zakharchenko, Mr. Zakh. But these are exceptions; the majority, apparently, succeeded in getting their friends and business associates to get used to their difficult names. The same could be said about the accent of the graduates. Some, even after many years, have a strong Russian accent. Others, especially those who have attended colleges where there were no other Russian students at the time, have acquired the accent of the part of the country where they stayed and can hardly be distinguished from the rest of their classmates.

Most of the Russian graduates, before they came to this country, had little, if any, knowledge of social and political sciences. For that reason, to most of them reading of the "Federalist" papers or of Bryce's *The American Commonwealth* usually meant more than to an average American-born student. As a result, in some instances at least, a greater understanding of free political institutions was achieved. The difference between the theory and practice, the ideals and actuality, must have been frequently confusing and disappointing, but with all this came the realization, no doubt, that the progress of the whole depends primarily upon the development of the individuals who comprise the whole.

Hand in hand with the study of America and American institu-

tions came also the opportunity of explaining some of the things about Russia. True, there are not many Americans who are likely to ask, as an elderly New England woman did, whether people in Russia are still riding bears, to which, as it happened, a tactful reply was: "Those who used to ride them probably still do so." But there are many Americans who know little about Russian history and Russian culture, and whenever they expressed interest in the subject, the Russians took the opportunity to improve their understanding a little.

On international questions most graduates naturally think as do Americans. Their thoughts are guided by considerations of what will be to the best interest of the United States. At the same time, the contribution of the Russian people in the Second World War, their gigantic war effort, and their sacrifices have been the source of pride and sympathy.

IV

The Russian Student Fund never had any political aims and was never connected with any political movements. Its establishment was made possible primarily because of the interest, encouragement, and financial aid which was given at the beginning by Professor B. A. Bakhmeteff who at the time was Russian Ambassador to the United States, representing the Russian Provisional Government. The aid and sympathetic encouragement of the War Work Division of the International Committee of the Young Men's Christian Association has had a great deal to do with the accomplishments of the Fund. Participation of Dr. John R. Mott and Dr. E. T. Colton, both of whom are particularly devoted friends of the Fund, was of immeasurable help.

Dr. Stephen Duggan, Director of the Institute of International Education, has taken a most active part in the founding of the Fund and is now Chairman of its Board of Directors. A Director from the outset, he became Chairman when the late Honorable Norman H. Davis accepted the Chairmanship of the American Red Cross and resigned from the Chairmanship of the Fund. Dr. Duggan for many years gave generously of his time and thought in the selection and guidance of the students. Much of the cooperation of various colleges and universities with the work of the Fund has been made possible because of the personal interest of Dr. Duggan.

To Mr. Francis R. Hart, a prominent banker in Boston, never

officially connected with the Fund, goes the credit of enlisting the active interest of the late Mr. Thomas Nelson Perkins of Boston, a man of great vision, whose judgment was universally respected and who was held in great affection by many people throughout the country. It was Mr. Perkins who approached a group of his friends in New York with the suggestion that they serve as Directors. The formal existence of the Fund began at a dinner meeting at the University Club of New York, arranged by Mr. Perkins. In addition, Mr. Perkins' enthusiasm and confidence in the value of the Fund resulted in some generous appropriations toward the Fund's financial needs by the Laura Spelman Rockefeller Memorial Fund.

The Russian Student Fund was extremely fortunate in its Directors, and not merely because of their prominence and practical wisdom in guiding its destinies. Equally important was the element of the warm understanding and genuine satisfaction they derived from seeing the results of these efforts. Fortunate, too, was the fact that a number of the Directors have visited Russia at one time or another. Mr. E. T. Colton, General William N. Haskell, Mr. Edwin G. Merrill, Treasurer of the Fund for many years, Dr. John R. Mott, Mr. Reeve Schley, and Mr. Allen Wardwell, Vice-Chairman and an old and true friend of the Fund, have all for many years been active in matters related to Russia and Russians. Colonel Serge Obolensky, Dr. Robert E. Wilson, and Mr. Charles Scribner joined the Board of Directors during the more recent years. Dr. Wilson remained a Director until his election as the Chairman of the Board of Directors of the Standard Oil Company of Indiana necessitated his moving to Chicago. Among the earlier Directors of the Fund should be mentioned Mr. C. V. Hibbard, Mr. Arthur W. Page, and General Cornelius W. Wickersham.

Two of the present Directors of the Fund are sons of late Directors; Mr. Leighton H. Coleman and Lieutenant Frank L. Polk, Jr., continuing the interest of their fathers.

Mrs. Henry Alvah Strong, the only woman Director the Fund has ever had, in addition to her direct generous aid has interested a number of her friends throughout the country and during all these years has in a personal way given of her friendship and inspiration to the efforts of the Fund. Mrs. Strong has also established her own Foundation which assists outstanding students in their efforts toward a life of usefulness and service.

A number of those who gave their generous financial contributions did so specifically for a definite student or students. It is in this

manner that Professor William Emerson has helped a number of students to complete the courses at the School of Architecture of the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, of which he was the Dean. Each of the Directors has found some way, in addition to that of serving on the Board, to assist in the efforts of the Fund. There is no way in which this gift of friendship could ever be adequately acknowledged.

In grateful memory, so that those who are interested in the Fund would be fully cognizant of our friends, we are mentioning here the late Directors of the Fund who are no longer with us: Mr. Anson W. Burchard, the first Treasurer of the Fund, President of International General Electric Company; Mr. Irving Bonbright, financier; Judge Thomas Burke; Mr. Charles P. Coleman, President of Worthington Pulp Company; Mr. John H. Finley, Associate Editor of the *New York Times*; Mr. Ogden L. Mills, Secretary of the Treasury of the United States; Colonel Francis L. Robbins, Attorney; and Mr. H. H. Westinghouse, Chairman of the Board of the Westinghouse Air Brake Company.

In memory of the Honorable Frank L. Polk, who was Vice-Chairman of the Fund until his recent death, the Fund has established at Columbia University School of Library Service the Frank L. Polk Library Fellowship.

The Advisory Committee Members, who throughout the years have helped in general educational problems and in passing upon requests for aid, include the present members: Dr. Edgar J. Fisher, Chairman, Mr. Harvey W. Anderson, Professor S. F. Baldin, Captain Nicholas P. Belaeff-White, Professor George M. Day, Mr. Edward F. Duffy, Mr. George J. Hadjinoff, Mr. C. D. Hurrey, Professors M. M. Karpovich, M. I. Rostovtzeff, and S. P. Timoshenko, President of the Alumni Association of the Russian Student Fund; also former members: Mr. Gordon L. Berry, Professor George S. Counts, Dr. Stephen Duggan, Professor Paul Monroe, Mr. Edward R. Murrow, Mr. Arthur Packard, Mr. Archie M. Palmer, Professors N. C. Roerich and D. Vinogradoff, Miss Nancy Walker, Mrs. Allen Sage Wilbur, Dr. George F. Zook; and the late members: Dr. M. J. Demiashevich, Mr. S. V. Rachmaninoff, and Mr. Irving Squire.

The Fund always operated with a very small staff. After having devoted for ten years all my time to the Fund, I accepted a business position. Miss Lucille de Nevers Jones was in charge of the Fund's office until 1933, and from that time Mr. Pierre Routsy has been

carrying on the duties of the Executive Secretary. Miss Catherine Whyte is the Office Secretary and has been with the Fund for fifteen years. Many of the Fund's accomplishments are due to their tireless efforts.

It would seem that those who have helped the Fund in one way or another did so primarily because they felt that it was the kind of effort which they wanted to see succeed. It was a practical plan of making young men and women who had lost their country through no fault of their own become useful by completing their training interrupted by the First World War and its aftermath. It was a friendly help, the effects of which will continue for many years after the original borrower will have completed his or her education.

One objective of the Fund—that of helping people to become more useful citizens of their adopted country—has been accomplished. The larger objective—that of assisting in the promotion of a better understanding between the American and Russian peoples—still remains to be accomplished. The realization of this objective depends primarily on conditions within Russia itself. The graduates have basic ethical, social, and political principles and beliefs. They should preserve these as their most valued personal possessions. Until recently it seemed that the return of the graduates to Russia required some compromise with their conscience. Recent developments in Russia, however, seem to give hope that within not too distant a future there might be an opportunity for them to become directly useful in Russian-American relations.

When an individual is permitted to keep his own faith and his own ideals, when the relationship of nations and peoples within a nation is based on good-will and tolerance, real progress is possible. Thus it is to be hoped that some day a sound basis will be found for extensive cultural as well as economic contacts between the American and Russian peoples. In that event some of the graduates of the Russian Student Fund may well serve as important connecting links between the two countries.

Book Reviews

DALLIN, DAVID. *The Real Soviet Russia*. New Haven, Yale University Press, 1944. 260 pp. \$3.50.

LAUTERBACH, RICHARD E. *These Are the Russians*. New York, Harper and Brothers, 1945. 368 pp. \$3.00.

SNOW, EDGAR. *The Pattern of Soviet Power*. New York, Random House, 1945. 219 pp. \$2.75.

STEVENS, EDMUND. *Russia Is No Riddle*. New York, Greenberg, 1945. 300 pp. \$3.00.

WHITE, W. L. *Report on the Russians*. New York, Harcourt, Brace and Company, 1945. 309 pp. \$2.50.

Books on Soviet Russia continue to multiply, yet an objective, comprehensive study of the Soviet Union still remains to be written. So complex were the forces released by the Revolution, so far-reaching their reverberations, that, in spite of more than a quarter of a century which has elapsed since the Revolution, the necessary detachment has not yet been achieved and probably will not be in our time.

The five books reviewed here, all dealing with wartime Russia, were published within the past year. Each falls, inevitably, into the "pro or anti-Soviet" pattern. Foreign correspondents Lauterbach, Snow, and Stevens have written the familiar type of journalistic accounts, pro-Soviet in orientation; Mr. W. L. White surveyed critically Soviet conditions in 1944; Mr. D. Dallin, a Menshevik *émigré*, presented a schol-

arly critical analysis of Communist theory and institutions. Instead of examining each book in detail, which has been done by various reviewers elsewhere, the present reviewer would rather attempt to analyze here the main points of disagreement as well as agreement between the authors of these books.

Whether a given book on the Soviet Union is predominantly of the "pro" or "anti" variety depends on the author's attitude toward Communism in general, and more specifically, on the type of material he chooses for emphasis and special treatment. Thus, it makes all the difference whether, on the one hand, the bulk of the book is devoted to such topics as the Red Army leadership, the development of the U.S.S.R.'s backward national groups, Soviet science, German atrocities in Russia, points of similarity between Russians and Americans—subjects treated extensively in the present case by correspondents Lauterbach, Snow, and Stevens—or, on the other hand, Soviet prices and standard of living, the N.K.V.D. (security police), forced labor, bureaucratic red tape, industrial inefficiency—emphasized by W. L. White and David Dallin. In either case the "facts" may be, and usually are, faithfully reported, but the general impression which the reader gains is widely divergent. The extent to which emphasis on particular subject matter determines the general spirit and orientation of a book can be illustrated by a comparison of the accounts of Richard Lauterbach and W. L. White. Here are two unquestionably able reporters and skillful

writers, though Mr. Lauterbach is probably a less opinionated and petulant observer than Mr. White. Both were in Russia at the same time (in 1944) and saw about the same things: industrial centers beyond the Urals with Eric Johnston's party, devastated cities, the front line (Polish and Finnish, respectively)—yet the pictures of wartime Russia they evoke could hardly be more dissimilar. Lauterbach's Russia is friendly, progressive, eager, above all, for peace and collaboration with the United States; White's Russia is a vast prison camp, with which friendly collaboration will, at best, be difficult to achieve.

Specific points of disagreement between the sympathetic interpreters and the critics are not many. One refers to "democratic liberties" in the U.S.S.R. Messrs. White and Dallin deny the existence of any. "The greatest indictment which can be brought against Stalin," said Mr. White, "is that, because of his iron rule which suppresses freedom of opinion, Russia is still less ready [for liberal democracy today than under the old régime] in spite of his paper constitution." Correspondent Stevens, on the other hand, is of the opinion that "there exists in Russia a form of democracy, elementary if you will, but more genuine and pure within its limited scope than any American institution except the town meeting, to which in many ways it closely corresponds." This "elementary democracy" Mr. Stevens found in collective farm and factory meetings, as well as inside the Government and the Party. It would appear that Messrs. Lauterbach and Snow concur with this opinion.

There are differences in interpretation of the Russian victory and its

consequences. Correspondents Lauterbach, Stevens, and Snow as a primary factor stress the leadership of the Communist Party. "When Hitler struck," said Lauterbach, "it was the cement which held together all the bricks in Stalin's fortress." According to these observers, the prestige of Stalin and the Party has been immeasurably increased since the war. "However it may have been in the past," observed Mr. Snow, "no one who has lived there [in Russia] during the war can doubt that in the future Stalin will be respected as the man who led all the Russians to the greatest military victory in their history." And Mr. Stevens concurred: "Politically the power and prestige of the Communist Party are higher in Russia today than they have been in its whole history." Mr. White, on the other hand, although granting the effectiveness of communist war leadership, placed the emphasis elsewhere: on the stamina of the Russian soldier, Russia's vast manpower, American lend-lease aid, especially trucks. Mr. Dallin is the severest critic of Stalin's leadership. Russia, he believes, because of the gigantic losses in manpower, is emerging weaker, not stronger, from this war. The great losses and sacrifices which the Russian population has suffered were unnecessary, he thinks, and could have been avoided. He is hopeful, however, that the war may bring about important internal changes, notably, the fall of the much-hated N.K.V.D., "the incomparable, majestic, unique monolith resting upon inhumanity, slavery, abomination, and death." Here, one may well sympathize with Mr. Dallin's sentiment. Unfortunately, there is little evidence in his own book or elsewhere to justify his optimism.

What is more significant, perhaps, than the disagreements existing in the present group of observers, is the rather amazing similarity in many conclusions they reach regarding important aspects of present day Russia. Thus, all five agree that Communism continues to be the underlining principle of the Soviet régime and that, as Mr. Snow has put it: "Nothing had been done or said which suggested any intention of abandoning the main body of Marxist-Leninist teachings as the foundation of the state." And in the words of Mr. Lauterbach: "In the peace that follows there will be no 'withering away' of the state . . . there will be no freedom of speech for those who advocate any changes of basic concepts. And there will be no freedom of religion for those who use the Church as a weapon against the state or Party." Mr. Dallin arrives at the same conclusion: "The principle of state economy was and remains the highest principle of Soviet policy; it continues to determine not only its economic policy but its policy in all other spheres."

Similarly, all observers agree that the Kremlin's new liberal policy toward religion is merely a change in tactics. No real separation of church and state has taken place. "The Orthodox Church," Mr. Stevens observed, "became a valuable adjunct of Russian foreign policy as it had been in Tsarist times." From the present accounts it would appear that the position of the Church is still precarious and that its rôle in the social life of the country is likely to deteriorate in time.

There is likewise substantial agreement on the other shifts in Soviet policy. Promotion of nationalism and the strengthening of the family were also measures used by the So-

viet Government to stimulate the war effort and to unite the nation. But today already the emphasis is beginning to shift again to the basic teachings of Soviet Marxism.

Both groups of observers agree that the primary object of Soviet foreign policy in Europe and Asia is the creation of spheres of influence dominated by Russia. In this respect the difference between the sympathetic observers and such critics as Mr. Dallin is that the latter views this policy with alarm as one of imperialist expansion with revolutionary implications, while Messrs. Lauterbach, Snow, and Stevens consider it a policy of national security and as such inevitable, if not desirable. On the whole, the pro-Soviet writers justify Soviet foreign policy on the basis of fears of "capitalist encirclement," ignoring, as they often do, the reverse possibility of "Communist encirclement." Urging collaboration with the Soviet Union at all costs, they tend to emphasize the bright side of Soviet-American relations while soft-peddalling points of difference and friction.

Each of the five authors has brought some new data which throws additional light on many phases of Soviet life and conditions. The present reviewer found of special interest and value Mr. Lauterbach's chapters on the growth of the Communist Party and Soviet scientific and medical research; Mr. Stevens's anecdotes and stories on Churchill's visit and the life of American diplomats and correspondents in Moscow; Mr. Snow's sketches of Politbureau's members; Mr. White's data on the Soviet standard of living; Mr. Dallin's chapters on forced labor and the inner workings of the Communist Party.

If read together, the five books

reviewed here present a fairly comprehensive picture of wartime Russia; yet much still remains in the shadow.

D. S. VON MOHRENSCHILDT

Dartmouth College

CRESSEY, GEORGE B. *The Basis of Soviet Strength*. New York, Whitelsey House, 1945. 287 pp. \$3.00.

The reader will find this book filled with factual information presented in a stimulating fashion. Those who have read the author's earlier volume, *Asia's Lands and Peoples*, will soon discover that he has greatly expanded the Soviet portion of it and added pertinent ideas in writing the present book. Few if any American geographers are better qualified to discuss the Soviet Union. Professor Cressey's acquaintance with the U.S.S.R. began as early as 1923 and in 1937 the author returned to the country as a delegate to the Seventeenth International Geological Congress in Moscow. In 1944, he visited some of the more remote parts of Soviet Middle Asia. After the Congress in 1937, he remained in the Soviet Union for several months as consultant during the preparation of the Great Soviet World Atlas. Such recognition clearly indicates the esteem in which he is held by Soviet geographers, and readily qualifies him to discuss the strength of the Soviet Union.

Geologists and geographers are now agreed that the Soviet Union has been richly endowed by nature. But it is not alone in the material richness of her natural resources that the strength of the Union lies. Equally important has been the vitality and youthful exuberance of the Russian people themselves, and

the manner in which they have been using their natural resources toward patriotic achievements.

Since the author's early training was in geology, the chapters concerning the Physical Foundation of the Union and Soviet Mineral Wealth are particularly worth reading. Enormous production figures in Soviet mineral industries, and mineral reserves of the Union "need to be considered in terms of a country eight million square miles in area inhabited by 200 million people." Despite the variety and abundance of mineral deposits in the U.S.S.R., however, the author points out that some of the deposits, notably of copper and aluminum and iron at Magnitogorsk, are of lower quality than formerly thought, and hence of doubtful value, considered from a capitalistic point of view. Nine single page black-and-white maps of Eurasia and seven double page black-and-white maps of the Soviet Union depict such things as the location of mineral deposits; physical, climatic, and vegetation regions, railroads, and population distribution. The maps are easy to read and purposely not over-crowded with information. It is true, however, that a few lose something of their effectiveness through reduction in size from his earlier volume, *Asia's Lands and Peoples*, where they first appeared. And it is to be regretted that on the Land Forms map the regional names do not always correspond exactly to the names used in the text. On the whole, however, the maps are excellent and certainly among the most useful features of the book.

In later chapters there are descriptions of the numerous and varied regions of the Soviet Union. Systematically treated, these chapters paint a clear picture of life in such

remote portions of the Union as Southern Turan, the Soviet Far East and the Lena Taiga. The great industrial areas, such as Moscow, Leningrad, the Donets and Kuznets Basins, the Urals, etc., are all critically analyzed.

The book concludes with a chapter on "Geostrategy and the Future of the Union" in which, after reviewing the "Heartland Idea" of Mackinder, Kjellen, and Haushofer, the author concludes that, contrary to the Heartland concept, it is sound geography to expect the margins of continents to turn out to be of greater importance than their inner cores. "Peace and prosperity lie not in withdrawal into the interior but in active cooperation in a world society." And, so far as a true Heartland is concerned, the author suggests that North America, so lightly dismissed by many a geostrategist, actually may have greater potentialities as a Heartland than Eurasia. The attributes of national strength in our world to-day, such as intelligence and loyalty in a nation's citizenry, technological and organizational skill, etc., are after all found nowhere better developed than in North America. The Soviet Union and the United States will emerge from this war as the world's mightiest military and industrial nations. "Whether this new situation will hold seeds of catastrophe or of opportunity will be determined by policies still to be formulated." . . . "Two things are clear. The first lesson of geography is interdependence, and the first requirement of world citizenship is an understanding of global geography."

Professor Cressey's book contains an unusually fine selection of suggested readings on the Soviet Union. For those who do not desire to read

the details of geology or anthropology contained within his volume, the author provides a "Reader's Guide" which directs the reader's attention to the "highspots" of the volume. The numerous illustrations are among the best which the reviewer has seen come from the Soviet Union in years. They are not only up-to-date, but attractive, well reproduced, and representative of life to-day in many parts of the Soviet Union.

Few will deny Professor Cressey's contention that "No citizen of to-day's world can afford to remain in ignorance about the geography" of the Soviet Union. It is to be hoped that his contribution to our fund of information about the Soviet nation will stimulate many toward further reading in this field.

DONALD H. CHAPMAN

University of New Hampshire

The Russia I Believe in: The Memoirs of Samuel N. Harper, 1902-1941. Edited by Paul V. Harper and Ronald Thompson. Foreword by Bernard Pares. Chicago, University of Chicago Press, 1945. 279 pp. \$3.50.

The editor of this volume says of the late Professor Harper that "he obviously meant the book to be as much about himself in relation to Russia as about Russia itself." As a matter of fact, these posthumously published memoirs deal much more with the former subject than with the latter, and they contain relatively little that is new on Russia's internal development either before or after the Revolution. What might be called their autobiographical part is incomparably richer in content and thus more interesting. To those who,

like the present reviewer, had the privilege of knowing Samuel Harper they offer a unique opportunity of renewing a direct contact with his unforgettable personality, of hearing him talk again as it were. But the general reader, too, will be interested in this story of Harper's relations with Russia, of his life-long study of the country, of the evolution of his views on the Soviet régime—a story that is told against the broader background of America's changing attitude towards Russia.

Samuel Harper was one of the pioneers of Russian studies in this country. He became interested in Russia back in 1900 when he was only eighteen years old, under the influence of that staunch and enthusiastic friend of the Russian people, Charles R. Crane. He studied in Paris under such outstanding Slavic scholars as Boyer, Leger, Meillet, and Haumant, and later for a while at the University of Moscow. From 1905 he taught Russian language and literature at the University of Chicago, with some intervals, in the course of one of which he joined the staff of the University of Liverpool's School of Russian Studies. He gradually extended his interest from the field of linguistics and literature into that of Russian history and contemporary Russian politics until, in his later stage, he found himself "being drawn more towards political science, as opposed to history." To keep up with the Russian developments, he undertook numerous journeys to Russia, the latest of which was in the early summer of 1939, almost on the eve of the war. It was in the course of these travels that he formed his friendship and scholarly partnership with Bernard Pares, one of the foremost British authorities on Russia.

It is significant to what extent Harper's career as a teacher and public lecturer depended on the ups and downs in the history of America's interest in things Russian. He began his teaching career at the time when this interest was aroused by the revolution of 1905. But by 1909 he had to discontinue his Russian studies at the University of Chicago because of the waning of active concern about Russia. He was able to resume them in 1914, after Russia had become one of the major participants in the First World War, and from that time on, almost for a decade, attention to Russian events was kept alive first by the war and later by the Revolution. Once more conditions became less favorable in the 1920s after the first interest in the "great Russian experiment," of a somewhat emotional and sensational nature, had begun to subside, and Harper, the professor and the lecturer, had to wait for the depression to find a sufficiently numerous and responsive audience. This time Russia mattered because of the fact that "the interest in some plan, even a Soviet plan, had become very active." This did not mean, however, the end of Mr. Harper's troubles, as in subsequent years, no less than before, politics continued to interfere with Russian studies. In this connection he tells an amusing story which is a little gem and worth quoting. "The more trials there were in Moscow, the more trials there were for me. As a rule I tried to meet the question 'Why the confessions?' by the fact of the Oriental in the Russians—'We Westerners can't understand.' One Oriental student of mine, however, chimed in by saying he couldn't understand either." To me, the moral of this record of professional

tribulations is sufficiently clear: Russian studies in this country—as elsewhere—must be divorced from the unstable “public interest” and political motivation of this or that fleeting moment. Their chief task should be the creation of a solid, be it even a small, body of earnest students who would be interested in Russian history and Russian culture for their own sake—just as one is interested in the history and culture of France or England or any other great country.

Professor Harper's record as a political observer of Russia also gives food for thought. When he first came to Russia, he was full of hope for Russia's constitutional development. At that time, he recognized “the emptiness and irresponsibility” of the extreme revolutionaries and dreaded to think “what will happen if they succeed in their mad plan of getting up a genuine bloody revolution.” He even chided the Cadets (the Constitutional Democratic party of Milyukov) for “trying to keep in with the radicals,” and advised them to “stand up” for their own more moderate program. In 1915, he found no evidence of a revolutionary movement in Russia and noted that even the former revolutionaries of 1905 did not talk of the imminence of revolution. When the Revolution came in 1917, he greeted it enthusiastically because he had “absolute faith in the trustworthiness” of the members of the Provisional government and considered them “the best-qualified leaders Russia had.” After the July days of 1917, when, under the influence of Bolshevik propaganda, an abortive attempt was made to overthrow the Provisional government he rejoiced in the fact that the extremists had been shown up as traitors, he was impa-

tient with Kerensky for not using his “full authority” in order to suppress the Bolsheviks by force, and he saw rising in the country a spirit of healthy patriotism. In the memoirs there is an undertone of apology with regard to all these points, as if Harper felt sorry for his errors of judgment. As a matter of fact, they were not errors at all. There is no absolute fatality in human history, and at each given moment there is more than one possibility as to future development. In 1907–1914, there were fairly good chances for Russia's peaceful constitutional evolution. Revolution could have been avoided not only in 1915, but even in the beginning of 1917. And Lenin's ultimate victory over the Provisional government was by no means predestined—on the eve of his *coup d'état* he himself was not sure of victory while most of his closest collaborators were sure of defeat. In a sense, Harper's political impressions as of the moment when they were formed are of greater historical value than his own—or anybody's else's—*post factum* rationalizations in which certain events tend to look inevitable just because they happened.

For almost a decade after the October Revolution, Harper maintained an attitude of hostility towards the new Soviet régime. He saw his most important task in counteracting Bolshevik propaganda in this country, and as a special assistant of the State Department he prepared reports which “tended to support and perhaps even reinforce the policy of our government not to recognize the Soviet government.” Recognition, he felt, “would serve no useful purpose for either side unless it were based on common interests and mutual respect.” Apparently, for a while, he saw neither the one nor the

other as between the United States and revolutionary Russia. Then, after 1926, he began "to feel that our policy of non-recognition was ceasing to be constructive." When recognition came in 1933, he found it justified on the basis of a common interest between the United States and Russia—to oppose Japanese expansion in the Far East. But he still felt that the resumption of official relations between the two countries did not rest on mutual confidence. Subsequently, his changed attitude towards the Soviet régime was based on the conviction that it was there to stay, and on his own growing interest in the experimental features of its political and economic system. Before long, he became a convinced champion of what he thought were its positive achievements. In the process, as he frankly admits, he had to "steel himself" against the instances of human misery into which he was bound to run "at every turn." As he explains it: "Perhaps it was because I had to maintain the professional attitude if I was going to continue to study the Soviet system that I found myself less moved [than some of his friends] by such occurrences." I am mentioning this not in a vein of moral condemnation. I know only too well that Harper's was a warm and kind-hearted nature, but I sincerely believe that in this case he erred in his understanding of the requirements of a "professional attitude." After all, when one is studying an experiment with human society, no realistic appraisal of it can be made if one does not take into account its cost in human lives and human suffering.

As an intelligent and well-informed observer, Harper often showed unusually good judgment with regard to the Russian developments. Thus

he was convinced from the outset that the New Economic Policy was not "a complete abandonment of the program of revolution," but "simply a tactical retreat." He foresaw, back in 1926, Stalin's complete victory over the opposition. He understood that the Five-Year Plan "was primarily a political plan, a program of class struggle." On the contrary, he was mistaken when he saw in the Constitution of 1936 a "promise of less political rigidity in the Soviet system"—an error which he himself admits. Neither is he very convincing in his defense of the purge. He gives the following reason why its victims had to be liquidated: "If they did try to organize an opposition, it became, by forces of circumstances, a conspiracy. If they said, 'Stalin must be removed,' they had to mean 'by assassination.' If they said, 'This isn't Socialism,' they were guilty of saying, 'Let's overthrow it.'" In saying this, he does not seem to realize that this is the severest indictment of the régime imaginable.

With the outbreak of the war, his attitude apparently became much more emotional than before. To some extent, he shared with so many others the curious aberration which saw in the defense by the Russian people of their country something like a national plebiscite in favor of the régime, and in the demonstrated ability of the Soviet government to create a powerful military machine, a justification of all of its domestic policies past and present. He also became less tolerant, it seems, than I knew him to be in earlier years. Any mention of the "*Communazi rapprochement*," for instance, was for him a "lie" although in his book he himself speaks of the cooperation of the Communists and Nazis in

Germany as against the moderate Socialists and liberals, and although in another place he argues that in 1939 there was "a very definite common interest of Germany and the Soviet Union" to decide between themselves all matters in Central and Eastern Europe, and thus "to put an end to a system that had aimed both at encircling Germany and at forming a *cordon sanitaire* against Sovietism." Or again, when he says that to him it was surprising to find anti-Bolshevism (which by that time he began to identify with Nazi propaganda) "a factor in the thinking and activity of a Blum," he seems to forget his own record and the fact he cites elsewhere in his book that hostility to the Soviet dictatorship was shared by many American liberals.

The editing of the memoirs apparently has been done with loving care, but unfortunately some of the factual errors have remained uncorrected. For the sake of the record:

Milyukov was not a member of the First Duma (pp. 37, 48), being first elected to the Third Duma in 1907; "Tsaninism" (p. 55) should be "Saninism," and was so named not for "the writer Tsanin" but after the hero of Artsybashev's novel *Sanin*; Rasputin was murdered not in November (p. 94) but in December, 1916, and only one "extreme conservative Duma leader," not a whole "group" of them, took part in the deed; Tereshchenko was not a Duma member (p. 97); "Guskova" (pp. 158, 192, 227) should be Kuskova; "Menshnikov" (p. 224) should be Mechnikov; Soviet Russia did not apply oil sanctions against Italy during the Ethiopian war (p. 251); in the treaties of 1920 there were no clauses stating that Moscow would respect the independence of the Bal-

tic states "only so long as they did not again become centers of activity for other great powers" (p. 272).

MICHAEL KARPOVICH

Harvard University.

KOESTLER, ARTHUR. *The Yogi and the Commissar*. New York, Macmillan, 1945. 247 pp. \$2.75.

Arthur Koestler is one of the best writers of our time. His style, nervous, imaginative, resourceful, is a model of philosophic-political essay writing. Here and there it sins on the side of easy-going journalism, which was the author's literary cradle. Yet, style and wit are not his chief merits. Behind them there is a passionate struggle for truth, for a new, deeper, and wider world-outlook, and for the social ideal of freedom and justice. Koestler belongs to the political left. His starting point was Communism. In many things he is still breathing the air of the "left" tradition. For him Revolution is still a symbol of progress, the intelligentsia is always revolutionary, and the British Labor Party the object of condescending pity. But his bitter disillusionment in Russian Communism meant for him the beginning of an inner evolution the extreme landmarks of which he covers with obviously inadequate terms: the Commissar and the Yogi. The Commissar stands for revolutionary rationalism, the Yogi for mysticism. Koestler is moving, out of a critical chaos toward religious totality, but he is moving unwillingly, with strong resistance and rear-guard fighting. He reveals a sharp insight into religious psychology, considers it sociologically salutary and creative, but, obviously, still

strange to his own experience. In a well-founded distrust of mystical charlatanism of modern Yogis and repelled alike by the reactionary ghost of the Christian Church, he looks for salvation to modern science, though he is perfectly aware that rational knowledge alone is not a way out.

The book lacks unity in subject matter. It is a loose collection of essays, written during the last two years of the war, ranging from a survey of some French books, through an analysis of fascism and modern intelligentsia to a critique of the "Soviet myth." Almost half of the book is devoted to Russia which looms behind all the "meanderings" of the author's story.

Koestler approaches Russia from the angle of a Western leftist for whom she is not a political reality but a quasi-religious myth. Nobody is better qualified than Koestler to analyze this myth. He knows the spell of Russia from within and he knows that no objective facts are able to overcome the power of a myth. It can only be worn out with time or else be displaced by another myth. In spite of this conviction, Koestler undertakes the analysis of the motives and arguments supporting the Soviet myth in the eyes of the Western liberals.

Not content with the analysis of the Soviet cult, Koestler presents also a picture of Soviet reality in some brief but drastic chapters. He makes no pretense at impartiality; his primary concern is to show the bankruptcy of Socialism in the U.S.S.R. since the 1930's. With a good deal of conclusiveness he surveys the trend against equalitarianism and toward the creation of a new class society not unlike that of the old Russian Empire. The only chap-

ter which is not based on official Soviet data is the one on forced labor and concentration camps. Here the author is able to give some new information, though the substance of it was already circulating in the socialist press abroad. His new source is the "confidential report" by Lucien Blit, a member of the Jewish Bund, who went through the Soviet prisons and camps in 1941.

Koestler's criticism is thus directed from the left, his main object being to show that Russia, under Stalin, betrayed the great promises of the Revolution and developed into the familiar type of an imperialistic national state. The author is, however, no Trotskyite. His approach is largely ethical—he rejects totalitarian society of whatever type and stands firmly in defense of human personality and freedom.

The most serious limitation of the author is due to the residue of his Marxian dogmatism. For him the first years of the Russian Revolution stand on the level of the highest periods of world history—Athens, or the early Renaissance. Koestler was a boy of twelve in 1917, and Lenin's Russia remained for him a legendary epoch. Yet, he finds that the ultimate reason for the failure of the Revolution lies in the arid nineteenth-century materialism of its doctrine. He seems unaware that this failure was already foreshadowed in Lenin's works long before the Revolution.

This criticism is not intended to deny the rare qualities of Koestler's book. It is full of sharp insights, of masterful analysis, of sincere ethos. For many this book will be a guide in the labyrinth of our time.

G. FEDOTOV

New York City

GLAGOLIN, B. S. *Slovo za Rasputina* [*In Defense of Rasputin*]. Hollywood. Priv. printed by Miss Mary O'Dwyer, 1945. 61 pp. \$1.00.

Miss Mary O'Dwyer, of Hollywood, California, has undertaken the publication, in limited (50 copies each) lithographed edition, of some of B. S. Glagolin's manuscripts. This small volume is one of the series.

A prominent actor and stage director, Glagolin has written a great deal about the theatre. However, the present volume's principal essay deals not with the stage, but is an attempt to rehabilitate and to reinterpret one of the strangest historical personages of the last years of the Russian Empire—Gregory Rasputin.

The reviewer finds himself in a complete disagreement with the characterization of the "Holy Devil" by Mr. Glagolin. As far as he knows, there does not exist any documentary foundation for the author's interpretation of the rôle and character of the enigmatic Siberian peasant.

Mr. Glagolin had met Rasputin only twice. On one of these occasions he was under a severe nervous strain, expecting serious consequences to himself at the hands of the police for bringing Rasputin's name into the play in which he was acting. The second meeting took place at one of the fashionable nightclubs Rasputin was known to enjoy so much.

The author himself gives as the main reason for his essay the moral obligation which compels him "to testify in favor of the universally calumniated Rasputin." He goes on to say: "In my memory Rasputin continues to live as a wise Siberian and a delegate from the peasantry oppressed by the judiciary called in

the days of the Tsars 'prompt and merciful'."

These quotations suffice to give an idea of Mr. Glagolin's standpoint. As he says: "Overburdened by professional work I did not give thought to politics then"—meaning the years immediately preceding the 1917 Revolution. Very likely he was then a very rare exception among Russian educated people. Practically every thinking Russian was at that time drawn into the whirlpool of political controversy. One wonders whether this strange isolation of the artist from the prevailing mood of those years had helped Mr. Glagolin to form his view of Rasputin.

Some people might dismiss Mr. Glagolin's essay as a mere pose of a brilliant actor known to be inclined to *épater le bourgeois*, at least in some of his rôles. Others—as an exaggerated discharge of a debt of gratitude to Rasputin for the latter's kindness in making the police drop the charges against Glagolin. This reviewer feels, however, that the matter should be approached from another angle. Rasputin was undoubtedly a man of remarkable histrionic gifts. He was a born actor, endowed with an unusual feeling for a dramatic situation. Possibly, this trait was the principal magnet that drew to Rasputin not only Glagolin, but the old tragedian Mamont Dalsky as well.

The last rôle Glagolin had acted in Russia was that of Rasputin in "The Empress's Conspiracy." The fourth act of that play (dealing with Rasputin's murder) is included in the volume. Some notes by Mrs. Alexandra Mazourova and an excerpt from Mr. Glagolin's diary, dealing with the problem of amnesty of political exiles by the U.S.S.R., complete the small book.

It is quite likely that Mr. Glagolins' volume will soon become a much prized collector's item, not because of its historical value, but on account of the unusual slant, made interesting by the author's literary gift.

D. FEDOTOFF WHITE

Philadelphia, Pa.

POLNER, TIKHON. *Tolstoy and His Wife*. Translated by Nicholas Wreden. New York, W. W. Norton & Co. 222 pp. \$2.75.

Tikhon Polner was a typical public-spirited Russian liberal, a journalist and a member of the *Zemstvo* of the pre-1917 vintage. He was also an authority on Tolstoy. In 1918, he took an active part in the preparation of the incomparable 80-odd volume edition of the great writer's collected works the publication of which continues to this day. Besides the book here under review, Polner wrote little, if anything, of lasting value. But this book is a remarkable work. In the huge literature about Tolstoy, it stands out as a classic. It makes fascinating reading from beginning to end. Its original Russian text appeared in Paris in 1927, eight years before its author's death. The publication of its English version, excellently done by Nicholas Wreden, must be warmly welcomed.

The book is much broader than its title connotes. Although Tolstoy's relations with his wife do form its central theme, it is, at the same time, an all-round and an exceptionally fine interpretative biography of the great writer. The only formal objection to calling it a biography may be that it does not "begin at the beginning." Instead of tracing Tol-

stoy's life from his birth, the author begins with the time of the Crimean War—with the return, in 1855, of the 28-year old Tolstoy, still in an army officer's uniform, from the just surrendered Sevastopol to Petersburg. In the process of drawing—and drawing with consummate skill—the introductory picture of the young Tolstoy, the author throws "condensed" retrospective glances into his childhood and youth, into his family background, etc. But from that point on, Polner's narrative follows, roughly speaking, the chronological sequence. In it, Tolstoy's passion for the youthful Sophie Behrs and the nearly fifty years of their married life; the "domestic background" of his work; and the psychological process of his spiritual crisis, or, rather, successive crises—are blended into one moving and continuous story.

Though, as Mr. Wreden says in his "Translator's Note," Polner and Tolstoy lived in the same social milieu, Polner's personal acquaintance with the great writer was only sketchy. His book is contrived chiefly of documentary material. But this material is organized with real mastery and skill. Polner's narrative is calm, sober, and very reserved—there is not a trace of "dramatic fireworks" in it. Yet his intelligently chosen words are always to the point; they, somehow, strike at the very root of those life situations and of those spiritual conflicts through which Tolstoy lived. And his characterizations of Tolstoy himself, of Countess Tolstoy, and of all those around are replete with expressiveness and suggestion. Tolstoy's life and, in particular, the pathetic story of his great love and great conflict with his wife have been retold on no end of occasions. Yet, that

story and the potent fascination of Tolstoy's overpowering personality emerge from Polner's book with greater and more spontaneous power than, perhaps, from any other work.

In telling the story of Tolstoy's family drama, the author neither takes sides, nor moralizes (though a few words he drops here and there about Countess Tolstoy may be unjustifiably harsh by implication). Yet the human impressiveness of the drama only gains from it. Perhaps the best chapters of the book are devoted to Tolstoy's clashes with Turgenev, to his spiritual crises, and to the way in which they refracted themselves in his daily life. But even aside from these and other highlights, the whole book may be read with unflagging interest.

Let it be repeated that Mr. Wreden's rendering of the text in English is beyond praise.

A. I. NAZAROFF

New York City

ALMEDINGEN, E. M. *Dasha*. New York, Harcourt, Brace and Company, 1945. 278 pp. \$3.50.

If you like *Frossia* you should like *Dasha*, and vice versa. That is the situation for a non-Russian reader. The author has talent and skill and her book is entertaining. For a Russian reader, however, the approach to the novel is different.

The value of realism in literature may be contestable, but an author unfurling its banner makes himself (or herself) open to criticism from this particular angle. Miss Almedingen's novel aims at a realistic presentation of contemporary Russia, but it does not fulfill its promise in this respect. Though each page is sprinkled with Russian words, no local colour is being achieved. Women call each other *golubushka*, *dushenka*,

and eat *pastila*, *shashlyk* and *bubliki*; men, when in love, say *Moya Dasha*, and all of them drop casually: "I have read 'Oblomov' twice," or "I have read 'Dostoevsky' thrice,"—and yet a Russian reader, somehow, fails to be convinced. He also knows that *boy baba* must be written in two words and that the lady who goes through the novel under the name of *Barina* really should have been a *Barynia*. Still all this is on the surface. But would a Russian reader recognize the inner spirit of his country? Let us quote a few lines chosen at random. Page 14:

"We have just received an important paper about your return. Such a big envelope with a violet seal on it. . . . I heard that one can get French silk stockings in a shop from Arnautskaya in Odessa. Buy me some."

This is a letter from a Russian mother to her daughter, whom she had not seen for years. The daughter, an invalid, spent years in a sanatorium. The mother is a peasant-born woman who has worked "in various factories in Kursk, Rostov, and Kiev."

Or on page 22:

" . . . He got up [he was eating chilled cucumber soup, mutton *shashlyk* with rice, and strawberry jam tart], wiped his hand on a towel and slapped her face" [it was his wife's face].

Couleur locale! Our only consolation is that the slapped wife was the same woman who wanted French stockings from Odessa.

Thus we refuse to accept the novel on the basis of a realistic creation. Though they all eat *vobla* and *vatrushki*, we feel no kinship with the species.

NINA FEDOROVA

Eugene, Oregon

WHITFIELD, FRANCIS J. *A Russian Reference Grammar*. Cambridge, Mass., Harvard University Press, 1944. 222 pp. \$2.50.

Mr. Whitfield's grammar is a welcome addition to the small number of scholarly works in English devoted to the Russian language. The book consists of a concise treatment of Russian pronunciation, a detailed analysis of the inflected parts of speech, and the essentials of the syntax. In general, the classification is sound, the presentation is clear, and the facts are correct; some of the material has not been hitherto available in English. The grammar is intended "for use in conjunction with practical lesson-books of the language."

Mr. Whitfield's approach is essentially descriptive, and that is as it should be, but I think he sometimes loses sight of the fact that bald statements may be misleading or incomplete. This is particularly true of the appendix dealing with syntax. Titles of books are not necessarily used in the nominative case (e.g. *on chital "Annu Kareninu"*). Examples are given of the predicate nominative and the predicate instrumental, but the real difficulty is in defining the usage. Similarly, the student would probably want to know that the indefinite-negative pronouns are used with infinitives, etc. Occasionally, the author seems to take too much for granted: will the college student know what the "derived dissyllabics in *el'* and *yl'*" are?

Mr. Whitfield cites some good sources for his grammar, but he seems to have used them too exclusively. He mentions no works on phonetics, but his standards of pronunciation are like those of Trofimov and Jones, rather than those of

Boyanus. I, for one, would have preferred to see the transcription *kto* (rather than *hto*); the *y* of the adjectival *-yi* may be a weak *y* rather than a semi-vowel; the first *ya* of *sinyaya* could have been rendered as an *i* sound rather than as a semi-vowel, etc.

There are some inaccuracies and omissions. In the phonetics section, the short *i* is transcribed as both *j* and *i*. The choice of the adjective "unpopular" to characterize the use of the diaeresis over *e* is unfortunate, for lately some newspapers have begun to use it regularly. The difference between close and open vowels is not indicated, and this constitutes a serious omission. The first *t* of *smotrit* is hard. The statement that final consonants are pronounced without voice needs the usual qualification. *Stklo* (a variant of *steklo*) is not in "common usage." The pronunciation of *h'*, strictly speaking, does not involve any "contact."

Some of the points of grammar are equally questionable. It should have been made clear that the great majority of loan words have been fitted into the Russian system of inflections. Not all nouns in *-ei* are declined like *solovei* (cf. *lakei*, *charodei*, etc.). The list of nouns having a genitive in *u* (*yu*) omits *kon'yak*; the list of idiomatic expressions should include *ni shagu*. The prepositional form *prudu* is used with *v* as well as *na*. *Khristiánin* (p. 6) is also accented *khristianín* (p. 43): both are correct. *Koren'ya* is a plural of *koren'*, according to Vinogradov.

The classification of the Russian vocabulary according to the pattern of inflection is one of the most valuable features of Mr. Whitfield's grammar; but a check with other sources, including the occasionally

unreliable Pérot, shows omissions. I cite only some useful nouns: *prud* should be in Class II, as well as in III; *most*, II, not III; *tsena*, II, as well as IV; and add *Bog* and *nogot'* to IV. The adjective *dorogi* may be accented *dorogí*.

Nebo, like *chudo*, has a plural in *-esa*. *Kakoi* should be included among the interrogative pronouns in Section 72. *Takov* and the interrogative *kakov* have plurals. *Nechto* is indeclinable, since *nechego*, etc. is of a different origin; the case of *nekto* is virtually identical. The neuter pronoun *sié* also occurs as *siyo* and *syo*, e.g. *ni to*, *ni syo*. Mr. Whitfield does not give the feminine accusatives *samu* and *samoyu*, which Boyanus prefers to *samoyo*. I find myself in frequent disagreement with Mr. Whitfield as to what words should be considered "rare": *tonchaishii* is not rarer than *skol'-zche*; *zizhdit'sya* should have been described as rhetorical, *gorodovoi* as obsolete, etc. The section on the superlative adjectives should have included the prefixes *nai-* and *pre-*. In fractions the word *chast'* (not *drob'*) is understood.

Mr. Whitfield follows tradition in calling the uninflected participle a "gerund," a misleading term in English. The "gerund" ending in *-v* does not belong merely to literary style; in fact the alternative *-vshi* is nearly obsolete (Shakhmatov, *Och. sov. rus. lit. yaz.*, p. 201).

Because of the nature of the Russian language, the formation of Russian words is a subject of practical importance: a prefix may alter the meaning of the root, or indicate that the verb is in the perfective aspect; infixes change compound perfective verbs back to the imperfective (incidentally the effect of

the infixes is nowhere adequately evaluated in this book). A general treatment of the subject could well have been included. As it is, I note some vagueness as to what constitutes a stem. The past tense of *zagradiť* should not be described as accented on the ending (p. 127); it is accented on the last syllable of the stem of the past system. The divisions *ishchu-shchii* (p. 131) and *ta-yushchii* (p. 134) are not consistent.

Sidyá is usually accented *sídyá*. The compound past passive participles from the stem of *iti* may be accented on the first syllable, e.g., *próidennyi*. The section on the reflexive verbs does not take into account the possible shifts of accent; e.g.: *záperli*, but *zaperlís'*.

In the appendix on the syntax, there is no treatment of the use of the accusative as object of a negative verb, though the phenomenon is common enough; in fact, elsewhere Mr. Whitfield furnishes us some examples (*ya ne budu chitat' etu knigu*, p. 175). Strangely enough, this use of the accusative is often ignored in Russian grammars, though Shakhmatov gives it some attention (*Sintaksis*, pp. 325-331). The section on the use of the present imperfective should have included a treatment of the *khodit'-itti* type of verb. The negative perfective imperative is generally used to caution, rather than to prohibit a single definite act, e.g. *ne upadi*. The imperfective past "gerund" is virtually obsolete.

In all fairness to Mr. Whitfield, it should be noted that the objections raised affect only a small portion of his very useful book.

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